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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 I contend that a common form of human creativity operates in domains as diverse as 
art, science, and everyday life. Creativity is the capacity to introduce novel ways of making 
sense of experience, which entail new meaningful possibilities. Creativity enacts the 
becoming of new being. Three primary results characterize my study. First, creative novelty 
is discontinuous with antecedent orders that would seek to make sense of them. Thus, 
complete explanations for creative acts necessarily fail. Nonetheless creative novelties must 
be partially continuous with antecedent conditions in order to achieve meaning and value. 
These two aspects of creative novelty provide the basis for claiming that creativity puts one 
“out of order,” and this entails the characteristic, inextricable from creativity, that one 
creates something from nothing. Second, creative novelty is a modification of one’s own 
sense-making. This result is the key to grasping the generality of creativity in multiple 
domains and its importance in understanding the self. Scientific practice and everyday 
problem-solving often require creative work no less than artistic practice, and creativity 
affects one’s conscious ordering of experience which can account for much of who one is. 
Third, creativity does not necessarily imply a positive value. I argue against conceptions 
that either stipulate the positive value of creativity and its results or argue for the intrinsic 
value of new being. As a consequence, the evaluation of creativity stands to be much more 
complex, for both creators and the recipients of their creations, than is implied by 
contemporary definitions of creativity.  
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PREFACE 
 
 
 I contend that a common form of human creativity operates in domains as diverse as 
art, science, and everyday life. Creativity is the capacity to introduce novel ways of making 
sense of experience, which entail new meaningful possibilities. Creativity enacts the 
becoming of new being.  
 Three primary results characterize my study. First, creative novelty is discontinuous 
with antecedent orders that would seek to make sense of them. Thus, complete 
explanations for creative acts necessarily fail. Nonetheless creative novelties must be 
partially continuous with antecedent conditions in order to achieve meaning and value. 
These two aspects of creative novelty provide the basis for claiming that creativity puts one 
“out of order,” and this entails the characteristic, inextricable from creativity, that one 
creates something from nothing. Second, creative novelty is a modification of one’s own 
sense-making. This result is the key to grasping the generality of creativity in multiple 
domains and its importance in understanding the self. Scientific practice and everyday 
problem-solving often require creative work no less than artistic practice, and creativity 
affects one’s conscious ordering of experience which can account for much of who one is. 
Third, creativity does not imply a positive value. I argue against conceptions that either 
stipulate the positive value of creativity and its results or argue for the intrinsic value of 
new being. As a consequence, the evaluation of creativity stands to be much more complex, 
for both creators and the recipients of their creations, than is implied by contemporary 
definitions of creativity.  
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 These results are distributed within the text as a whole, with some sections first 
introducing the key claims, and others reinforcing or supplementing my arguments for 
them.  
 Chapter One introduces the key themes that occupy this study, provides some 
context from previous work on creativity, and argues for my phenomenological approach. 
Crucial to what we want from an understanding of creativity, I think, are answers to the 
questions why we create and what is created, which would be largely lost or misrepresented 
in other approaches to creativity.  
 Chapter Two focuses on meaning, and provides the most summary, but imprecise, 
version of my view of creativity. This chapter has a blatantly practical sensitivity, positioned 
as it is in investigating creativity in our everyday world of meaning. It argues for a view of 
creativity that responds to a revised version of Meno’s Paradox: that we cannot recognize 
creativity, because either we would have to know what was created beforehand, in which 
case there is nothing new in the creation, or we would have to create something before we 
could know it, in which case the knowledge could not be connected with what we already 
know. This chapter shows how created meaning can be simultaneously discontinuous with 
preceding, familiar practice in one way and yet continuous with it in another way. 
 Chapter Three focuses on creative novelty. I investigate novelty phenomenologically 
before turning to concerns with explaining creativity in more fine-grained scientific and 
philosophical systems. I argue for the view that, most generally, creative novelty is a new 
way of making sense, which necessarily expresses a discontinuity, a “disorder,” in its 
relation to antecedent conditions. The most general problem with systematic attempts to 
explain creativity is that they exclude or occlude creative novelty by either failing to 
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account for it directly, ignoring it, or reinterpreting it in a way that illegitimately makes it 
disappear. In short, they offer what I call explanation with compensation—a kind of empty 
explanation that falls short of genuine understanding. On another argumentative front, I 
emphasize the importance of meaningful continuity within creative activity. Creations must 
be continuous with antecedent conditions, even if they are not determined by them. Based 
on this investigation, I criticize an attempt to define creativity in terms of spontaneity and 
efforts to extend the concept of creativity to all experience.    
 Chapter Four argues for a minimal constitutive value of creativity, but seeks to add a 
great deal of complexity to the evaluation of creativity by examining the role of creativity in 
forming persons and selves. Through creative acts, I argue, one can develop one’s own way 
of thinking and doing, in addition to new cultural objects. And a value-creator can even 
introduce new values. This situation suggests the importance of further investigation into 
the relation between creators, their creations, and the world than I introduce here.  
 In a brief summation, I offer what I think are the most promising—and needed—
directions for further research.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION TO A PHENOMENOLOGY OF CREATIVITY 
 
 
‘Expressions such as “a world in pieces” or “a world turned upside down,” trite 
as they have become, nonetheless express a feeling that is authentic. The rift 
between the rational order and events, the mutual impenetrability of minds 
opaque as matter, the multiplication of logical systems each of which is 
absurd for the others, the impossibility of the I rejoining the you, and 
consequently the unfitness of understanding for what should be its essential 
function -- these are things we run up against in the twilight of a world, 
things which reawaken the ancient obsession with an end of the world.’1 
 
The idea of creativity animates our hopes for continuous cultural transformation 
and improvement, and it informs several prominent models our culture offers for how to 
live—the artist, the inventor, the intellectual, the entrepreneur, and the civic leader. One 
notable part of the importance of these models comes from the value of their products— 
art, invention, theory, private institutions, and social institutions—and another part comes 
from the sense that these lives of creative pursuit are those most worth living. There is 
currently no shortage of claims for the existence of human creativity to explain a wide 
range of phenomena, and claims to explain creativity itself. 2 The concept figures centrally 
in understanding artistic production and the generation of new ideas in scientific theory 
and everyday life. With some refinements, creativity serves in conceptions of the self, as an 
                                               
1 Levinas, 7 
2 For psychological views supporting creativity, see, e.g., Boden (2004), Csikszentmihalyi (1996) and 
Sternberg (2011). For representative views of those who resist the distinctiveness of creativity, see 
Weinberg (1986) and Minsky (1982). 
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ethical virtue,3  or in theories of language.4 Such associations initiate the philosophical 
wonder for one who takes creativity as an object of study.  
Creativity depends on the idea that change is possible, that the future need not mean 
the same thing as the past, that not all is vanity, that there may be something new under the 
sun. Creativity names this possibility. Yet creativity is sensible, possible, and desirable only 
on a specific background of conditions for its existence. Indeed, not all creative work need 
be considered desirable. The basic claim with which I begin this dissertation is this: we do 
not understand creativity well enough to cultivate its value or mitigate its disvalue. I will 
have to substantiate this claim. But, furthermore, my goal is to offer an understanding of 
creativity and a position on its value and disvalue.  
This philosophical wonder directed at creativity is both contemporary and classical. 
For example, Mark Johnson proposes that, 
The greatest mystery that remains [for a theory of meaning]…is how 
creative imagination works--that is, how new meanings and new 
connections emerge. … We are really only beginning to see how something 
new can emerge that transcends and transforms what has gone before.5 
  
Johnson contends that in some way creativity must be rooted in the meaning-making 
capacities of our embodiment. He implicitly returns to some of our oldest philosophy and 
attempts to overcome its inadequacies, descriptive and theoretical. Plato’s dialectical 
attempt to understand the meaning of a term by providing a theoretical definition 
terminates in a divine intuition of Forms. The semantic or “felt” meaning of a term is 
                                               
3 Nietzsche is representative here. See, especially, “Schopenhauer as Educator” (1997). More recently, see 
Kieran, “Creativity as a Virtue of Character” in The Philosophy of Creativity (forthcoming). 
4 This conception of creativity applies in particular to Noam Chomsky, whose discussion of creativity ranges 
across his published works. For an overview, see: D’Agostino (1984). 
5 Johnson 2007 
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ultimately supplied by a direct aesthetic apprehension of its essential nature, made possible 
by the tacit knowledge of an eternal soul. This view informs one of Plato’s theories of 
creativity, his hopeful one, which we find in Symposium: a creative act is really an act of love 
that gives birth—brings into being—a new object. At the highest point of the ladder of love 
stands a philosopher who gives birth to new theories and ideas. This act is a kind of 
madness (cf. Phaedrus), but it is a madness guided by a vision of Beauty. For Johnson, if we 
can understand how our natures situate us in a world of meaning that gives rise to new 
meanings then we may perhaps get this creativity without divinity. For both philosophers, 
creativity is immensely important, practically and theoretically.  
 But from a conservative standpoint, this importance only intensifies with Plato's 
theory of creativity, his pessimistic one, that creativity involves a dazzling species of 
ignorance that often bewitches youth, hijacks education, and undermines conditions for 
justice.6 Or we see the danger of creativity in Nietzsche's reminder that every creation is 
also destruction.7 Creativity should not be inspected through rose-colored glasses.  
 So why don’t we understand creativity? 
My answers to this question are threefold. First, the idea of creativity is mired in a 
mess of popular associations. Second, despite its prominence in popular consciousness, the 
sweep of its historical associations, and the attention psychological science pays to it, 
creativity is philosophically suspect. Creativity exists, I argue, itself as an ambiguous 
phenomenon, one that escapes predictive efforts or full theoretical explanation. 
Consequently, theoretical constructions of creativity purport an understanding of creativity 
                                               
6 Plato’s less hopeful theory emerges most notably in the Ion and the Republic. 
7 See, for example, Nietzsche’s claim in the Genealogy of Morals that every creation of an ideal is the 
destruction of another ideal (Nietzsche, 2007, page 65). 
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without attending to the philosophical problems underlying it. The final problem, rooted in 
the previous two, is that we cannot appreciate the value or disvalue of creativity without 
understanding it. Put more specifically, most conceptions assume that creativity is always 
positively valuable. But there is no basis for this claim.  
 With respect to the first answer, I will not engage many popular associations. Where 
I can avoid it, I do not try, for example, to identify the many ways in which the term is used 
in an effort to articulate a bunch of family resemblances. I just mention that the result of my 
efforts should move one from a hazy, emotional sense of creativity that seems prominent—
creativity is wonderful—to a conception that specifies creativity with greater precision. In 
this way, we are equipped to evaluate it more appropriately.  
 The rest of this dissertation is devoted to answers two and three. This introduction 
will lay out some of the overarching ideas related to investigating creativity and try to make 
sense of my basic approach, which seeks a phenomenological understanding of creativity.  
1.1 THE SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS OF UNDERSTANDING 
Creativity seems to begin precisely where familiar meaning and predictability end, 
when the artist introduces a new style, the scientist a new paradigm, or the entrepreneur a 
new resource from the world’s waste. These things surprise us with new meanings. This 
creative work starts at “an end of the world”—where the typical meaning offered by that 
world no longer does justice to our experience or the problems we aim to solve. Were this 
not the case, then the familiar practices, problem-solving, and discovery we normally 
depend on would always be sufficient, and creativity would not be necessary. 
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If we cannot count on a full rational understanding of creativity, then it would be a 
mistake to begin by assuming our results must be fully rational. Understanding is 
consistent with partial non-rational intelligibility, if that is what the phenomenon demands. 
Artworks provide an intuitive example here. But there are ways of approaching a 
phenomenon that fail to recognize this demand for non-rational understanding, and there 
are ways of approaching a phenomenon that could totally overemphasize it. To be clearer, 
one may look at creativity and see in it an entirely determinate phenomenon consistent 
with other rationally coordinated phenomena. Or one could see in it some radical break 
from the constraints of knowing and doing—perhaps even physical law—that make sense 
of all the rest of experience. The ultimate basis for this dichotomy in attempts to 
understand creativity is the tension between affirming a principle of sufficient reason—
everything must have some basis in or continuity with what exists around it—and the sense 
that creativity concerns something genuinely new, or a discontinuity with what comes 
before the creative act. Navigating this tension is no small feat. Here we are concerned with 
what understanding looks like.  
Suppose that understanding is roughly the compatibility of one’s experience, 
knowledge, and capacity to act with the demands of a situation. Understanding is reflected 
in one's capacity to cope effectively with things, people, and oneself. When coping 
effectively, we typically do not realize the demands of a situation to which we are already 
adequately responding. But problems of different kinds challenge one's understanding and 
put more explicit demands on us. So if I notice mold in my basement and need to know why 
it is there, I realize a demand for explanation. If I know that dim, moist areas like my 
basement provide excellent conditions for mold, then I may be satisfied. Or I may remain 
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dissatisfied, for instance, if I stumble upon the thought that there are dim, moist places 
where mold does not grow—i.e. I do not have the knowledge to meet fully the demand for 
explanation. Or I may remain satisfied with my explanation and realize a question and 
demand elsewhere. “Why is my basement so moist?”  Alternatively, however, perhaps I do 
not know much about mold and cannot concoct an explanation for its presence in my 
basement. Nonetheless, I might say that biologists (or mold experts) surely understand 
how mold propagates. In this way, I may be satisfied, but indirectly. The mold is not 
understandable to me, but I have confidence that the mold is understood by someone. In 
another version of this, a devout theist, when faced with some inexplicable event, may still 
claim, “though this event is beyond my understanding, it is nonetheless part of God’s plan.” 
In both of the latter cases, a general principle supervenes on one’s immediate demands in a 
situation and, so to speak, compensates for them. This is explanation with compensation. 
One symptom of a compensation is the inability to answer the child’s question, why, for 
oneself.    
But this inability to answer “why” is just a symptom. Imagine the person who 
realizes his color-blindedness late in life. He has lived a life so ordered as to conceal the 
possibility of a distinction taken for granted by others. Only a finely honed moment, in 
which the distinction is made to matter, opens up its surreal possibility, and opens up the 
necessity of finding a new way to cope. Surveying his past, this man will find that the world 
in which he was coordinated with others was never quite the same for them as it was for 
him, and that his identical forms of behavior always contained an implicit compensation for 
some feature others responded to directly. Or take the mold example again. If I find myself 
satisfied with the first explanation that mold grows in dim, moist place, and lack the 
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sensitivity to counterexamples, then only another set of circumstances would challenge my 
understanding—e.g. when I needed to grow some mold and found my basic understanding 
for its conditions deficient. Or take one of the problems with writing that Plato introduces 
in the Phaedrus, that writing enables the representation of understanding without 
understanding itself. In an everyday case, we know that a person may provide the missing 
term in “1 + 1 = __” without understanding arithmetic, because he has seen it written 
before. A genuine understanding would enable one to perform arithmetic in cases one has 
never seen before. In cases of compensation, one fortifies experience artificially, permitting 
one to cope for a time without genuine understanding. In such cases, a faux-understanding 
operates, one that works, but which comes with risks both practical and theoretical. I will 
develop several applications of this concept of compensation in the chapters to follow, but 
the core of it is this: compensations are empty explanations or incomplete understandings 
that one takes to be “full” or complete. In one’s effort to understand something, one takes a 
limited amount of the sense or evidence afforded by experience to account for the whole 
thing.  To overcome a compensation can be exhilarating, because it means encountering a 
phenomenon anew; but it can also be daunting, because it reveals the inadequacy of one's 
past ways of thinking and doing.     
On the other hand, within the concerns of everyday understanding, I know of no 
better conversation-enders than “Why is there something rather than nothing?” or, “Why 
does anything exist at all?” There are ways of calling into question any piece of presumed 
intelligibility. If I ask my friend what causes the mold in my basement and he responds that 
we really do not understand the nature of causation, then I am unlikely to be moved—I 
certainly will not be helped. More precisely, I will think he either intentionally feigns 
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ignorance or is legitimately blind to the intelligibility of the situation as offered and the 
legitimate concern one can have for it. In this case, the word “cause” has a context to help 
the term refer precisely to the system of things in which I am working with at least some 
traction; my friend takes the term out of its context and supplants it with something 
irrelevant. He uses a representation to introduce ignorance, rather than compensate for a 
lack of knowledge. Some questions and some attitudes—Cartesian doubt, for example—
raise philosophically important issues, on which one can even make some progress. But 
when pitted against an immediate concern in experience, they deprive us of the 
intelligibility offered within that experience. When taken seriously, babbled wisdom effects 
the bewitchment of intelligence (c.f. Wittgenstein), separating one from one’s legitimate 
concerns and the concrete evidence offered by engaged experience. Or this wisdom is 
dismissed, spreading rumors of the irrelevance of philosophical inquiry for life.   
These are the Scylla and Charybdis of understanding: compensation and 
deprivation. In an everyday sense, we can see Sophists cultivating these dangers in the 
courts to their advantage. If the object is conviction, rather than justice, one may need to 
fortify a case with compensations that work for the limited time they are necessary. If the 
object is to produce doubt, one can deprive the evidence of its internal coherence for the 
time it takes a jury to vote.  
Are creative acts or events understandable? The answer to this question depends 
mightily on the demands we set in the course of its investigation. It seems clear enough to 
me that, within everyday life, we are quite confused about how to answer this question. 
When someone introduces a new idea, indeed an idea that may never have been thought 
before, we easily wonder where it could have come from. This kind of wondering sets the 
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demand for some kind of reductive explanation. Why did it take Einstein to articulate 
relativity theory? Why Picasso to introduce cubism? Why Ford to innovate the assembly 
line? On the one hand, we point to copious antecedent conditions operating prior to this 
work—the early advances in scientific thought, artistic influences, market conditions—and 
often want to say the next advance was inevitable. On the other hand, the fact that we are 
looking for further understanding implies that something in the situation resists this 
reduction. The creations do not seem impossible—that would deny the de facto evidence of 
the idea or doing. Nor does creation seem improbable. That dismisses the ingenuity evident 
in the creation, as if any of us shaking ideas around long enough would eventually give birth 
to this new one. The creations seem impossible with respect to the way we were thinking 
and doing before the creation; then they often seem entirely sensible in their being, though 
still not in their arising from antecedent conditions. In everyday life, when we call 
something “creative,” and really mean something extraordinary by it, we tend to 
acknowledge this discontinuity—a break in a chain of being and becoming one could not 
have predicted. We can find the falling of dominoes intellectually engaging and important, 
but not creative.  
 This description of the everyday understanding of creativity holds when one reflects 
on one’s own experience as well. If, after thinking or doing something one takes to be 
creative, one seeks its origin, there is little progress to be made. Certainly, one may analyze 
the idea into its constitutive elements and point to environmental conditions or occasions 
for their synthesis. One may see that each of the necessary elements was ready and 
available for the synthesis. But even isolating that moment of synthesis—even, or 
especially, one as celebrated and prominent as a Eureka moment—does not quite answer to 
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the understanding demanded: what brought this synthesis into being? How did one have 
this idea, which seems impossible relative to all the ways one was thinking before, whether 
for minutes or for decades?  
Yet the characterization of the creative moment as a peculiar way of bringing 
something impossible into being is the one position that must be denied by someone who 
seeks to fully explain creativity. There is an immediate risk for one who adopts this 
explanatory pursuit, because he may limit his sensitivity to the demands made by the 
phenomenon of creativity and make his own demands instead. His demand for 
understanding is a demand that all things be fully determinate or rationally coordinated. 
Thus he risks a compensation in his understanding. Nonetheless, clearly this demand is 
quite sensible.  
Why would one demand that creativity be fully determinate? In everyday 
understanding, one may simply think that “everything has a reason” whether we can find it 
or not. But, more precisely, one may claim that there is no creatio ex nihilo—no creation 
from nothing—and believe that every event is continuous with antecedent and subsequent 
events which explain the character of the event. That is, a before and after bracket every 
event, and these brackets relate to a present event through causation. By causation, most 
will think of physical or psychological causation, which relates an event to antecedent 
conditions, but one may well have Aristotelian final causes in mind as well—an event may 
relate to an essential developmental necessity for teleological explanation. If we want to 
understand an event or phenomenon, we look to the network of causal factors of which it is 
a part. Such a view, I take it, is sensible, and following through on a causal reduction of a 
putative act of creation always contributes something to its characterization. Having 
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something to say by way of explanation denies a view of creativity in which new entities or 
new ideas simply pop into existence without precedent and magically exist with new 
meaning. Einstein, Picasso, and Ford had a great deal to work with, after all. They were not 
wizards, and they required great knowledge, skill, and sensitivity to create as they did.  
But the question is whether such a reduction yields explanation without 
compensation. I argue it does not. In creative acts, the grounds for understanding 
themselves shift—what counts as a fact changes or what counts as the meaning or use of an 
object changes. Thus, the intelligibility of a situation in retrospect can be clearly presented 
in a way that was impossible before the act. The links a new being makes to its past are 
typically newly made as well.  
Suppose (1) that there are situations in which our meaningful engagement in a 
situation proves under- or over-determined. What this means is that our customary skills, 
values, and knowledge are either so incomplete or so conflicted that we are unable to act—
to think something or do something more. Consider as examples one caught up in a moral 
dilemma, one who has reached the end of the expressive possibilities of tonal music, or one 
who has reached the end of the theoretical explanations provided by Newtonian physics. At 
that point only a very peculiar event can resolve the difficulty and enable further 
meaningful action—making a choice, breaking for atonality, or conceiving of a new physical 
theory. I will argue for calling this event “creativity.” Creativity builds a new meaningful 
continuity between how we thought and acted before and how we think and act now.  
Suppose further (2) that the investigation of creativity leads us into just such a 
situation, where paradoxes and entrapments of reason look inescapable. At just this point 
creativity would be called on to fortify our experience with a continuity it could not have on 
12 
  
its own. Creativity could conceal its own existence by affirming an understanding that 
denies creativity. This, I propose, is precisely what we do when we try to explain creative 
acts—we look for a bunch of putative causes and, at some ad hoc point, declare the act 
explained. In this way, one can create a compensatory theory that disguises creativity.  
Part of my work in this dissertation is to justify these two suppositions. In the 
investigation of creativity, the difficulty is to hold onto the phenomenon long enough to see 
just how much we can learn. I argue that creativity is necessary to enable action wherever 
determinate orders of thought, action, and meaning prove over- or under-determined—
where resources available to us, and our abilities to work with resources, prove inadequate 
to the task of managing our concerns. In such situations, we respond to disorder in our 
experience. Creativity is our way of introducing new order—new ways of making sense, 
which realize new possibilities. But undetermined as it is by any antecedent meaningful 
order, creativity can indicate something about ourselves, our own being out of order—our 
position with respect to orders of meaning as their creators. Creativity enables action when 
we come to the end of a meaningful world, and changes ourselves and our world when 
given concrete form.   
1.2 A PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPTION OF CREATIVITY 
 To begin, we need a substantive view of creativity around which to frame an 
understanding. By examining a psychological understanding of creativity, I identify two of 
the major themes for the philosophical investigation of creativity: why we create and what 
creative novelty is. 
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 I begin with Arthur Koestler's concept of bisociation from The Act of Creation 
(1964), still among the richest and most sustained treatments of creativity. As far as I can 
tell, contemporary explanatory theories of creativity make little advance on the major 
philosophical assumptions underlying such theories, even if they offer conceptual or 
empirical refinements. The basic idea of bisociation is that, in the creative act, one perceives 
an identity in two habitually incompatible associative contexts. Roughly, for example, one 
can see the bisociation of two associative contexts in a joke, quoted by Koestler from Freud: 
 Chamfort tells a story of a Marquis at the court of Louis XIV who, on entering 
his wife's boudoir and finding her in the arms of a Bishop, walked calmly to the 
window and went through the motions of blessing the people in the street. 
 'What are you doing?' cried the anguished wife. 
 'Monseigneur is performing my functions,' replied the Marquis, 'so I am 
performing his.'8 
 
The context of adultery and the context of job functions bisect to form a curiously fitting 
bisociation, which many will find funny. More contemporary psychological conceptions, 
using terms like “cognitive fluidity” or “conceptual blending,” deviate little from the 
substance of Koestler's general view. In effect, such psychological conceptions reproduce 
the old Humean view that new ideas or behaviors are recombinations of preexisting 
material. This recombination view remains standard, even as psychologists dispute how 
this recombination takes place, whether through ordinary, everyday processes like 
problem-solving or extraordinary, exotic processes like insight or Gestalt. My concern is not 
with the psychological disputes, except insofar as they commit to unsupportable 
fundamental assumptions.  
                                               
8 Koestler, 33 
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 But I accept much of the basic description and fertility of the recombination view. 
Beyond Koestler and recombination psychologists, we find affinities with Koestler's 
conception in some philosophical conceptions of metaphor. Lakoff and Johnson's Metaphors 
We Live By describes the “essence of metaphor” as “understanding or experiencing one kind 
of thing in terms of another.”9 While the aims of their study differ from Koestler's, what they 
describe as a metaphor is systematically a bisociation of associative contexts. The metaphor 
argument-is-war bisects habitual associations of argumentative methods and rigor with the 
stakes and strategy of war (“He attacked every weak point in my argument”). And when 
Lakoff and Johnson suggest an alternative metaphor, argument-is-dance, we are meant to 
see the fecund, perhaps creative difference such an alternative metaphor could make. When 
Nietzsche begins Beyond Good and Evil with, “Supposing that truth is a woman—and why 
not?” he too establishes a bisociative context for further exploration.10 Examples of possible 
creativity, then, may be as easy to spot as a new metaphor.   
 On Koestler's view, most human life is governed by ordered patterns of thought and 
behavior he calls matrices or associative contexts. A “code” of fixed rules governs a matrix, 
which is more or less flexible with respect to the environment in which it is deployed, and 
which brings coherence and intelligibility to the activity. For example, a game of chess 
requires a set of fixed rules to govern play, in terms of which a variety of possibilities 
emerges. How one approaches a game of chess is then a matter of strategy—whether to 
advance aggressively or build a strong defensive position, for instance. To break one of the 
rules violates the coherence of the game, yet it can also indicate a sudden release from what 
                                               
9 Lakoff, 5  
10 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 3 
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one takes for granted about the game. As Koestler puts it, “to the experienced chess player a 
rook moving bishopwise is decidedly 'funny'”.11 Even without breaking the explicit rules of 
the game, however, one can challenge further habitual rules—he calls these 'heuristics'. For 
example, a novice player is usually taught to control the center of the board from the outset 
by advancing center pawns. In practice, such a heuristic places constraints on a player in 
addition to the rules of the game. 
 This analysis extends beyond orders of behavior with explicit rules. Bodily skills like 
riding a bicycle, which exhibit know-how rather than propositional knowledge, similarly 
have an order. The improvisation of a pianist follows the typical constraints of the diatonic 
or chromatic scale—though a “mistake” to such a musician may be welcome to another 
atonal or twelve-tone composer. The constraints of the piano also order the musical 
possibilities of such a composer. Non-Western instrumentation and composition afford a 
much different set of musical possibilities. 
 In the creative act, two matrices are brought into contact. Depending on the context 
of emotional and intellectual states, this contact may be one of collision, fusion, or 
confrontation. Koestler identifies these three idealized types of bisociation with comedy, 
understanding, and aesthetics, respectively. However the same set of matrices can often 
generate any of the three types, which are neither mutually exclusive nor discrete; rather 
they present a continuum along which the wide range of creations we encounter occur. To 
illustrate, consider the bisocation of human and machine. In the first case, taken as fodder 
for comedy, we have the collision of our lofty aspirations—our hubris—and our earthly, 
mechanical limitations. “The variations on this theme are inexhaustible: the person slipping 
                                               
11 Koestler, 42 
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on a banana skin; the sergeant-major attacked by diarrhea; Hamlet getting the hiccoughs; 
soldiers marching like automata; the pedant behaving like a mechanical robot; ….”12 This 
bisociation also furnishes material for intensive intellectual stimulation. Human-as-
machine plays its role as early as Pythagoras, treating the body as a musical instrument, up 
to the present day—whether as mechanism, machine, or physical object, science has 
tracked an understanding of ourselves on the basis of an external object governed by 
physical law. Yet we may also perceive this link between human and machine aesthetically, 
in the tragic end of a promising life by a fluke illness, the melting of Icarus's wings, or 
Frankenstein's monster. Or, to take some examples from film and television, we get the 
automated, exploited workers in Metropolis, the networked Borg of Star Trek, the machines 
made human by memories in Bladerunner, or the machines made human by emotions in 
Artificial Intelligence. To take another example, Don Quixote may be read as a comic hero at 
one's leisure, or as a psychological study, or as a tragic fight against windmills. One may 
seek out additional examples with ease: human as animal (or animal as human) in 
biological science, Animal Farm, or Disney movies; Duchamp's urinal as a work of art; the 
physical world as atoms, waves, or strings. Each of these bisociations, on Koestler's view, 
has its origin in some human act of creation, bringing frames of reference into new contact. 
Based on this conception of creativity, Koestler seeks to account for apparent acts of 
creativity, from Kekule ’s work on the structure of the benzene molecule (he saw a snake 
eating its own tail) to Gutenberg’s discovery of the printing press, combining the grape 
press with existing printing methods.   
                                               
12 Ibid. 47 
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1.3 THEMES FOR INVESTIGATION 
From this point in the account, I am able to extract two major themes for 
philosophical investigation, one focused on explaining why we create and the other dealing 
with the novelty of creations.  
First, why does one create?  
Koestler has a complicated answer to this question involving the emotional 
satisfaction involved in doing creative work. For example, laughter and weeping, according 
to Koestler, have no biological function other than to discharge the stress involved in being 
the complex organisms we are, living within orders of behavior, but capable of recognizing 
the limitations and contradictions of this behavior. Emotional and intellectual satisfaction 
stems from encountering and overcoming these limitations.  
Yet this is a curiously blithe answer to the question. There are two immediate hints 
of this. First, satisfactions of the sort Koestler describes are generic biological functions, 
which one may purchase cheaply—indeed, Koestler goes to great (and interesting) pains to 
show how his view explains ticklishness. But the creator, focused intently on a specific 
subject matter, is not moved by the promise of a generic experience; such an experience is 
only a distraction from complexities of concepts or values in which she is involved. If she 
only wanted to laugh or cry, there are far easier ways to achieve this. Only within her 
singular work does she find something of the movement that keeps her working—though I 
have yet to adequately describe this movement. The pedant seeks a sublime thought; the 
sublime thinker thinks a thought and finds it sublime. Koestler himself seems to recognize 
some of this when he notices that the effect of a good joke is on the audience; the comic 
himself tends not to laugh during the serious work of crafting his jokes. Thus, second, these 
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biological functions are better understood as effects of creative work. They can be powerful 
for an audience, and quite important in communicating creative work, but they are 
ultimately external to the creative work, rather than constitutive of it.13        
But I seek to make a more general point about attempts at explaining creativity. The 
more pressing question is not why one creates, understood as asking for a proximate or 
functional explanation. Asking for a proximate explanation begins by assuming an objective 
analysis of human beings, which inevitably results in an ordering of objective necessities. 
Even if successful, this explanation more appropriately answers the question how creativity 
works, while assuming a translation from “meaningless” behaviors or events to meaningful 
intentions and actions. Starting with an objective analysis, and forgetting to investigate the 
meanings involved in creativity, there would be no way of recognizing any compensation 
such an explanation involves. The question why one creates must be rephrased to make its 
significance clearer. The question, rather, asks: what do we experience of being that it 
affords--or even requires—creativity? The question calls for a concrete understanding of 
our creative way of being. The scientific analysis of being creative offers a view that 
conceals its own origin in the kind of being that seeks explanatory intelligibility, but which 
is open to other kinds of understanding as well.  
Second, what is the novelty of creativity?  
                                               
13 It would be a mistake to take my claims here to imply that creativity is dispassionate, emotionless, or 
always “serious” in tone. On the one hand, it can indeed feel, in one sense, dispassionate—a sense that led 
Edgar Allan Poe to describe his work as completely “rational.” On the other hand, an improvisational jazz 
musician working a club plays in a medium replete with emotional sensitivity and tones of aesthetic value. 
His “getting into the music” need not be divorced from the requirements for generating creative content in 
that medium. The medium requires it.   
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Anyone who studies creativity must brush against the difficulty of understanding 
novelty, and it is exceedingly tempting to simply brush the question aside: 
The creative act is not an act of creation in the sense of the Old Testament. It does 
not create something out of nothing; it uncovers, selects, re-shuffles, combines, 
synthesizes already existing facts, ideas, faculties, skills. The more familiar the parts, 
the more striking the new whole. Man’s knowledge of the changes of the tides and 
the phases of the moon is as old as his observation that apples fall to earth in the 
ripeness of time. Yet the combination of these and other equally familiar data in 
Newton’s theory of gravity changed mankind’s outlook on the world.14  
 
I will put this starkly: creativity will not be denied a relation to discontinuity or 
nothingness. Either a creative act brings something new into being or it does not. If it does, 
then there is no sense in denying ex nihilo creation outright. Something that did not exist 
now exists. Something that was nothing is now something. And if the creative act does not 
bring something new into being, then there is only a deflated sense in speaking of 
something new resulting from creativity. One cannot reduce the novelty of a recombination 
to the familiarity of its constitutive elements, making it completely continuous with 
antecedent conditions. Were this all we could do, we would be in the position of one who 
sees only the typewriter in the personal computer, the latter more deficient because now 
you have to plug it in. Moreover, one cannot even smooth out this wrinkle by claiming that 
the novelty of creation is found in the new reality of what was previously only a possibility 
(or an unrealized necessity, put more strongly). A person who knows what his schedule 
looks like the next day will not find any novelty in executing that order on that day, nor will 
a person find novelty who sees that yesterday’s events determined what happened today. 
And if one is simply surprised by what yesterday determined for today, this surprise may 
just point to a lack of knowledge rather than to any creative development.    
                                               
14 Ibid. 120 
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I take these two themes as the charge for philosophical investigation.  
1.4 SEDIMENTED BELIEFS ABOUT CREATIVITY 
 I offer the following results of past work on creativity in order to introduce a 
background of conceptual resources commonly used for defining or describing creativity. 
These resources include two criteria used to define creativity, the analysis of creative 
activity into four related terms, and the broad philosophical positions that underwrite a 
conception of creativity. I briefly criticize aspects of this background along the way in 
preparation for my positive statement of how to proceed in investigating creativity.  
1.4.1 Two Criteria 
To be a creation, researchers often assume that an identity must satisfy the two 
criteria of novelty and value.15 Creativity, then, is the capacity to create something novel 
and valuable. Novelty seems essential to the definition of creativity in order to distinguish 
it from determinate or rule-governed processes like making, discovering, or reasoning, or 
to signal something distinctive about the creative product. Intuitively, for example, the 
activity of a painter who establishes a new style seems different from the painter who uses 
the pre-established style as a model, the painter who copies someone else’s painting in 
detail, or the printer who prints copies of a painting to sell. Where is the creative novelty? 
The standard definition of creativity also includes a criterion of value in order to exclude 
eccentric, trivial, or valueless novel identities. Depending on one’s analysis of novelty, many 
acts or objects—from personality quirks to broken glass—could end up being creative, 
                                               
15 See, for example, Hausman (1984), Boden (2004), Sternberg (2011), Csikszentmihalyi (1996).  “Identity” 
here stands for whatever, by hypothesis, might be created—things, objects, entities, ideas—with enough 
intelligibility to be recognized or identified. 
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were it not for this criterion. Both novelty and value receive much fuller attention in 
subsequent chapters, but their introduction here is necessary to advance my own 
approach.    
1.4.1.1 Novelty 
Novelty can be interpreted in numerous ways. An extremely inclusive 
interpretation, for instance, attributes novelty to every possible identity, because every 
identity is unique in some way. An identity is novel if and only if it is unique. Every paper 
cup churned out by a factory is novel, because it is singular, or self-identical. Minimally, 
every identity possesses its own extrinsic properties of space and time; every grain of sand 
is unique in its location and temporal appearance. Such a promiscuous interpretation does 
not do justice to creativity, because it trivializes the notion of novelty: nothing can fail to be 
novel.16  
A slightly narrower interpretation recognizes novelty only in the first instance of a 
type. Call this first instance a prototype, and all subsequent instances copies. The type, in 
this case, is a model for concrete particulars, each possessing identical intrinsic properties. 
The particulars are then organized by the extrinsic property of temporal succession, and 
the first instance in the series is the prototype. Then an identity is novel if and only if it is a 
prototype. So the first paper cup is a prototype, while later paper cups are copies.17 This 
                                               
16 Despite my dismissal here, it will be important to sharpen my criticism of this view in Chapter Three in 
response to those who might defend it. One might defend this view precisely if one thinks everything is 
creatively novel in a special way (e.g. Bergson) or nothing is creatively novel in a special way (e.g. 
reductionism).   
17 This view, as far as I offer it, invites further clarification in accord with a theory of types. Supposing a type is 
itself a model specifying intrinsic properties, do we allow that the first instance of the type may be 
deficient or faulty as an instance of the type (a cup may have a hole in it)?  A prototype, we might think, 
must fall within an acceptable range of possessing all and only the intrinsic properties of the type, though 
this may only be a practical issue for making satisfactory copies. Did Edison produce a prototype for light 
bulbs only with the first working bulb, or do the early faulty bulbs suffice? 
22 
  
view has the apparent benefits of restricting novelty to a non-trivial class and using the 
structure of time (temporal progression) as a defining characteristic—rather than using 
temporal properties simpliciter as just one more extrinsic relation. On the inclusive view of 
novelty, it does not matter when something comes into being, but only that it has temporal 
properties. The special emphasis on time in the prototype view, however, seems relevant 
for both an intuitive understanding of novelty and for specifying what it might mean 
to bring something into being. But this view has some objections. First, there is at least the 
logical possibility that two prototypes are brought into being independently and at the 
same time.18 And second, if the extrinsic property of temporal succession is relevant to 
defining novel identity, then this view seems unable to handle cases of independent, 
unrelated creation.  Suppose two agents bring an identity into being independently, and 
that this identity possesses its own unique intrinsic properties. For instance, two agents 
design and make a new kind of cup, but at the same time. I do not see the prototype view 
capable of analyzing this case into just one prototype, which matters to the extent that 
temporal priority is supposed to settle what is uniquely novel. And if the new cups are 
designed decades apart, the prototype view implies that we should regard the earlier cup 
as a creative novelty, but not the later cup, which seems to miss the creativity of the later 
designer who, by hypothesis, did not know anything about the earlier work.  
A more restrictive conception of novelty attempts to define a special class of 
novelties appropriate for defining creativity. Restrictions come in at least two kinds. First, 
                                               
18 Of course there is a host of difficulties related to a theory of time and a conception of simultaneity (e.g. 
issues of infinite divisibility of time, of relativity, and the like). Practically speaking, we just talk of 
simultaneous events relative to a unit, and we select the unit based on our interests: Allosaurus and 
Tyrannosaurus lived at the same time (the Age of Dinosaurs—these dinosaurs actually lived millions of 
years apart). I can speak and gesture at the same time, but this is because actions are temporally-
structured identities with overlapping extensions. 
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one might restrict creative novelty to a particular type of identity, so that, for example, 
actions are created but objects or artifacts are only created indirectly. In Chapter 3, I argue 
for a view of this kind, according to which creative novelty is a new way of making sense, 
often embedded concretely in new objects (paintings, theories, and so on). Second, one can 
restrict creative novelty to particular categories of identities, for instance forms of objects 
or styles of production rather than particular instances of forms or styles—a new literary 
genre, rather than a particular work in that genre. Typically, these candidate restrictions 
must be explained with a great deal of care. For instance, does manufacturing a newly 
designed paper cup count as creative novelty? Does the new design itself count as the 
novelty? Would making cups of a familiar design out of a new material count as creatively 
novel? Is one creative in writing a new horror novel, or must one pioneer a new literary 
genre, or even a new expressive medium? The difficulty for those who venture this kind of 
analysis is to provide a principled break between different identities that clearly, at least in 
principle, separates creative from non-creative novelty. 
Add to this difficulty the problem of perspective. An identity may be personally or 
subjectively new, but historically or culturally old, even hackneyed. If one comes up with 
the idea that, “I think, therefore I am,” then one may well have been personally creative, on 
some views. Nonetheless, from a historical perspective, the idea is merely a copy of 
Descartes' claim in his Meditations. The question, then, is whether there are good reasons 
to privilege some perspectives over others in a definition of creative novelty. 
Margaret Boden offers one contemporary account of novelty that attempts to deal 
with these issues.19 On her view, creative novelty consists of a modification of constraints 
                                               
19 Boden, 2004 
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on a conceptual system. A conceptual system is a rule-governed organization of thought 
and behavior, and to be creative, one must remove, add, or transform the rules of a 
conceptual system. On these grounds, Boden distinguishes between exploration in terms of 
a conceptual system and creativity, which modifies a conceptual system. For example, in 
composing his forty-eight preludes and figures, Bach explores the musical system 
constrained by the rule that all music must have a home key. Schoenberg, by contrast, 
exhibits creativity by dropping the constraint of a home key and producing atonal music. 
Schoenberg counts as creative, while Bach does not, in this idealized example. Similarly, 
Kekulé counts as creative by dropping the constraint that all carbon chains must be 
linear. On Boden's account creative novelty is restricted to a particular type (conceptual 
schemes) and a particular category (forms of conceptual schemes). Alternatively, Hans Joas 
argues that creativity is properly analyzed as an aspect of all and only human action, with 
rationally- or normatively-led action serving to modify creative action.20    
One may object to Boden's account on numerous grounds. For instance, the account 
may appear too exclusive if it rejects the creativity of the majority of artistic or scientific 
work. Or it may appear too inclusive if, say, one need only add the rule of adding potatoes 
when cooking chili to count as creative. But these objections may miss the mark when one 
argues, first, that the conceptual distinction between creativity and exploration does not 
demean exploration or strip it of its importance, and, second, that the historical perspective 
should not be used as a criterion for assessing personal creativity. Not all creativity has to 
be world-changing. But an additional objection asks whether the distinction between 
exploration and creativity is sustainable when the modification of a conceptual system is 
                                               
20 Joas, 1996 
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made on the basis of regular higher-order rules or heuristics. For example, if one follows 
the rule to “add an ingredient” to make new entrees, this looks like an instance of 
exploration again. “Modify a constraint” may be a general rule for exploring conceptual 
systems themselves. And, in any case, which constraint? And in what way?  
Among this analytical work, several key ideas rise to prominence. I call these 
symptoms of creative novelty. The first symptom appears when no method, procedure, 
scheme, or set of antecedent conditions can be understood to be sufficient for determining 
how or what one makes (or creates). Kant voiced this view in his Critique of Judgment, with 
the idea that a genius produces something for which there is no definite rule or procedure 
prior to production.21 Second, some identity is a creative novelty if it cannot be or could not 
have been predicted within an explanatory theory or account. Third, the identity must 
exhibit a difference in kind from standard examples in its domain, a difference that 
challenges assumptions about what counts as good or bad in the domain, what counts as an 
instance within the domain, or even what the domain ranges over. So, for example, 
Duchamp’s “Fountain” challenges the domain of art in all three ways. Fourth, the creative 
product, despite its novelty, serves as a model or exemplar for further production—for 
copies. Finally, specifically creative novelty appears to be appropriate or apt; it seems to 
resolve issues or offer insights entirely germane to a situation. Call this set of symptoms the 
standard view.22 
In my own treatment of creativity, I range from strong agreement (symptom 1), to 
qualified endorsement (symptoms 2, 4, and 5), to qualified rejection (symptom 3) of the 
                                               
21 Kant, 2000. See also Koestler, 209 and Hausman, 40.  
22 D’Agostino (1984) nicely summarizes many of these ideas about creativity.   
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symptoms represented in the standard view. But I should note an immediate 
dissatisfaction with a way of arriving at these views, whether they agree with mine or not. 
One path to these symptoms is a method of analysis, which tries to cut our body of terms at 
joints according to consistent and helpful usage, decompose them into simpler parts, 
disambiguate them by identifying conflated meanings, or translate them into a language 
with more perspicuous logical form. This analysis finds distinctions in the way we use the 
concept of novelty and, together with the method of counterexamples, attempt to piece 
together a definition with a precise and consistent extension. In this way, analysis equips us 
with more precise tools for thought. However, one faces one practical and two principled 
problems in favoring this analytical method. First, the practical problem: one risks 
selection bias more than is necessary. If one already thinks creativity has mostly to do with 
art, or acts, or objects, or geniuses, or genre-production, or problem-solving—if one starts 
with a preconception like this, then it is possible one sharpens tools in too small a domain 
or in the wrong domain entirely, because one sets to work in a single, rich domain and, 
after all, finds oneself very busy. The first principled problem: on its own, analysis can at 
best only clarify what we already think. The curious thing about analysis is that it cannot 
reveal anything new, unless supplemented by additional skills of noticing and articulating 
some element of the analysans with a direct reference. To take a silly analogy, I might 
“analyze” a chair into the constitutive elements of the seat, legs, arms, and back. Each of 
these elements will already have a sense because I am already familiar with them. Then I 
might ask whether the arms are really necessary for the object’s being a chair, or I might 
divide chairs into types (armchairs and non-armchairs) for the sake of clarity. But I would 
not, for all of this analysis, have left the ambit of my familiarity. I would not have learned 
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anything. Consequently, we have a second principled problem: if I offer a single definition 
of a chair at this point, it cannot fail to be stipulated and motivated. I must use some 
obscure selection criterion to determine what counts as a chair in the “right” way. 
Something quite different happens if one accustomed to only non-armchairs encounters an 
armchair and seeks to make sense of it or if one analyzes an object and discovers an 
unaccountable remainder, like gaps in Mendeleev’s periodic table, or if one finds in the 
analysans additional features requiring careful descriptive work—for these are each a 
matter of unfamiliarity that calls for additional investigation. Different too is the case of 
analyzing a concept like freedom into positive and negative freedom, which is a matter 
more of drawing a distinction than decomposition. These cases show analysis to be a tool for 
thought and description, but not a replacement for it.23      
I cannot convince myself that any one method escapes all criticism, or even that the 
methods we have so far invented can perfectly complement each other. All investigations, 
for example, must start somewhere. Analysis is an important tool in investigation, and I 
often use the word to describe what I do.24 But if all we do, in the case of creative novelty, is 
delineate all the different senses of novelty with which we are already familiar and 
stipulate that one counts as creative novelty, then we will not have gone very far in our 
investigation. I, too, will have to ask that we call something specific creativity. But this 
comes later in the investigation and not from an overly obscure criterion for selection. I 
                                               
23 I am not targeting all the figures mentioned above with this criticism, but rather larger or smaller parts of 
each one. The key is to realize that not all the philosophical work has been done once one offers an 
analysis. 
24 I have not intended to deny the relevance of analysis in even the sense I have attacked. But I especially do 
not want to deny its importance in other senses, like in geometric analysis or in the Classical sense of 
simply “loosening up” a phenomenon, or even an everyday sense of tearing something apart to see how it 
works. In each of these cases, it remains important to notice that synthesis, some kind of insight, or 
additional tinkering is necessary to give the “analysis” its point.   
28 
  
seek to highlight a specific phenomenon, and whether one wishes to join me in calling it 
“creativity” is beside the point, for one would still have to call it something. 
Another way of going wrong in investigating creativity, from my point of view, 
involves studying lots of different kinds of things called “creative” and, lacking a general 
formulation that would encompass them all, simply allows “creativity” to mean many 
things. Irving Singer is representative of this tactic: 
…I make no attempt…to give a definition of the word creativity, or of the 
concepts that flock around it. The portmanteau language that we all use in 
this area does the work of communication in too many scattered ways for us 
to think that any single, rigorous, totalistic statement of necessary and 
sufficient conditions can account for every instance alike. … What we need to 
clarify is how they may overlap and metaphorically suggest a resemblance to 
the creativity in one another. … Trying for anything else is unneeded … and 
could easily misrepresent the individual and inherently distinct phenomena 
that are involved.25 
 
I sympathize with the problems Singer notes. I agree that “creativity” and its analogs have 
achieved a degree of use that makes a coherent synthesis of conditions for their application 
unlikely. Unlike Singer, however, I have no temptation to credit every claim to creativity 
every time the claim is made. I agree with Singer that the effort to offer a set of necessary 
and sufficient conditions for creativity—a definition, on one view—would be difficult. But I 
argue that there is, in fact, a specific phenomenon at work in many “domains” of creativity, 
even if not in all the cases one wishes to call creative in every domain. The special difficulty 
involved in defining creativity relates to the phenomenon itself, and not the general 
problems involved in defining any complex term in a family of resemblances. I define 
creativity to be the capacity to introduce new ways of making sense. Clearly I will mean a 
lot by this formulation, and I will not be able to give necessary and sufficient conditions for 
                                               
25 Singer, Locations 308-312 
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identifying creative acts except in extremely controlled cases, but this formulation at least 
promises a way to integrate a great deal of creativity in diverse domains.  
1.4.1.2 Value 
The investigation of creative value reproduces some of the problems of creative 
novelty, and adds others. Some of these problems result from the stipulative character of 
the criterion of value. The complexity of values and their analysis, for instance, ensures that 
the stipulation makes little contribution to understanding many concrete cases, because 
value often seems relative to a perspective. By hypothesis, many creations possess only 
“subjective” value—say, one’s private, idiosyncratic thoughts recorded in a journal. Or a 
creation may possess social value, but lack subjective value. It seems that creations may 
possess intrinsic value, but lack utility, or vice versa, in the cases of artworks or new 
technology. In addition, some putative creations – for instance, propaganda techniques or 
the institution of slavery – have a dubious value. Finally, some thinkers have conceived of 
values themselves as created entities (cf. Nietzsche), as the identities created rather than a 
property of those identities. Unless a more specific theory of creative value is offered, its 
inclusion in the definition of creativity is liable to confuse rather than clarify matters. The 
challenge for an account of creative value is to specify precisely what the criterion of value 
amounts to. 
Some take up this challenge. Carl Hausman, for example, argues that being as such 
has intrinsic positive value, and that therefore anything brought into being creatively 
possesses at least this value. This view implies that there can be no intrinsically negative 
(or evil) creations.26    
                                               
26 Hausman, 44 ff. 
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I admire Hausman’s recognition of the problem—that one cannot simply stipulate 
the value of creativity. Nonetheless, I will not find his treatment sustainable. In my own 
treatment, I will find a bare minimum of constitutive value (chapter 4) for creativity, a 
value that is not clearly positive value. The important task is to introduce much more 
complexity into an account of the value of creativity, rather than simplify it through a 
stipulation or brief argument. I will argue that much of this complexity rests in the 
contribution creativity makes to the self and in the heightened form of creativity we find in 
value-creation.      
1.4.2 Four Areas of Research: Agent, Process, Product, and Place 
In addition to the investigation of novelty and value, a survey of creativity research 
indicates four typical areas of focus: the creative agent, the creative process, the creative 
product, and the creative place. For example, Freud investigates the creative agent as one 
whose psychological complexes express themselves in a work.27 Alternatively, many 
investigators have attempted to catalog particular traits of artistic or scientific geniuses to 
explain creativity.28 Second, Graham Wallas offers one of the first models of the creative 
process in 1926, proposing that creativity occurs in a series of five stages.29 More recently, 
Finke, Ward, and Smith have developed a model of the creative process emphasizing 
imaginative generation and exploration – the “Geneplore” model.30 Such models of the 
creative process abound in contemporary psychology. Third, a focus on products, put 
generically, looks at the results of creativity. In psychology, this can mean running an 
                                               
27 See Freud, 1995. For a criticism of Freud’s, see Singer, Location 814 ff.   
28 Francis Galton (circa 1869) offered an early version of this approach 
29 See Wallas, “Stages in the Creative Process” in Rothenberg, 1976. Wallas describes five stages in his model, 
often truncated to four: preparation, incubation, intimation, illumination, and verification. 
30 Finke, 1992 
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experiment to see how many different associations one can generate given a prompt. In art, 
this can be studying an artwork for its creative merits. Clearly, this emphasis can go in 
many directions. Heidegger, for example, emphasizes the creative product (the artwork) 
almost exclusively, but in its manner of presentation as a created entity.31 Fourth, one may 
focus on contextual elements of place, taken to range over physical location, social 
conditions, access to resources, and so on. Among philosophers, Nietzsche has perhaps 
given the most attention to place, first in specific exhortations to shape one’s local setting to 
support one’s work, and, in a more attenuated sense, through investigating culture with an 
eye for conditions supporting excellence (creative excellence included).32 Finally, 
philosophical figures like Plato and Kant seem to discuss multiple aspects of creativity, 
focusing alternately on the agent, the process, and the product. Admittedly, one must do 
some interpretive work to understand them in quite these terms.  
I mention these distinctions for the sake of comprehensiveness in registering some 
of the ways investigators have attended to creativity. In my own treatment of creativity, I 
give the concepts of the self and the created novelty greatest prominence, with minor 
emphases on process and place. The upfront delineation of research into these areas is 
liable to fall prey to the methodological problems mentioned above plus others. Note, for 
instance, that improvisational production in jazz or dance may require investigation in all 
four divisions, and perhaps the traditional divisions themselves need to be rethought in 
such cases. Or consider models of creative process stemming from descriptive psychology. 
That these models are possible should not be surprising, since, in their construction, one 
                                               
31 Heidegger, 2001, “The Origin of the Work of Art” 
32 Nietzsche, 1997. The themes of creation and culture appear throughout Nietzsche’s work.  
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begins with a set of cases one already assumes are creative and abstracts details from them 
until they appear to have similar stages or elements. Once constructed, any cases that 
disagree with the model are either reinterpreted to establish an agreement, offered as an 
exception to the rule, or dismissed as uncreative. Or they might be admitted as genuine 
counterexamples—like musical improvisation to the Five Stage model. But I do not know 
what the point is of offering this counterexample if it leads only to further revisions of the 
model. Both the model-construction and the admission of the counterexample are based in 
a prior sensitivity to what counts as a case of creativity, which continues to go unexamined.  
I do not know that this problem can be entirely avoided, but it at least helps to be 
sensitive to it. I will offer details for specific phenomena, and my basic defense to 
phenomenological criticism must be either that I have ineptly described the phenomenon 
(which is a sorry defense) or that, whatever it is an objector is pointing to, it is not what I 
am pointing to. Once we overcome these issues, however, an objector succeeds if her 
phenomenon subsumes mine and offers greater insight into creativity. In this way, we 
argue about the basic sense of creativity and not the examples different senses illuminate, 
mediated prematurely by a theoretical model. The main point is to avoid narrowing one’s 
focus into one aspect of the phenomenon to quickly, and to the extent that I do this too, I 
expect my account to remain open to revision.        
1.4.3 Basic Philosophical Positions 
One's broad philosophical orientation often implies a particular account of 
creativity. The most basic methodological division in studying creativity is between 
descriptive and explanatory approaches. A descriptive approach attempts to identify 
specific characteristics of creative agents, processes, products, or places, without 
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necessarily interpreting the characteristics in terms of a unified theory. Descriptive 
approaches focus on observation rather than interpretation, to the extent that this is 
possible. Explanatory approaches attempt to conceptualize creativity within a theory and 
in relation to other elements of philosophical or scientific systems. Such approaches are 
most distinct from descriptive approaches if they include prediction as a necessary feature 
of a successful explanatory theory.33 
Explanatory approaches include naturalism, rationalism, and supernaturalism. Here, 
naturalism is the view that reality, including all identities and events, is entirely law-
governed and can be known through empirical investigation of the physical universe; 
minimally it rejects any claims to a priori knowledge. On this view, creativity too must be 
well-ordered and intelligible in terms of natural law. Rationalism proposes that a set of 
rational principles explains reality, some of which may only be known a priori (by reason 
alone, without reference to any empirical data). Finally, supernaturalism posits a principle 
of origination not governed by natural law. Any of these approaches attempt to explain 
reality in either of two ways: either deterministically or teleologically. On a deterministic 
view, the state of the universe temporally prior to the occurrence of some event is 
necessary and sufficient for the occurrence of that event. On the teleological view, a 
reference to future events, purposes, or rational necessities may be included in an 
explanation of an event. Both explanatory approaches suggest a system of necessities in 
terms of which creations must themselves be necessary, though the conception of necessity 
can vary considerably, say, between some determinist and teleological accounts. Without 
                                               
33 Hausman (1984) 
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this creative necessity, creations are anomalies that weigh against the adequacy of the 
explanatory theory.       
By contrast, one may insist that creativity cannot be fully explained, because 
creativity is essentially unprecedented, undetermined, or without necessity. On such a 
view, some aspects of creativity must remain inexplicable. At best, we can hope for a 
descriptive account, and perhaps creativity is not a proper object of inquiry at all.  
One point should be made about these positions from the outset. If we start with any 
of them, we are likely discover a version of creativity that confirms our presuppositions. 
This is because we allow the positions to imply what creativity must be, and our 
understanding, as we already know, is susceptible to compensations and deprivations 
where they are artfully administered. I take a different approach to creativity, a 
phenomenological approach, with the aim of seeing what creativity can reveal for 
philosophical reflection, rather than what extant philosophy tells us creativity must be. 
Though I acknowledge that I, too, must make some presuppositions, I do not think they are 
the presuppositions that settle the extent to which creativity is explicable.  I finish this 
chapter, then, by explaining what I mean by this approach. 
1.5 THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION OF CREATIVITY 
 The point so far has not been to develop a complete record of investigations into 
creativity, but rather to orient the discussion for effective transmission of my central view 
that creativity is an essentially phenomenological concept—a concept that finds in its 
adequate expression a necessary reference to direct experience.   
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 Phenomenology, as I shall use the term, comprises two recognizably different 
strands—a primary and a secondary strand. The primary strand considers the respect in 
which all claims or assertions bear a relation to a perspective, and implies a fundamental 
philosophical position. The secondary position offers a more precise take on how one may 
concretely do work in phenomenology.  
 The primary strand finds its classical expression in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, 
which records his view of the ordered transformations of consciousness as it manifests a 
variety of robust perspectives. Each stage of consciousness in Hegel’s work is given a 
philosophical articulation. Consciousness is interminably unsettled by its inability to satisfy 
its self-engendered criteria for verifying its claims in experience. For example, the claim of 
consciousness to be entirely determined by an external world of objects finds 
disconfirmation as the world varies with the contents of its concepts; the claim of 
consciousness to possess the power of constructing its own world of objects finds 
resistance in objects themselves when it tests this claim by trying to spontaneously varying 
their properties. Crucially, for Hegel, concepts like consciousness, subject, object, and 
experience possess shifting concrete referents, ending their restless quest for stability only 
in “Absolute Knowledge”—that stage of consciousness in which the subject sees itself in its 
object, and objects appropriately reflect the subject that beholds them. Perspectives are 
constantly self-relating, self-interrogating, and, until the final stage, self-defeating.  
 What I wish to extract from Hegel’s conception of phenomenology is its sheer 
extension. There is no getting out of phenomenology in Hegel’s sense, because any possible 
claim that can be made takes form as an aspect of a perspective of consciousness. Perhaps 
this point is clearest when one makes a general claim like, (1) “experience is in no way 
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constitutive of being” or (2) “there is truth independent of perspective.” Properly 
understood, there may be no problem with these claims. But the phenomenologist may 
always point out that these claims only take form as an aspect of a perspective, and that 
phenomenological concepts of experience and perspective are of an entirely different order 
than those operating in the claims. A necessary condition for a claim is a claimant who 
seeks to understand her world in issuing the claim. Uttering (1) is one way of dealing with 
the demands for intelligibility one finds in a situation. Claim (2) must be offered from 
within a perspective in experience capable of understanding the claim, and it is this 
perspective that phenomenology investigates.     
 The second strand must be more specific about how to proceed. I claim that we do 
not get a substantive concept of experience and its structure except by means of 
description. Description, as a way of defining a concept, is orientational and ostensive. We 
are engaged in pointing to finer and finer discriminations of experience and what “shows 
up” in it. Thus, descriptive language in the first instance is intended to orient interlocutors 
(e.g. writer and reader) in a shared frame of signification. Orienting descriptions situate 
and prepare an audience for the reception of some phenomenon, and can therefore be 
either “literal” or “metaphorical” so long as their primary purpose is served.  The purpose is 
to elicit a frame of mind in the audience, which should be fulfilled by some concrete 
experience. Understood this way, orienting language can just as well include poetry as 
traditional argumentation, analogical reasoning, and contrastive examples, but now 
subsumed under a common purpose.34 It is a matter of putting you in a place to see what I 
                                               
34 I interpret Heidegger (cf. Being and Time) as doing precisely this in of his use of some traditional 
arguments, which should be understood as subservient to his overall project of delineating phenomena. To 
be responsive to reasons and arguments is to be affected by them in a way that alters our receptivity. This 
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see. A second ostensive act serves to name the phenomenon that shows up, assuming one is 
verified by the audience, as in for example the phenomena of shape, color, time, or melody. 
Description takes place in a communicative practice in which participants, gradually and 
collectively, scope out the full experienced structure of some domain. Phenomenology, I 
submit, is founded upon the most general kind of this descriptive practice, concerned with 
what experience and meaning is for us in our way of being. 
 Though the most general, phenomenology is not our most familiar descriptive 
practice. It can be further understood on analogy with the concept of “taste” and practices 
that revolve around developing particular kinds of taste. In wine-tasting, for example, 
practitioners together sample wine and develop a descriptive language to scope out its full, 
salient features. Primarily, this is a matter of descriptive investigation, rather than the 
expression of preferences—i.e. it is a matter of disclosing properties (almond bitter, 
blueberry sweet) and their relations, rather than expressing one’s “subjective” preference.35 
The descriptions aim at being comprehensive in their domain (wine), but subject to 
revision when contested by experts or by the introduction of new samples (new wines). 
The practice achieves a degree of coherence to the extent that practitioners achieve a 
shared descriptive language and develop these standards of revision. Every practitioner is 
engaged in enhancing the adequacy and integrity of the descriptions through a suitable 
amount of practice and exposure to enough samples, in the course of which they enrich 
their understanding of wine and the possibility for wine “appreciation.”  
                                               
is not to say that all arguments serve in this way, even for phenomenologists. But, for Heidegger, in his 
analyses, “the issue is one of seeing a primordial structure of Dasein’s Being—a structure in accordance 
with whose phenomenal content the concepts of Being must be Articulated” (81).      
35 Thus, descriptive practice is only one condition for a full account of taste, cf. Hume. 
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 We might say the phenomenologist pursues a taste for experience. Every concept in 
his descriptive canon refers to a possible concrete experience that verifies it and provides 
its sense. The concept is a gateway to the phenomenon, and a phenomenological account 
seeks the concepts to elucidate experience in general. Without the particular 
philosophically significant results and additional argumentation added by the primary 
strand of phenomenology, however, phenomenology may remain no more (and no less) 
than merely taste.36 But even without these philosophical additions we can note what this 
practice yields. First, even if merely a matter of taste, phenomenology need not be an 
individualistic enterprise in which anything goes. Practitioners must engage with each 
other collaboratively and critically; results are always fallible and subject to revision. 
Phenomenology shares this feature with other taste-practices as well as with science, in its 
own way. Second, given its subject matter, phenomenology retains a “humanistic” import 
even if it loses its philosophical significance. Even if philosophy and science discredit the 
concept of experience, experience cannot discredit itself. This humanistic import lends a 
characteristic literary quality to some classic phenomenological texts,37 which is not 
irrelevant to their goal of enriching our appreciation for the richness of experience.  
 But phenomenology is not a mere taste-practice. There is a danger of importing too 
much from the analogy to taste, including a purported purely introspective basis—a matter 
of reporting subjective takes on “what something is like” in which potentially anything 
                                               
36 In the philosophy of mind, Daniel Dennett seems to hold a merely-taste view. In ethics, Alasdair MacIntyre 
discounts phenomenology (and conceptual analysis) on grounds that their results are historically 
contingent, and thus, as I will put it here, a matter of the taste of the times.  
37 Sartre is the most perspicuous example here, who sought to embed phenomenology in literary works. 
39 
  
goes.38 Phenomenological description and analysis is a version of existential philosophy, 
rather than empirical psychology, insofar as it concerns the general structures and 
conditions for experience and meaning, and the ways in which things exist for us. Moreover, 
it is not an existential subjective philosophy, because it investigates the contributions of 
subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and objects without prejudice of priority. Introspection is an 
operation already situated within experience generally, as one of its modes, which can 
introduce error precisely because of its quality of presentation to an internal perspective. 
Indeed, introspection introduces the philosophical error, which much phenomenology has 
been concerned to overcome: the bald distinctions between isolated subjects, other minds, 
and independent objects. The importance of the claim that experience is “like something” is 
found in the structure it helps demonstrate: experience is self-intimating (internally related 
to itself), and meanings are typically embedded relationally among other meanings 
(likenesses). Whether a comprehensive investigation of what some particular experience 
(color, pain, time) “is like” yields a philosophically relevant result depends on the particular 
phenomenon under scrutiny and what in general can be gleaned from it. But 
phenomenology diverges from taste-practices, if by such practices one means an endless 
indulgence in “likenesses.” Phenomenology investigates what it is to like (and not what it is 
like to like). Phenomenology is not merely a survey of all possible phenomena and all 
possible experienced meanings.39 Rather, its investigations are focused on the phenomena 
                                               
38 Cf. Nagel. I regard Nagel as making a genuine contribution to phenomenology, but one that is easily 
misunderstood to be a focus on transient phenomenal experience, rather than on the general structures of 
experience that are verified in experience.  
39 For more elaborate defense and explication of philosophical phenomenology, see Merleau-Ponty 
(Phenomenology of Perception, Preface and pg. 66ff.) and Zahavi (Subjectivity and Selfhood, Introduction). 
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most shared between us and constitutive of experience generally—e.g. time, space, identity, 
consciousness, intentionality, and perception. I will add creativity to this list.  
 In my use of the word “existential,” I hold a non-standard position. I describe 
phenomenology as “existential” with due consideration of the differences between 
Husserlian transcendental phenomenology, Heideggarian hermeneutic phenomenology, 
and Merleau-Pontian or Sartrian existential phenomenology. I accept the criticism of 
Husserl’s notion of “bracketing” or neutralizing of “the natural attitude”—the dominant 
attitude of metaphysical realism, or of a real mind-independent reality, which conditions 
both science and daily thinking. The existential criticism is that the natural attitude is just 
as much an aspect of how we engage or live through experience as the neutralized 
attitude—and probably more prominent an aspect; thus, to exercise bracketing can be 
artificial. Yet what I call “existentialism,” stems much more from the Hegelian primary 
strand of phenomenology and its extension than from a figure like Sartre. Existential 
phenomenology marks an orientation toward how, in what way of being, do we experience 
as we do or does our experience make the demands on us it does. Efforts to analyze, to 
explain, to argue, and even to describe are always rooted in more basic efforts to cope. 
Hence none can be ignored, but none can be excised from the being so ordered to make use 
of them.  
 Thus I have been trying to orient us toward what creativity really demands from us 
in order to understand it. This understanding is not found in scattershot attempts at 
compensation or deprivation of understanding, in frantic or fixated analysis, in models and 
modes of creativity, or in starting from systematic philosophical positions. What is 
creativity? Each of these starting points conceal the background perspective that gives rise 
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to the question we care about in a flurry of presuppositions and busy-work. What we crave 
is the phenomenology of creativity, one that locates the heart of the phenomenon and holds 
onto it as long as possible. One must keep in mind that this basic orientation to the 
creativity question guides my work, sometimes in the background, and usually in the 
foreground.  
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CHAPTER 2 
MEANING—CREATIVITY IN CHANGING OUR WORLD 
 
Imagine four people arguing about a recent science fiction film. The first claims that 
the film is hackneyed and conventional, a copy of themes and plots about indigenous 
people, technology, and scarce resources found in earlier fiction, veiled by special effects. 
The second claims the film takes a conventional theme, but executes it with greater clarity 
and refinement than earlier fiction—it shows improvement. The third argues that, though 
rooted in convention, the film develops new implications from earlier premises or new 
depths of meaning—it shows progress. The fourth, however, claims some specific new 
insight achieved in the film, advancing connections between scarcity and power relations 
irreducible to previous efforts in the genre—it shows creativity. In this case, the defender of 
creativity is at a distinct disadvantage, for any description of a new insight must be made in 
terms familiar to her interlocutors, and from conventional terms usually come conventional 
insights.  
But the situation is worse for creativity than a problem of communication. 
Recognizing something to be a creative achievement requires us to do something seemingly 
impossible. First, how could one even recognize something to be novel? If we assume that 
the meaning we experience in a situation is what we are familiar with, that we read a 
situation through the lens of what we have mastered in our past, then there is a puzzle 
about how anything could fall into cognition simultaneously outside our conventional 
means of cognition. Second, how could new things be anything other than discoveries—
making what is implicit in one’s conventions explicit or drawing all the implications of 
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conventional premises? Even if we accept that some inquiry or progressive learning is 
possible, this progress must, it seems, be made fully on grounds of what we find familiar. 
Third, even if we could recognize something unfamiliar, disconnected from our mastered 
and conventional meanings, how could it be anything but nonsense, oddity, or aberration? 
Without this connection with past meaning, there could be no integration into the world of 
meaning we already have.  
These problems can be put more precisely by considering Meno’s classic Paradox, as 
expressed by Socrates: “man cannot enquire either about that which he knows, or about 
that which he does not know; for if he knows, he has no need to enquire; and if not, he 
cannot; for he does not know the very subject about which he is to enquire.”40 On one hand, 
there is an equivocation in the paradox as it applies to a posteriori knowledge. A simple 
assertion like, “I don’t know whether the cafe  is open past nine” denies the paradox in this 
sense. Sometimes one can know what one does not know, and can find out something new 
by following a method of investigation. However, both the assertion and the means one 
might use to gain knowledge are familiar and conventional; an unconventional question or 
hypothesis can strike us as creative precisely because the means to answering or proving it 
are equally unfamiliar. But this latter idea must be pursued cautiously. Even an unusual 
question like “supposing teleportation is possible, where is the first place you would go?” 
invites more plumbing into the meanings one already has than the creation of new 
meaning; it typically improves the explicit clarity of where one already stands. The question 
can take one to new places in one’s thinking, but does not for that reason introduce a new 
                                               
40 Meno (80d-e), Jowett translation. Plato’s solution to this problem, for example, is his Doctrine of 
Recollection—i.e. the denial that we “learn” anything, but rather recollect it. 
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way of thinking. On the other hand, Plato takes the paradox seriously as a threat to non-
empirical knowledge. His Doctrine of Recollection is intended to defend a priori knowledge, 
which is always available as an object or means of knowing, even if implicit or concealed. 
Even if Plato’s (or someone else’s) defense of a priori knowledge is successful, however, this 
does nothing for creativity, because if what we mean by creativity is the uncovering of a 
priori knowledge, then nothing new is actually created, but only progressively disclosed and 
articulated. The peculiar “knowledge” involved in creativity, by contrast, exists in a no-
man’s-land between the a posteriori and the a priori, allowing no reduction to previous 
experience or disclosure among some pre-existing ground of being, objective reality, or set 
of Forms. Meno’s Paradox finds its easiest victim in creativity, a phenomenon that, if it is 
thoroughly a posteriori, cannot seem to make the traditional rejoinder, and if it is 
thoroughly a priori, does not seem particularly different from a priori intuition.        
Despite these problems, I contend that through creative acts one introduces novel 
meaning for oneself and for others. Meaning, in this context, is the most basic, the most 
generic, medium for creative activity—in fact, the medium of all intelligible activity. 
Meaning is that about experience that is coherent, connected, intelligible, purposive, or 
identifiable. It includes all those things for which we can have positive concern and with 
which we may be involved. When we create genuinely new meaning, we create something 
different from previous meaning. My aim is to show how this can be. I describe how 
meaning is organized and limited in a world, and how certain kinds of meaningful change 
require creativity.  Dealing in abstractions with the concept of meaning, however, will not 
do. I prioritize an investigation of changes in the way we relate to each other and our world, 
typically called social, historical, or cultural change. Such change is exemplified in change 
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resulting from the work of a figure like Martin Luther King Jr. or in the introduction of a 
new product or service that changes how we do and understand our everyday activities. It 
is necessary to focus on specific forms of change in order the understand how meaningful 
change can be understood to be continuous with our world while including a great deal of 
underlying discontinuity of a different kind, with which only creativity can deal.  
2.1 THE ONTOLOGY OF WORLDS AT A MOMENT 
Those who tend to focus on a world of largely practical and prudential concern—
social, political, economic, or technological concerns, for example—will be sensitive to the 
claim that the world is changing and we contribute to this change. The experience of change 
reflects a shift in our involvement with familiar practices, objects, values, and each other. At 
any time, the deficiency of this involvement affects our sense of the world as something 
coherent, reliable, and meaningful. In encountering this deficiency in the working of our 
familiar world, we undertake a re-working of its elements, to change it. We initiate political 
causes, start businesses, and invent technology to solve problems of one kind or another. 
This change proceeds against a background of a meaningful world, which organizes 
meaning in ways one can easily miss either because it is so familiar that one takes it for 
granted or because one’s dominant concern is with unchanging principles. To appropriately 
recognize change, we need a set of distinctions that make the features of worlds and types 
of change more explicit. Here I present the ontology of worlds according to which we can 
build a sensitivity to creative change. 
Heidegger's account of “worldhood” in Being and Time roughly inspires my offering 
here, along with significant contributions from the work of Hubert Dreyfus in his 
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extensions of Heidegger’s work. However, I believe this account is sufficiently different to 
require its own direct exposition.  
 A world refers to a set of interrelated practices supporting a relatively coherent, self-
standing way for one to cope with oneself, others, and things. Abstractly, worlds appear 
against a background of an environment—all those elements of experience that appear 
approximately to be useless, purposeless, or outside the range of human concern. The 
environment is not a nothing. It is relatively meaningless, in the sense that it means less and 
bears little relevance to our everyday ways of coping. The abstract picture of a background 
environment and foreground world, however, misses how we actually see an environment 
only through a world of concern. The concept of waste for example applies to those things 
we no longer have anything to do with; this is the environment appearing at the edges of 
our purposive activity.41 Nature, as an aspect of the environment, appears very differently 
than mere waste in most cases. It displays its “environmentality,” its separation and 
independence from human concern, even as we carve into it or encircle it with our worlds 
or express concern for preserving it. For example, we build farms and cities even while 
protecting parks, which gives us a sense of the environment in the midst of our worlds. But 
nature and waste share a status at the fringe of a world, providing its basic inputs and 
outputs.   
Practices are the basic units of organization in a world, arranging resources, 
equipment, purposes, and skills into groups that reinforce and sustain themselves, while 
                                               
41 I mean waste as a substantive noun here. Examples include the pile of waste scraps of lumber after a 
carpentry project or the toxic waste of a nuclear power plant. The waste a lumber company sees in not 
clear cutting a forest is an entirely different phenomenon. And calling scraps of wood one burns for fuel 
“waste” is conventional; in this case, the ashes are the waste. We do have to cope with waste, but not 
because we positively value it, but rather because we want to get rid of it—to have it not exist. 
47 
  
linking with other practices. To become an input, a world must coopt its environment into 
resources; and as an “input” waste and nature may be treated similarly, because both lose 
their environmentality by being coopted into a world—they adopt a human purpose. 
Equipment includes the tools and instruments with which we work. Purposes are the ends 
of our activities. And skill indicates the operations and abilities one must master and 
execute to link equipment with a purpose. For example, one may use an ax (a tool) to chop 
wood (a resource) in order to build a fire (a purpose), but skill is required to split the wood 
and spark the flame.  
By engaging in a practice or practices that constitute a world, one embodies an 
identity or set of identities—e.g. a carpenter. These identities constitute one's meaningful 
relation to a world. In everyday language, worlds roughly approximate cultures, and 
subworlds roughly approximate subcultures. So we speak of the Western world, the 
business world, or the world of philosophy.  
 Everyday experience in a world is directly meaningful and solicits us to act in 
specific ways. First, for example, everyday identities do not normally first show up to be 
bundled properties, compositions, or mere stuff of some kind, only to be interpreted as a 
thing. I do not see an elongated mass of metal with a large end, then interpret it as a 
hammer. Rather, I directly encounter a hammer.42 Second, the identities we encounter 
solicit our involvement with them in contextually-sensitive ways. The hammer appears to 
be the tool for the job of pounding in a nail. The long sidewalk appears to be a place to walk 
to a park. Something is meaningful in this way when it is part of the arrangement of a 
                                               
42 I do not deny that a “thing”—a mass of metal—is meaningful. The point is that we do not experience an 
intermediate act of interpretation on masses of metal to compose the meaning of a hammer.  
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practice. That is, the character of one’s encounter with a thing and the relations we expect 
between identities depend on the practices we engage in and bring to bear on a situation. 
Everyday carpentry practice enables an assortment of equipment and resources to show up 
as the things they are, related to specific tasks and purposes, and requiring skill in their use. 
To someone without carpentry experience, however, objects like custom jigs or planes, or 
the difference between walnut and hickory, are insufficiently understood. The carpenter 
encounters that wood, in a tree, to be a resource for a table; for an ecologist, it may be an 
element in a complex system showing up within scientific practice. Hence, what we 
encounter depends on the practices we engage in, whether carpentry or ecology. We live in 
concrete worlds of meaning delivered to us by the developments of the past. Even a custom 
jig does not appear to be a waste, so much as someone else’s equipment. We normally have 
enough mastered sense of our world to cope with a huge variety of situations and achieve 
sufficient coherence and meaning within them.     
People, too, are typically encountered on the basis of our practices. People show up 
in specific roles, which mediate the ways in which one relates to them, whether it is a 
teacher, parent, or salesperson. Personal relationships with individuals are no doubt more 
complicated to characterize. But under normal conditions, even our most valued personal 
relationships depend on a complex of practical involvements. Friends labor or play together 
in shared activities. Romantic relationships follow certain patterns if they are to count as 
romance.      
One may object to this account so far on grounds that it exhibits a questionable 
cause for meaning--cum hoc ergo propter hoc. Meaning on my view, one might charge, 
spontaneously accompanies organized practices; love or friendship is merely the result of 
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organized behavior. Were this view correct, then meaning would be fixed in place by the 
practices we happen to have. For example, a wrench could sensibly be used for nothing but 
turning nuts were that the only possible meaning for the object as dictated by a mechanic’s 
practice. But I am not contending for a view that makes practices sufficient for meaning.43 
Rather, though practices are necessary for ordering meaning into mutually shared, 
relatively stable meanings, they do not constitute meaning itself. Indeed the fact that an 
object may be taken up in a new, creative specification depends on a background of 
involvement richer than the foreground of practical ordering and a capacity to introduce 
new meaning. When a wrench becomes a hammer, a toilet an artwork, or a salesperson a 
friend, we see changes to the typical ordering enforced by a practice. Practices set 
constraints on meaning, channels for everyday shared intelligibility, but these constraints 
may be broken.44 They are like the heuristics of chess, rather than its rules.        
 We further see the separation between meaning and practice by recognizing that 
worlds can be systematically analyzed into two aspects, their effective or instrumental 
aspect and their meaningful or valuable aspect. Imagine a quasi-world inhabited only by 
robots that, by hypothesis, lack meaningful experience. Following their programming, they 
might gather and consume resources, reproduce, and perpetuate their existence 
indefinitely. This world includes tools, resources, tasks, skills, and identities, but each in 
only an effective arrangement. A factory full of robots manufacturing car parts is a more 
                                               
43 I contrast my view here, for example, with Dreyfus, et al. (1997, pg. 29; henceforth DNW): ‘What gets 
covered up [by] common sense in everyday understanding is that the ultimate “ground” of intelligibility is 
simply shared practices—that there is no right way of doing things.’ In many cases, I would agree that that 
there is no one right way of doing things, but I do not agree that existence offers nothing by way of basic 
constraints, which may even be winnowed to a single “right” way of doing or thinking something in some 
cases.   
44 See worthwhile discussions on meaning from Mark Johnson (2007) and Eugene Gendlin (1962). 
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familiar example; here the activity within the factory achieves meaning only in relation to 
the human world. A quasi-world including meaning and value, but lacking effectiveness, is 
harder to imagine. A world that consumes all its resources, for example, still has an 
instrumental arrangement, even if in-effective. Perhaps religious conceptions of Heaven or 
Nirvana offer the best representation, in being undifferentiated and static in their 
arrangement of what exists, in which actions no longer have consequences and objects no 
longer have constraints in the way they do for us. Conspiracy theories serve as more 
familiar examples, at least on analogy. As theoretical constructions, conspiracy theories 
purport to offer explanations for experience based on general principles, but since the 
theories are typically so constructed to be unfalsifiable by any possible evidence, they need 
never adapt to a new situation or develop new sensitivities to experience. The effective 
organization of a world is in direct intercourse with the concrete resistance offered by 
existence; the quasi-world of meaning untethered to any effective organization lacks any 
resistance to the meanings it perpetuates. In a world, therefore, both the effective and 
meaningful aspects must be considered jointly.  
 Practices relate to each other in the way they are effectively organized or 
meaningfully coordinated. The organization and coordination of a world are 
interdependent, in the simple sense that each requires the other. But, first, organizations 
typically afford multiple meanings and, second, meaningful engagement can remain 
constant across effective organizations. Take the first case. Driving practices require 
drivers, cars, roads, and rules—i.e. an organization. But, as Dreyfus, et al. point out in 
Disclosing New Worlds (henceforth, “DNW”), the way we drive can vary from aggressive 
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driving to defensive or leisurely driving.45 Driving varies in its meaning. What one notices 
and cares about as an aggressive driver is how one can pass the next car. A leisurely driver 
notices and cares about the surrounding landscape, say, the new house being built in one’s 
neighborhood. In the second case, changing driving laws so that everyone must drive on the 
left-hand side (in the United States) would change the organization of driving practices 
considerably without changing its meaning. There would still be aggressive and leisurely 
drivers under this new arrangement.  
Let’s extend this example. The addition of self-driving cars to the road would likely 
lead to a change in the meaning of driving. One way to understand the claim that the 
meaning of driving could change recognizes the change as a shift in the way the practice is 
coordinated with other practices. Following DNW, I refer to the different ways practices in a 
world fit together as styles. That is, practices are coordinated on the basis of a style, which 
provides one kind of continuity between many practices. For example, the aggressive style 
finds a focus equally well in driving and in playing basketball, and different situations 
become familiar on the basis of a style. A competitive athlete will find the elements of 
competition and teamwork involved in business familiar. By contrast, a writer without the 
significant development of a competitive style may find the cutthroat competition involved 
in publishing foreign and jarring. Style, on this view, provides the basis for a shift in the 
meaning of a practice. The overall style typical of transportation with a horse was 
regulation—one had to participate with a horse as an independent creature in order to 
travel successfully. The overall style relevant for driving a car has been one of control, 
where a vehicle responds immediately to one’s direction. The style of automation so far has 
                                               
45 DNW, 21 
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been marginal with respect to driving (e.g. automated climate control). To make this style 
central to driving would affect not only the organization of driving, but also how one 
meaningfully engages in the activity. Just as nurturing a relationship no longer made much 
sense in the shift from horses to vehicles, aggressive driving could no longer make much 
sense with automated vehicles, because, by hypothesis, it would find no outlet but in the 
marginal act of honking a horn.       
A snapshot of a world, as specified so far, looks as follows (Figure 1):  
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Figure 1 
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 I intend the difference in relative size between practices to indicate the centrality or 
marginality of a practice. The centrality of a practice may be taken in two ways. First, a 
practice may be central if it is shared by many people in a world, organizing a large amount 
of shared activity. Voting in a democratic culture, for example, periodically becomes central; 
dining practice using a fork and spoon is pervasive in the Western world, though not 
completely dominant. I call this kind of centrality shared centrality. Second, a practice may 
be central for a single person or group of people if it organizes much of their personal 
activity. For example, the carpenter’s central practice of carpentry is not shared with many 
others, but it is central for her. Call this personal centrality. The marginality of a practice has 
similar variation, and indeed a practice like eating with chopsticks may be simultaneously 
personally central and marginally shared. Nonetheless, one’s facility in navigating a world 
normally gives one an additional global sensitivity to how one’s practices stand in relation 
to others. The carpenter does not expect everyone to practice carpentry, and conventional 
Western diners do not expect everyone to eat with a fork and spoon.  
 Styles, as we see, provide a network of additional organization for navigating 
practices. Some groups of practices, like driving, can accommodate multiple styles. Other 
groups resist meaningful engagement on the basis of some styles. A style of egalitarianism, 
for example, meets resistance in extending driving privileges to pre-teens. In most cases, it 
will not even occur to one to direct this style toward resistant practices; ‘driving for all’ will 
not show up in experience to be a central example of what one means by egalitarianism. 
 In principle, one might live one’s entire life within one snapshot of a world. If the 
world is relatively simple, with many shared practices meeting a group’s extant concerns, 
ways for channeling all the available styles into these practices, few environmental 
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challenges, and little conflict with other worlds—one’s life is a continuous circuit of 
conventionality, of “what one does,” with all its coherence and shared meaning.  
 The key phenomenon that drives one’s integration into such a world is familiarity. 
One is familiar with the everyday practices one engages in and their accompanying styles. 
And in encountering a new situation, one draws on familiar styles to help coordinate 
practices, to make sense of them. Because others are like us on average, with most of the 
same familiarities, whether marginal or central, we can make shared sense of our 
experience. In general, I call such familiarity positive familiarity, because it is a familiarity 
that presupposes the contribution of past experience, mastered skills, values, purposes, and 
other forms of meaningful engagement to make sense of how one copes in the world.   
2.2 THE ELEMENTS OF FAMILIARITY 
 To enrich this picture, and give some initial indication of its limitations, we need to 
understand the limits of familiarity of the kind already described. Positive familiarity, I 
contend, comes of different kinds, one general kind, and one requiring a consecutive 
development to achieve. Moreover, I contend for the phenomenon of negative familiarity, 
which is crucial to understanding creative change. 
 Things are familiar either implicitly or explicitly. The difference is captured well in 
the difference between taking one’s form of life for granted versus not taking it for granted. 
For example, one can take one’s home or a garbage service for granted, but these elements 
of one’s life typically become more explicit during a house fire or worker strike. Reflection, 
reading science fiction novels, or visiting foreign countries can also induce an explicit sense 
of one’s own practices, as when one returns home from abroad and notices, for the first 
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time, that one has been living differently from others elsewhere—in everything from the 
design of homes and cars to how one shows respect or concern for others. But in less 
totalizing circumstances, something is more explicit when one just looks for or at it, like 
when one looks for a hammer rather than just using a hammer.    
A second distinction appears in our familiarity with the effective and meaningful 
aspects of our world. I have already described practices as arrangements of purposes, 
equipment, and skills, but clearly we do not enter into this world already immersed in 
practices—we require a period of development into them, which reveals alternative kinds 
of familiarity. I use Alasdair MacIntyre’s definitions of a practice as a starting point for 
making this claim:  
By a ‘practice’ I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially 
established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that 
form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards 
of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of 
activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human 
conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.46  
 
The crucial elements of this definition are clear: cooperation, internal goods, standards of 
excellence, and the extension of human powers are all necessary for practices. Practices 
develop over time with changing goals and standards in the interactions of many 
individuals who contribute to them. This rules out solitary or individual pursuits or 
activities in which there is no social context in which the individual is accountable. Also, the 
requirement that human ends and powers be extended rules out merely technical skills 
counting as practices, though these will certainly be incorporated into them.     
                                               
46 MacIntyre, 187 
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On this account, activity is regulated by the motivating power of two kinds of goods, 
external and internal. External goods are intelligible and desirable across a wide variety of 
practices, without reference to any one in particular, and include such things as money, 
power, influence, prestige, and material wealth. Simple sustenance—a full belly—can count 
among external goods. Such goods are often defined by scarcity, and are thus necessarily 
differentially distributed among persons—i.e. being famous or rich depends in part on the 
existence of non-famous and poor people. Internal goods, by contrast, arise only within a 
specific practice, through one’s engagement in it, and are typically inclusive rather than 
exclusive. For example, a child first learning to play chess may be motivated by the 
prospects of receiving candy (an external good) for his participation. Through a long 
development in the practice, however, he is likely to develop a commitment to chess that no 
longer requires the external motivation. Instead, the child enjoys the game itself. Note that 
the instrumental or effective aspects of his engagement in the practice do not change in this 
transition, but only his sense of what makes the activity important.  
Positive familiarity, then, has a common basis for many practices in the external 
goods in which all practices trade, and on which they depend. In pursuit of money or a full 
belly, an inexhaustible number of behaviors can make limited sense in a world. 
Nonetheless, there is a richer familiarity that is not so easily generalized, intrinsic to the 
practices in which we engage. It would be easy to dismiss the internal goods of portrait 
painting (MacIntyre’s example) for lack of the development required to achieve them. It is 
easy not to “get” what others get from golf or philosophy or accounting for lack of serious 
exposure to the practices. Internal goods, therefore, are less accessible to those outside the 
practices that embody them.  
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Importantly, however, one’s identity can only be formed on the basis of internal 
goods. This is because, first, only internal goods are self-sufficient and satisfying in 
themselves in a way that can sustain a robust sense of self. Internal goods are experienced 
immediately in one’s activity, to be directly embodied aspects of an achieved identity. 
External goods, by contrast, are mediated by an extra relation of possession or desire. A 
person realizes internal goods, and only possesses external goods; internal goods 
contribute to self-worth, while external goods contribute to external wealth. External goods 
serve as a specific desired goal in a way internal goods cannot, because internal goods are 
not actually appreciated unless they are attained. One can strive for more internal goods, 
but this striving takes the form of more, deeper, and increasingly masterful engagement in 
the practice. Second, external goods are essentially instrumental, and are often general in 
their application to many possible practices.47 Internal goods, by contrast, are specific, 
concrete, and intelligible achievements in the context of a practice. Thus internal goods are 
local and actual, while external goods relate only to further possibilities among which one 
must select. Hence, while positive familiarity ranges across both internal and external 
goods, only internal goods contribute to one’s identity.  
 This account is complicated by the fact that one can form an identity, with its 
internal goods, while working with typical external goods. Examples of this phenomenon 
include investors and administrators. A less complimentary example is a miser. The point 
here is that external resources like money can be involved in a practice, not just as an 
enabling condition, but also as the medium for a practice. An investor experiences loss in 
                                               
47 Whether or not an external good has broad application depends on its particular features. Currency, for 
instance, is general by design to serve in the exchange of many resources; candy, on the other hand, is 
typically used in one way. 
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bad deal in roughly the same way as a chess grandmaster losing a game—a personal, rather 
than monetary, loss. For the consummate investor, wealth simply means something 
different than it does for others.     
To give them proper names, let us call the kinds of positive familiarity one can have 
with respect to external and internal goods external familiarity and internal familiarity. 
These goods identify the way one finds one’s familiar activities valuable. But the difference 
in types of familiarity also indicates important aspects of how we deal with the effective 
organization of our activities. Take bicycling as an example. One biker might ride a bike to 
get to work, and another might ride a bike for the love of biking. Both bikers are fully 
competent and they basically share the same instrumental arrangement in a world. But one 
engages externally and the other internally. And we can make two points based on this 
difference. First, both may be inventive in bicycling based on their engagement, though the 
meaning of invention differs. Suppose each invents a gear system to increase speed. One 
does so primarily to get to work faster—and if it is not fast enough, he may find a moped to 
substitute for biking. The other invents primarily to further develop and refine the internal 
goods of biking. Second, the epistemological status of these bikers differs in ways that cut 
across typical distinctions between implicit and explicit knowledge or (a different 
distinction) knowledge-that and knowledge-how. One biker’s way of knowing his activity 
includes its instrumental relations to other activities and its substitutability among the 
constitutive features of the activity. The other biker holds these features to be accidental. I 
mark this difference with a nonstandard distinction between extrinsic knowledge and 
intrinsic knowledge. The possession of this knowledge is not exclusive for single person, but 
intrinsic knowledge is typically prioritized when it is achieved—that is, one typically acts 
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for the sake of the activity and its goods, understanding its features to be non-substitutable, 
when that way of relating to the activity is possible.     
In the snapshot world in which one can live one’s entire life, we must posit a great 
deal of shared internal familiarity. Identities, though variegated to some extent, nonetheless 
include enough overlap within such a world that members of the world can appreciate the 
value of different identities. If we imagine a tribal world, for example, we need not posit an 
impassible gulf of understanding between the novice hunter and the chief. And even in a 
world like ours, we can point to an extraordinary amount of internal familiarity. We find 
ourselves concerned with many of the same things and sharing a recognition of what 
counts as excellence and achievement. For example, the extreme devotion of a practitioner 
to her practice can often provide the material for a cultural icon—an exemplar for how the 
possibilities of a practice are enlarged, who serves as a model for others. The master 
carpenter shows how some simple tools and an unpromising pile of scraps can be worked 
into a functional object; the master football quarterback develops a distinctive way to play 
the game, which stimulates the admiration of football enthusiasts. 
 There are limits to internal familiarity, however, even within a shared world. One has 
already been mentioned in the inaccessibility of internal goods. In this respect I note that, 
regardless of the appreciation involved in recognizing a cultural icon, there is nonetheless a 
difference between the goods realized by the icon and the goods recognized by voyeurs. 
Football enthusiasts and spectators achieve only a limited understanding of their heroes, or, 
at least, they achieve an understanding on the basis of their distinct practice of voyeurism.         
 But I must also turn attention more directly to the styles that coordinate practices 
and enable a transfer of meaning from one situation to another. The simple picture of 
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entering a situation and finding it familiar on the basis of a style is typically far more 
complicated. First, the familiar expression of a style in a situation or group of practices 
often itself depends on one’s development within the practice. A competitive athlete, for 
example, may easily miss the competitiveness involved in a spirited intellectual debate, or 
especially the trading of blows in academic journals. Even if necessary, the possession of a 
shared style is rarely sufficient for enabling familiarity in any but the most everyday 
situations.  
But positive familiarity with a specific style is often even unnecessary. Consider a 
singular or genuinely new style as seen in something like contemporary social media. The 
style afforded by social media is extremely complex, but includes the amplification, 
minimally, of constant contact with others, control of one’s image and the possibility of 
anonymity (in one sense), the constant risk of losing control of one’s image and increasing 
the disclosure of “private” information (in another sense), the possibility and expectation of 
instant information, and the reduction of the importance of physical proximity, contact, and 
shared activity.48 We see the difference this style makes when a person expects constant 
updates from some friend on a trip, who does not sit through a meeting without checking 
communications irrelevant to the meeting, or who no longer cares to conceal a “personal” 
life from observation by strangers; this style is then focused through an invention like a 
smartphone, which becomes an object of great concern, because, if lost or broken, the 
goods afforded by social media practice are unattainable.  
                                               
48 By “shared activity” I mean mutually enacted activity—e.g. friends building a cabin together—rather than 
sharing information (e.g. sending my friend a picture of me building a cabin).  
62 
  
Now we should note that this social media style is singular. It bears no reduction to 
earlier styles without remainder—it is a synthesis. We know this because it is not possible 
to understand, to “get,” the style, based on any one traditional style. From the outside, one 
may have no idea what satisfaction a person gets from broadcasting his evening meal over 
social media, as if anyone cares. Even someone who grasps this sharing element of the 
social media style in a traditional way can nonetheless largely misunderstand its nuances—
corporate culture, for example, misread social media to be a way to share “information” 
about products and services, and few people cared because this is not what sharing means 
in social media. If one enters into the practice of social media rigidly on the basis of only 
those styles with which one already has some development, however remote, one will 
never find one’s way to embodying or appreciating the new social style, because it is not 
completely adoptable on the basis of any of these specific styles. One can encounter social 
media on the basis of some style or other, but must be ready to abort or modify it in 
response to new demands. The experience of adopting this style is much more like that of 
achieving goods internal to a practice. One begins by mimicking behavior, doing what 
others do, developing ever finer discriminations of appropriate behavior, remaining open to 
additional opportunities to act on one’s developing skills, gradually fleshing out the 
coherence and integration of one’s new style in fuller life. One moves, in this case, from an 
external relation to the practice (“my boss is making me use social media”) to a deft 
execution of skill and achievement supportive of internal goods. One’s continued reliance 
on external goods or the insistence that earlier styles make sense of the new social media 
style will only distort and undermine one’s achievement of internal goods and full 
integration into the practice. In this case, previous styles are only heuristics and scaffolding; 
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they do not provide any constitutive basis for familiarity. Familiarity of this kind lies above 
the person, to be achieved, not below in the spent developments of a past.  
What, then, is the difference between a singular style and the internal goods of a 
practice? One might argue that they converge at a point, and are inseparable. But this is not 
the case. Though one gets distinctive internal goods from participating in social media, for 
example, the style one develops has a new broader application. The style is precisely what 
becomes transferable to a new situation. One with a dominant style of social media may be 
less sensitive to corporate collections of personal data that others see to be violations of 
privacy; the act of data-collection does not show up to be a relevant example of violation. 
The Modernist style in art, to take another example, brings a high-level coherence to a 
broad range of artwork. Picasso and Frank Lloyd Wright, for instance, both participate in a 
style of geometrical clarity. But one would not confuse the specific practices of painting 
with those of architecture. The point, then, is not that such singular styles remain 
permanently bound only within a narrow set of practices, like internal goods, but rather 
that some sets of practices afford newly minted styles, newly available for coordinating 
other practices.  
By acknowledging such singular styles, we get the first hint of the necessity for 
creativity in understanding change in a world. Such new styles, I argue, typically develop, 
not on the basis of shared coherence, but rather in response to shared incoherence. We 
must invert the world of positive familiarity to recognize the phenomenon of negative 
familiarity.  
Our practices are often poorly organized and coordinated. First, practices exist with 
genuine dependencies on the material world. Because of this, they compete with each other. 
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They break down. They conflict. Their resources run out. Skillful manipulations of 
resources lead in opposed directions. Second, our values often seek a middle ground that 
does not necessarily exist or has not been realized. Third, the intelligibility of an object, a 
practice, or a world remains inaccessible to any of the styles one brings to them. So, for 
example, some practices consume inordinate amounts of resources (fossil-fuel 
consumption), and are therefore unsustainable; some high-risk practices (derivatives 
trading) are destructive to other practices; and some practices are simply contradictory 
(democratic versus technocratic rule) at the level of functionality. Many of the styles by 
which we coordinate our lives lead us to face difficult choices in contingent circumstances, 
for instance a simultaneous allegiance to pacifism and patriotism in a time of war. In yet 
other cases, our environment challenges us with its destructive power or with the waste we 
have produced.  
Those are major cases. The more minor, everyday cases occur with greater or lesser 
explicit articulation. One’s relationship with old friends sours. One cannot find enough time 
to get all one’s work done. One cannot find a way to mince garlic efficiently. One keeps 
cutting oneself shaving. The air in one’s city is noxious with pollution. One cannot get a 
good cell phone signal in the country.  This generalized one indicates that these might be 
problems for anybody. But such problems could also be intensely personal, singularly 
appearing in one person’s life.  
Such problems mark the limits of our well-organized, well-coordinated world. We 
possess a negative familiarity with problems every bit as rich as our positive familiarity—
central and marginal, personal and shared, implicit and explicit, internal and external. To 
clarify, I focus on the simple distinction between positive and negative familiarity. 
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When one copes on the basis of positive familiarity, one draws on one’s past 
experience. Skills, values, and knowledge are brought to bear on occurrent experience 
flexibly, to recognize variations in situations and adapt to them. When problems appear, we 
typically draw on our background of familiarity to help us find a solution. Take a simple 
puzzle: 
What word, when pronounced right is wrong, and when pronounced wrong 
is right. 
 
With some thought, one will likely provide the solution, “wrong.” And if I stipulate that 
“wrong” is not the correct answer—or that there is another correct answer—one will likely 
arrive at another solution, “left.” In addressing this kind of puzzle, one draws on the 
knowledge and sensitivities to meaning developed in the past to address the present. 
Wrong, as used in the sentence, gets quite a different sense, depending on whether one 
navigates to the first or the second solution. But most people will see a way for each 
solution to bring its own kind of resolution to the puzzle. In everyday life, though there is a 
diversity of styles, skills, and values, the generic way we deal with new situations is not 
much different from how we solve the puzzle. We take up a situation initially on the basis of 
the most perspicuous meanings, and if something from our mastered past contributes to 
coping in the situation, and we are able to call on it, then we bring this past familiarity into 
the situation.  
 Most everyday problems we encounter are easily solvable on the basis of this 
positive familiarity. Even the puzzle above just loses its puzzling quality as we dig in, so to 
speak, to meanings we already know. As a problem becomes explicit, we typically have an 
immediate sense of a solution and move toward it in the most promising direction. If there 
is no milk in the fridge, we go to the store or make a list. If there is no more milk at the 
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store, the proprietor places an order from a supplier, and we temporarily do without. This 
is the everyday working of a familiar world, in all its complexity, which we typically just 
take for granted. And these are not the problems I mean to indicate with negative 
familiarity.  
 Suppose I ask whether the words in bold in the puzzle above are used or mentioned, 
assuming the technical use/mention distinction. The question is a bit nettlesome, as 
indicated, for example, by the deficiencies of any of the sentences: 
1. ‘Right’ is pronounced ‘right’.  
2. Right is pronounced right. 
3. Right is pronounced ‘right’. 
4. ‘Right’ is pronounced right. 
The first and second fail to indicate the different meanings in the terms; the third and 
fourth make odd claims using the referent of ‘right.’ Perhaps a fully satisfying analysis is 
possible, but the point is that, in addressing this new question, one senses the inadequacy 
of what one takes for granted about grammar or the simple use/mention distinction—by 
digging into the meanings, one encounters a disconnect between them. One detects that 
some modification to how we think will have to be achieved—a new thought or distinction 
or notation. Some work has to be done, and some change has to be made. In this case, we 
have to think the thought that some uses of a word are self-referential (i.e. the word-as-
pronounced), or perhaps that we use some mentions or mention some uses.  
 Again, despite the variety of forms of life in a world, there is a generic description for 
sensitivity to these kinds of problems, which I call negative familiarity, a sensitivity to the 
limits of our everyday world. So, when using a garlic press, one might detect that there 
must be a better way, or at least want a better way. Or many might want fast, cheap, 
sustainable transportation from Los Angeles to New York, but have little idea how that 
67 
  
might be achieved with what we have invented so far. At one time, we had little idea how to 
explain micro-physical behavior, because Newtonian physics could not do the job. The key 
point is that limitations to our meaningful experience and disconnects between meanings 
circumscribe our world, and indeed cut right through it, and that we are often sensitive to 
these limitations. Only the most conventional people—or, in another sense, people in the 
most self-contained worlds—fail to see at least some of the limitations of the worlds they 
inhabit. 
 Negative familiarity is formed on the basis of our positive familiarity. It is the 
detection of limits. Thus, negative familiarity is not identical with unfamiliarity. To be 
unfamiliar with a text, for example, is to have never read it before; to be positively familiar 
with a text is to have read it; to be negatively familiar with a text is to have read it and 
discovered where it makes little sense. When one encounters an interpretation, however, 
that makes new sense of the text, which establishes connections previously unappreciated, 
one moves from unfamiliarity to familiarity with the interpretation, while losing one’s 
negative familiarity with the original text. In this way, one’s way of thinking about the text is 
changed. This is the basic structure I propose for how creative change is introduced, at once 
different from the positive familiarity and continuously addressing shared negative 
familiarity. I turn now to a closer examination of change. 
2.3 CHANGE IN A WORLD 
A world of stability and unchanging coherence is rare. Such a world represents a 
strong integration of practices and styles, little provocation from other worlds, and little 
sensitivity to problems one might work to correct. Most worlds, by contrast, have a history 
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of change. Indeed, worlds are the proper subject of historical change, where a history is 
neither a record of events in sequence—“one damn thing after another”—nor an 
unchanging state of affairs, even if internally dynamic—“same thing, different day.” History 
records the changes in a world as it copes with new kinds of resistance, flexes its periphery 
in an environment, revises the centrality of its practices, or encounters other worlds—often 
all at the same time.  
We recognize historical change as different ways of relating to ourselves, others, and 
our world become dominant. This change is concrete in that it changes meaningful 
behavior. One may pithily reply that even a minor physical change in fact meets these 
conditions. Suppose I move the couch in my living room so people must now walk around it 
in a different way—don’t we now “relate” to it differently? Of course, but this change in 
effective organization implies no difference in meaningful behavior. We can see this in two 
ways. First, contrast two rooms, one with delicate Victorian furniture and one with sturdy 
rough-cut furniture. If one is sensitive to this difference, then the way one deals with the 
furniture will vary considerably. In the first case, one sits tensely and with as little shifting 
as possible; in the second case, one easily leans back and sets muddy feet on the table. The 
difference in these cases derives both from the styles one can marshal in a situation and the 
styles the effective organization can afford. Lean back in a Victorian chair, and it breaks. To 
satisfy a rough-cut style in a Victorian home, one must change one’s home. More 
significantly, if one is to satisfy a Christian style of brotherly love that includes African 
Americans, one must change one’s world as MLK and his followers did. This kind of change 
changes both the meaning of behavior and actual observed behavior. But, second, the 
meaning of behavior can change without much observed difference. Suppose that I, after a 
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trip to Germany, adopt a preference for German beer. Upon my return, I may continue to 
drink the only beer available, a cheap pilsner, but now I experience it differently, as 
unsatisfying. In such a case, only a specific situation would elicit a difference in observed 
behavior. A more dramatic case occurs in a personal conversion to new values; one can 
continue unabated in one’s family and work, but with a completely different appreciation 
for it.49 With respect to historical change, examples like JFK’s call to reach the moon or 9/11 
illustrate both kinds of change in different ways. In both examples, major effective changes 
ensued—allocations of resources, the priority of problems to be solved—but in the 
everyday lives of most people, nothing changed but some rekindled sense of the pioneering 
spirit, or patriotism, or dread, as the case may be. For many people, their behavior does not 
change, but what their behavior means does change. None of this happens when one moves 
a little furniture.  
How do those with sensitivity to change change their world?   
I want to formulate my answer in precise terms. By a real world, I mean the snapshot 
of a world with its specific practices and styles at a moment. By a possible world, I mean 
some possible shift in the arrangement of a real world based on its positive familiarity. And 
by an actual world, I mean the real world in aggregate with all its possible worlds. By a new 
world, I mean a change in the actual world—i.e. a change in meaning in the real world, with 
its implied changes in possibilities. A real world churns within its de facto practices along 
one possibility for that world—this internal “churning” is conventional change. In disclosive 
                                               
49 It would take us too far afield to discuss these cases in detail. On the one hand, clearly there are limits to the 
claim that nothing “observable” changes in these cases. Minor differences are bound to be noticed, but only 
if one has a precise-enough descriptive apparatus. On the other hand, we need not assume that our only, or 
even our primary, way of relating to others is through observing and interpreting behavioral cues.  
70 
  
change, however, a world shifts to proceed down a different possibility. But I argue in 
addition for creative change at the inception of new worlds, or new aspects of worlds, 
which are nonetheless continuous with earlier worlds. Non-creative forms of change 
initiate change only on the basis of positive familiarity.  
To make my case, I focus largely, though not exclusively, on the form of change 
initiated in entrepreneurial activity, because each type of change can be clearly seen 
operating in this domain. To appreciate this focus, two points should be made.  
First, entrepreneurship should not be misunderstood to be a purely economic 
activity. Contemporary scholarship acknowledges the analysis of non-economic factors in 
entrepreneurship as it ranges over many kinds of human involvements, rather than strictly 
economic categories of utility or well-being. For example, Peter Drucker argues (1) that 
entrepreneurship occurs in social and cultural activity, beyond strictly economic activity, 
and (2) that it affects cultural life beyond our economic well-being.50 In its role in a 
capitalist economy, entrepreneurship engages deeply with “the dignity or intensity or 
pleasantness of human life,” which refers to what is, for Joseph Schumpeter, ‘the true 
“output” of capitalist production.’51 Drucker may yet be short-sighted when he claims that 
entrepreneurship ‘pertains to all activities of human beings other than those one might 
term “existential” rather than “social”,’52 if it provides or transforms the values available for 
humans to understand themselves and lead meaningful lives. 
Second, the definitions offered by contemporary scholars of entrepreneurship imply 
the acceptance of some kind of radical change, because nothing less can explain the 
                                               
50 Drucker (1985) 
51 Schumpeter, 66 
52 Drucker, 27 
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differences in type between entrepreneurial and ordinary practice they embrace. Drucker, 
for example, develops the concept of innovation to distinguish ordinary practice from 
entrepreneurship: ordinary practice adapts familiar organizational models to a particular 
context to supply well-understood products and services; through innovation, 
entrepreneurs introduce novel organizational models for products and services. In a 
refinement of this view, Shane defines entrepreneurship as "an activity that involves the 
discovery, evaluation and exploitation of opportunities to introduce new goods and 
services, ways of organizing, markets, processes, and raw materials through organizing 
efforts that previously had not existed."53 Like me, Dreyfus, Flores, and Spinosa offer a 
descriptive account of entrepreneurship. On their view, the meaning of an entrepreneurial 
act derives from the way it makes history, where “something that makes history…changes 
the way in which we understand and deal with ourselves and with things.”54 Each definition 
appeals to something revolutionary, rather than merely evolutionary, in its characterization 
of entrepreneurial change.55 For example, Drucker seeks a view to explain how 
                                               
53 Shane (2004) 
54 DNW, 2 
55 The metaphor of evolution, taken from biology, refers to change that arises from the continuous working of 
dynamic, “blind” processes. In a world, every change of this kind is made intelligible by understanding the 
features of the processes at work in the environment—hence the processes are “blind” only with respect 
(1) to our ignorance or their workings and (2) insofar as they contradict an aim or telos we might insist 
exists to regulate change. The metaphor of revolution, taken from politics, refers to a more complete 
reconfiguration of processes, which resists a reduction to earlier forms of activity and intelligibility. 
Evolutionary theory, though offered as an account of biological continuity, depends on the concept of 
reproductive viability to provide its continuity. Natural selection operates on reproducible variations in an 
environment. Some of this variation is systematically expressed through normal genetic processes and 
recombinations in sexual reproduction. Some of this variation is introduced through “mutation.” As far as 
an analogy goes with evolutionary change in a world, only some aspects of mutation can be accepted. In 
biology, examples of mutation typically include replication errors and damage from mutagens. “Damage” to 
a world, which it is unable to repair, would represent a discontinuity—a breakdown in the systems of 
meanings from which it is unable to recover its previous state. And replication errors, it seems, bear at 
least two interpretations. First, because the reliability of a replication system can be higher or lower—i.e. 
express variability—such systems may well themselves be subject to natural selection. In this case, it 
would be imprecise to call these inexact replications “errors,” because they are theoretically coordinated 
by well-functioning systematic processes (i.e. species may be naturally selected based on their rate of 
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entrepreneurial activity can “transmute” values; and in its rejection of Drucker’s account, 
DNW itself claims to adequately describe how we transmute values. But if what we mean by 
the transmutation of value is the production of a genuinely new value out of old values, I 
deny that either of their views can account for it. Finally, the more distant and influential 
economist Joseph Schumpeter spoke of entrepreneurship most boldly. Entrepreneurs yield 
creative destruction; their function is to “reform or revolutionize the pattern of 
production”56 and to turn dormant materials into resources for the first time. Yet 
Schumpeter himself failed to distinguish between those elements of his vision that were 
evolutionary and those that were revolutionary, using the concepts interchangeably. 
Evolutionary change is significant, and can indeed lead to massive change in a world; but 
revolution is of a different kind, and lies on the side of his vision that is genuinely creative.  
With entrepreneurship as a primary example, I turn now to the investigation of 
convention, reason, disclosure, and creativity in producing change. Reason, I note, does not 
fall neatly into conventional or creative change; because it operates in its own distinctive 
way, and because it can involve creativity, reason must be examined separately.  
2.3.1 Convention  
There are at least three kinds of conventional change, one completely conventional, 
one featuring the relocation of a practice into new parts of a world, and one featuring the 
                                               
replication error, where this rate in part determines reproductive success). Second, considered as some 
unaccountable or unpredictable error, mutations must again be understood as discontinuities. Thus, in a 
sense relevant to the analogy, evolution may be understood as revealing the biological continuity of a great 
deal of underlying discontinuity. Revolutionary change involves this kind of discontinuity. The analog for 
biological continuity, in this case, is simply “successful coping” in a world. But successful coping cannot be 
understood as the sole criterion for historical continuity in a world without begging the question against 
my central argument, or concealing its main conclusion, that historical change includes many 
“revolutionary” discontinuities that do not threaten its status as a continuous history.   
56 Schumpeter, 132 
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hyper-development of a practice. Pure conventional change, in each case, depends on the 
execution or improvement of previously existing positive familiarities of practice and style. 
The cases are occasionally complicated by the fact that some elements of a single situation 
may be conventional, while other elements illustrate disclosure or creativity. So I try to 
indicate these differences along the way.  
 The first kind of conventional change is easy to see. The simple execution of our 
familiar practices have an effect on our world, we often initiate familiar practices in new 
locations, and we often reorganize elements of our world on the basis of familiar styles, 
methods, patterns, and so on. In entrepreneurial activity, this is the simple act of starting a 
new garden-variety business. One might recognize that the demand for some widget or 
service exceeds supply, and start a business to fill the gap. The success of this enterprise 
depends on how well one has judged the opportunity according to typical standards—how 
large is the actual need or market, how strong is the competition, etc. Starting a new diner 
in a town, for example, typically requires no creativity; one need only copy the methods 
previously established elsewhere, adapt it to the local conditions (following regular rules 
for adaptation), and rely on the local community to understand exactly what one is doing 
and trying to accomplish. Everything is conventional, and nothing world-changing typically 
results from these activities. Indeed, such activities simply reproduce the world as it is.  
 The second case of conventional change involves the relocation of a practice familiar 
in one context to a location with less familiarity. So, for example, one might open an 
Ethiopian restaurant in a small rural community with little exposure to ethnic cuisine. In 
this case, the success of the venture depends on whether a latent demand for this food can 
be realized in the community. Such cases bear an analogy to an invasive species in biology, 
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where the conditions in an environment support the invasive species extremely well, 
though there is no special adaptation required on the part of the species to the new 
environment. A community may well be receptive to a practice it did not come up with on 
its own.  
 To really understand this case, it is important to distinguish the familiarity of the 
actor (the restaurant owner) from that of the audience (customers, in this case). We need 
not assume any creative work or specific new insight on the part of the actor in initiating a 
venture in an unusual setting. This is why the change is conventional. On the side of the 
audience, however, there are three possibilities. First, a community may well have mounted 
a strong, explicit demand for the new practice. This case collapses into the pure 
conventional change described above, because then it is simply a matter for some business-
starter to recognize the opportunity and act in conventional ways. Second, a community 
may have marginal positive familiarity with the new practice, which the practice helps to 
make more central. Most people have some familiarity with ethnic cuisine, for example, and 
a new restaurant in their community would simply help make this kind of dining more 
central. This case then involves some disclosive change as described below. Third, however, 
a community may well lack familiarity with the new practice, and have little success in 
coping with it on the basis of their conventional styles. In this case the audience must 
engage with the new venture in a way that escapes mere convention and involves creativity.        
 I have already noted some examples of what I mean by the third kind of 
conventional change, which develops and refines previously existing styles and practices. 
Call this hyper-conventional change. For example, the exemplar of a practice can expand 
what we recognize to be the limits of a practice or set of practices by achieving new degrees 
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of excellence. This is the athlete who advances her sport by mastering and refining its 
required skills or the businesswoman who builds new levels of profitability in a company 
through excellence in management. This kind of change is conventional because it draws on 
skills and values shared with and completely familiar to others, but develops and enacts 
them to new extremes. The old chestnut “new and improved,” as applied to a product, 
captures this sense of hyper-conventional change. A product of this kind satisfies a need or 
desire with greater precision and consistency; it hones a satisfaction to a sharper point. 
 We see the most penetrating version of this form of change in the work of economist 
Don Lavoie, in his effort to express the insights of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics in 
economic theory. In his own terms, Lavoie acknowledges the requirements for 
understanding changes in meaning and for recognizing the genuine creativity underwriting 
much of this change. “…[C]ulture is to be understood broadly as the complex of meanings 
that allows us to comprehend human action: it is the background context that renders 
purposeful action intelligible.”57 Yet social scientists, and especially economists, have failed 
to study genuine cultural change—its conditions, features, and importance—focusing 
instead on static snapshots of a culture at a moment or on optimizations over time of 
current or past conditions. “Change usually appears in the economists’ models only as 
deterministic tendencies toward a fixed equilibrium, like the movements of a clockwork 
mechanism, not as a truly creative process. Thus economists usually explain 
entrepreneurial action as maximizing an objective function according to given 
constraints.”58 Here we can see Lavoie criticizing the normal kinds of conventional change. 
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Operating in this way, economic theory cannot grasp entrepreneurial transformations of 
cultural meaning effectively, because, to put it my own way, they tend to study only the 
process of optimization rather than changes in what is optimized. What we need to 
understand, according to Lavoie, are the properties of entrepreneurship “connoted” by the 
terms discovery and interpretation: 
Discovery suggests an element of radical change, a surprising find, an 
unanticipated break with past patterns. … Entrepreneurship should include 
genuine novelty and creativity and should not be rendered as a mechanical 
search for pre-existing profit opportunities. … Interpretation suggests the 
point that the profit opportunities entrepreneurs discover are not a matter of 
objective observations of quantities, but a matter of perspectival 
interpretation, a discerning of the intersubjective meaning of a qualitative 
situation. Profits are not measured; they are “read.”59      
 
I agree with Lavoie’s basic setup and with the emphasis on “discovery,” but the attempt to 
understand world-changing action on the basis of interpretation leads to either (1) the 
inability to escape positive familiarity to something genuinely new or (2) an implicit 
assumption of more radical creativity in his view that he incorrectly attributes to 
interpretation. 
 We should note two constraints operating on an adequate conception of 
transformative or revolutionary change, to which Lavoie is sensitive. First, we note that 
change on the basis of implementing or optimizing well-understood models cannot 
generate the kind of change associated with entrepreneurial action, as already mentioned. 
But, second, the entrepreneur’s action cannot be completely spontaneous or impulsive in a 
way that removes any possibility of intelligible connections to preexisting conditions. 
                                               
59 Lavoie, 36 ff. Note that Lavoie is careful to remove further unwanted connotations. Discovery is not merely a 
process of uncovering what was already there, and interpretation is not merely a subjective projection 
without constraints on meaning.  
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Navigating these two constraints can be difficult, because they seem mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive. As Lavoie puts it, “to many economists, explanations that are not fully 
mechanistic are necessarily unintelligible.”60 The theoretical fear, so to speak, of the latter 
unintelligibility leads many theorists to distort creative change by subjecting it to the stamp 
of rationalism or mechanism. Lavoie, I argue, goes as far as one can in the middle without 
actually reaching creativity. His view is not rationalist in the sense he criticizes, but neither 
does it explain any more than conventional change. 
 On Lavoie’s view, a true entrepreneur develops a hyper-sensitivity to his culture, 
enabling him to offer a “new reading” on the complexity, like someone reading a 
complicated book and offering a new interpretation. The entrepreneur is not an isolated 
rational agent and cannot be understood on the principle of methodological individualism. 
Rather, he is so deeply embedded in his culture that he identifies previously unrealized 
possibilities: 
[H]is ability to read new things into a situation is not primarily due to his 
separateness from others but, indeed, to his higher degree of sensitivity to 
what others are looking for. The really successful entrepreneurs we know are 
not unusually separate from others; on the contrary, they are especially well 
plugged into the culture. … They can pick up the sense of where their fellows 
in the culture stand, what values they adhere to, what purposes they pursue, 
what they consider beautiful, and what they deem profane.61 
 
For Lavoie, then, the most important aspect of the entrepreneur is his rich sensitivity to the 
features of the world of which he is a part. On the basis of this sensitivity, he can accelerate 
development of practices, anticipate what others want and need, and, through a shared 
positive familiarity, communicate his new discoveries to others, bringing them into the fold 
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of a new discovery. None of this is rational, in an abstract mechanical sense; 
entrepreneurial actions result from intense practical engagement, rather than reason.  
 Nonetheless, first, there can be nothing genuinely new introduced or recognized by 
such an entrepreneur, except insofar as creativity of a stronger form is implicitly assumed 
as an aspect of interpretation. Both the process by which an entrepreneur acts and the 
means by which it is intelligible and communicable for him and others remains fully 
conditioned by previous practices and styles. It is as though one increased the resolution of 
photograph, making a once blurry image clearer. To claim that, by clarifying the image, one 
sees something new in the picture requires a completely different claim to realizing a new 
way of seeing things or the creation of a new object in the picture, both of which call for 
something new to be recognized in the picture. And this is the heart of the matter. No 
position that depends entirely on positive familiarity to ensure continuity, connectedness, 
and intelligibility can make a claim to novelty in the sense required for creative, 
transformative, or revolutionary change, because identifying this kind of change is precisely 
to identify something unlike what one has experienced before. Hence, hyper-sensitivity to 
the features of one’s world, and initiating change on this basis, remains conventional. 
   Second, hyper-conventional change is singular and specific to a fault. The 
consultant who more perfectly identifies the needs of her client, the marketer who achieves 
the ideal communication of the value of a product, or the analyst who uncovers a trend in 
consumption with meticulous precision—each makes a hyper-conventional contribution to 
its practice that lacks extension or generality beyond a specific case. In a word, hyper-
conventional change does not introduce a new style. In this sense, the analogy to 
interpreting a complex text is apt, because a rich, detailed, and persuasive interpretation of 
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a text typically remains wholly absorbed in that text. Based only on one’s hypersensitivity 
to the text one can point out only what others had failed to notice, rather than motivate or 
envision a new way to read the text. For example the most erudite and sophisticated 
reading of Nietzsche as an existentialist, even if persuasive, would still just coordinate his 
texts on the basis of familiar style. A genuinely new way of reading Nietzsche, however, 
could actually be quite clumsy and underdeveloped—even unpersuasive—even while its 
importance as a creative contribution is recognized.    
Each of these kinds of conventional change is important. Ordinary conventional 
change affects the material conditions supporting our practices and the continuity of 
meaning on which we depend. Relocating practices spreads the diversity of practices. And 
hypersensitivity is often important in locating negative familiarity with precision. Yet no 
conventional change can modify our background understanding of things, each other, and 
ourselves in a way that revolutionary change suggests we can do. To understand history-
making, we must look elsewhere.    
2.3.2 Reason 
Another way of trying to understand how we change our world focuses on 
rationality and theory. Theoretical or rational accounts of change seek a rational model for 
practical activity. Such a model typically has two components, one ontological and one 
epistemological. First, ontologically, a theorist claims we can understand the nature of a 
complex practical phenomenon by reducing it to simple, theoretical units and their 
relations—this reduction constitutes an explanation for the phenomenon in simpler terms. 
A full explanation then permits the construction of new things from the simple units by 
altering their relations. Science is the ideal here, and especially physics, in which an 
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understanding of fundamental particles and the laws governing them constitutes an 
explanation of physical phenomena and endows us with new technical capacities. Second, 
epistemologically, a theorist insists that our intentional human production proceeds 
according to a set of basic operations on knowledge, that our knowledge can be 
systematically and explicitly articulated, and that theoretical rules may be supplied 
allowing us to exploit our knowledge to produce new things. On this view, humans are 
theorists; our productive activity, when competent, takes place on the basis of an abstract, 
theoretical understanding of our situation according to which we modify our environment.  
Drawing separately on DNW and Lavoie, I offer two separate lines of criticism of this 
rationalist view. Yet, as with the hyper-conventional view, I propose that reason can bring 
us close to creating new worlds in important ways—ways denied by its critics.  
The first criticism is acute. Creativity is necessary, rather than practical reason and 
decision-making, because practical reason itself cannot make a new choice.  
Following Lavoie (himself following the work of Israel Kirzner), consider the case of 
Robinson Crusoe using a vine to construct a net and catch fish. First, Lavoie mentions a 
rationalist construction of the case. On a typical rationalist view, Crusoe is hungry and does 
not have the equipment to catch a fish. Seeing the vine, he chooses to innovate—to make 
the vine into a net. That is, among the many choices Crusoe has for proceeding in his 
situation, making something new, for new use, is among them, and, all things considered, 
that is the best option.  
This quick characterization doggedly mis-describes the case. First, in Crusoe’s initial 
experience, the vine is simply an element of his environment—not a resource, but a 
nuisance or something to hold onto. There is no rational way of overcoming this prejudiced 
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familiarity with the vine; he must achieve a quite different way of seeing the vines—as a 
resource for his use. Only then can he choose this course of action. As Lavoie puts it: 
According to mainstream economics, individual choice takes place within a 
given interpretation of opportunities and constraints. [But] Discovery … 
necessitates the transcending of the prior interpretive framework and the 
emergence of a new one. Thus, Crusoe interprets his world in a 
fundamentally different way after he discovers the possibility of producing 
fishnet out of vine. Where before he had seen the vine only as an obstacle, as 
something to avoid getting tangled up in, he now sees it as an opportunity to 
make psychic profits.62  
 
The rational view begs the question. It implicitly assumes creative work one has already 
done in order to account for its “rational” results. “Choosing to innovate” makes no sense. 
One can want to innovate, just as one can want milk from the store. But this desire makes 
no concrete contribution to the innovative achievement, except, in my terms, to delineate 
negative familiarity.   
 While I agree with this argument, there is some weakness in the specific example. 
One may object that the rational power of abstraction easily handles this case. If my door 
will not stay open, and I do not have a standard doorstop, I can easily abstract to 
“something heavy” as a solution to the problem. This chair is heavy, so it is my new 
doorstop. Similarly, Crusoe’s familiarity with fishnets can enable an abstract scheme for 
approximate replication—what he needs is something rope-like, long, and strong-enough. 
Looking around with these criteria, the vine fits the bill. While this response has its own 
puzzles about how and why one selects abstract criteria and how one applies them in 
perception, it mounts, I think, a worthwhile objection to Lavoie’s key example. So let’s 
consider it.  
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 In my terms, on this objection, Crusoe encounters a problem he can solve on the 
basis of his positive familiarity. With enough previous familiarity with fishnets and what 
makes them work, I see no problem with the idea that he could, while perceiving his world 
on the basis of an abstraction, see the vines as net-material (and therefore no longer just as 
vines). Abstraction is a powerful way of clarifying the essential elements of a situation for 
transfer to another situation, finding something familiar in it that one overlooked before. In 
this case, however, Crusoe does not invent or innovate; he makes a fishnet satisfying its 
essential properties, but with different accidental properties (vine rather than rope). 
However, we recover the initial argument by pointing to or imagining cases where there is 
not this positive familiarity. There was a time when fishnets had not yet been invented, for 
example. If, by hypothesis, Crusoe lacks familiarity with nets and principles of catching 
game, then there is no basis in experience from which to abstract, and he finds himself in 
the “original position” of a world without fishnets. He certainly has the negative familiarity 
with limitations on familiar ways to catch fish—and he is hungry—but to catch his meal, he 
must create something new.  
Yet one might want to build a protracted chain of reasoning, rigging cases of 
analogies or abstractions that solve the problem non-creatively—based entirely on a 
continuous extension from familiar experience. Imagine, for example, that Crusoe tries to 
catch fish with his hands and fails. But he realizes that bigger hands in a net-like formation 
would work, and so on, until he arrives at the vine fishnet. This approach will not work, 
because both analogical reasoning and abstraction require creative syntheses to extend 
one’s familiarity, to build a new purpose that something familiar can be for. Because 
analogies are, in this context, relations among abstractions, we need only consider 
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abstraction. First, there is a problem of motivating abstract reasoning. The thing from 
which he abstracts (his hands) has already failed; hence he has no positive familiarity with 
a success that would suggest he is on the right track. He has only the negative familiarity 
that what he has does not work. Second, the notion that “bigger hands” would help is 
already a synthesis of meaning. He does not get the notion of “bigger” from his hands. 
Third, abstraction, on its own, is just a lack of detail. There are two important points about 
this. One, abstraction from a fishnet is just a less detailed fishnet; abstraction from one’s 
hands is a skeleton—or a color, or a shape. For the abstraction to mean anything else, one 
must relate it to other frameworks of meaning—strength and tensile qualities or weaves, 
for instance. Relatedly, two, the selection of what to abstract— which features of the fishnet 
(or hands) to retain—is guided by a purpose. This is the aspect of abstraction that guides it 
to produce a new, independent abstract object, a bundle of properties each relating to a 
specific value or purpose. But note that the purpose must be presupposed in detail for the 
act of abstraction—the purpose of “capturing” a fish is too general where the purpose of 
“netting” a fish is required. In general, one must achieve a sense of what would satisfy a 
problem before developing a useful abstraction, and one must therefore depart from one’s 
familiarity. Abstraction that generates an innovative difference from past familiarities must 
always presuppose some creativity. Otherwise, the abstraction would just tell us what we 
already know, but with less detail.  
We see this kind of criticism borne out differently in a direct discussion of changing 
a world. A descriptive account like that offered in DNW denies both that competent, human 
practice can be theoretically explained and that human production is entirely theory-
driven, because both theses entail a denial of many of the concrete, particular relations and 
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local, implicit knowledge that constitutes meaning in an historical moment. The ideal of 
theory is absolute, universal knowledge, true at all times and places, and is therefore 
“profoundly anti-historical.”63 
According to DNW, the capacity most enshrined in the theoretical stance, which 
makes it possible, is detachment. Detachment from our engaged, practical situation to a 
theoretical stance occurs in stages.64 First, like a military general moving to higher ground 
on a battlefield, we detach to remove ourselves from immediate pressures and demands of 
situations and gain a larger perspective on a whole. Second, we detach from the passions of 
a situation, which seem to distort clear thinking. We remove affect, because it seems 
accidental, rather than essential, to the objects we try to understand. Third, we detach from 
traditions and habits that inform our regular activity, enabling us to see the instrumental, 
or means-end, structure of our practices. Detaching to an instrumental perspective enables 
us to cope with the experience and mimic those around us. Fourth, because the 
instrumental perspective enables us to cope in multiple situations, we privilege the features 
of things that serve in their instrumental function. Finally, fifth, we achieve a theoretical 
stance, in which relations of de-contextualized elements constitute the nature of a 
phenomenon. From this stance, we try to account for empirical regularities in terms of a 
theory, and count our theories as truer the better they meet with predictive success. A 
theorist offers, for example, atomic particles, profit, or teaching as basic elements of 
physical reality, business, and education, respectively. A military general comes to think of 
soldiers and supplies in largely quantitative and instrumental terms, rather than qualitative 
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or personal terms, and develops strategies for deploying troops according to an overall 
theory of warcraft.  
Whatever the benefits of the theoretical stance in physical science, it suffers from an 
acute problem in the domain of history: it is unable to adapt to and explain historical 
change. Historical change consists of a modification to our background understanding of 
what things and people are. The theoretical stance is inadequate because what it posits as 
basic elements is extracted from, rather than constitutive of, these background 
understandings. Its abstract units are derivative. When the background understanding 
changes, “what counts as facts” change with it.65 Thus, new theories of practical activity are 
always responses to changes that have already occurred.  
According to DNW, Peter Drucker’s account of entrepreneurship is a perfect example 
of the theoretical stance and its deficiencies. Drucker argues that entrepreneurial 
innovation is a process amenable to rational ordering, and that management can stimulate 
innovation by learning its law-like principles. “Innovation is … organized, systematic, 
rational work.”66 Such rational innovation makes sense, on Drucker’s account, because of 
his understanding of change. Change seems itself to be a basic fact of a world, conforming to 
its own order, definable in terms of the dynamic interactions of practices and knowledge. 
These interactions supply data for the observant theorist, who then works to exploit the 
change to his benefit. “Usually,” writes Drucker, “[entrepreneurs] do not bring about 
[change] themselves. But … the entrepreneur always searches for change, responds to it, and 
exploits it as an opportunity.”67 As long as change is a datum for theorizing, it makes sense to 
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suggest that particular rational procedures can empower an entrepreneur to more 
effectively deal with change. Such procedures give one an ideally permanent theoretical 
stance outside of change, and thus a stance outside of history. 
The critical response from the descriptive account is that Drucker largely 
misunderstands the phenomenon of change, and thus misses the necessary role of the 
entrepreneur in making change happen. A theoretical stance neuters the nature of change 
by dictating the kinds of change that can intelligibly show up as a function of the theory. All 
change, from the theoretical perspective, is then only intelligible as evolutionary change, 
which we can understand through an adequate theory of cultural evolution. Changes that 
do not conform to the theory are merely aberrations or results of random events, if they are 
recognized at all.68 Theory finds such change unintelligible, and thus negligible. The kinds 
of change to which theory can be responsive, and which rational procedures can help 
understand, are only those internal to a dominant historical way of understanding people 
and things; it only serves to represent, extrapolate, or expand the typical values and 
assumptions of an historical era. Entrepreneurship, on this understanding, can never 
introduce a new practice, establish a new value, or “open up a new space for human 
action.”69     
To illustrate this point, consider the case of Citibank. On Drucker’s account, Citibank 
recognized the changing cultural perceptions of women in the work place through the 
1960s and 1970s, and sought to exploit this change by recruiting the most competent 
                                               
68 Drucker seems to recognize such change intermittently in his discussion of “bright ideas” (Chapter 10) 
resulting in interesting but unpredictable inventions, or “flashes of genius” that result in interesting, but 
unrealized ideas (Da Vinci’s notebooks are exemplary). We see the effect of theory dictating intelligibility 
here. The “romance of invention and innovation” is constrained by the theory, because it does not agree 
with the thesis of entrepreneurship as “hard, organized, purposeful work” (Drucker, 133).  
69 DNW, 37 
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women to the firm. Many firms equipped with the same fact—that many of the best college 
graduates were women—rejected the change and simply tried harder to recruit the best 
men. The change in perception, therefore, was inevitable on Drucker’s account; the 
question regarding entrepreneurship is who recognizes and exploits the change first.70 The 
DNW disclosure account, on the other hand, takes neither the change in the perception of 
women nor its particular features for granted. The change might have occurred a different 
way, through political or legal channels, or been stifled altogether by a reassertion of 
chauvinism or an alternative cultural movement. The main point is that Citibank “played a 
leading role in making the change occur as it did” through its acts, and is for this reason 
entrepreneurial.71 Citibank did not simply respond to determined changes in perception, 
but helped generate this basic change through its entrepreneurial activity. It did not simply 
respond to facts, but helped dictate what would count as facts about people and things in 
the new practical world. Thus, on the disclosure view, Citibank helped to enact 
revolutionary change—change that is (1) underdetermined by antecedent conditions and 
(2) history-making. But it did not and could not do this on the basis of a rational 
understanding of change. On the disclosure view, then, the point of an account of 
entrepreneurship is to develop sensitivities to our practical world and describe the ways an 
entrepreneur typically acts to initiate revolutionary change, rather than to convey 
knowledge and rational procedures for responding to evolutionary change. 
Nonetheless, I think Lavoie and DNW miss some key features in their descriptions, 
which enable a role for abstraction or detachment in generating change. They generate 
                                               
70 Drucker, 106-107 
71 DNW, 37 
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change, even if they do not understand it. I cannot be exhaustive in pursuing this claim, but 
I will give some indication of what I mean. 
First, rational action can change the parameters for a practice that affect the 
meaningful experience of practitioners. Take, for example, the problem that chess games 
just take too long. The introduction of timers to solve that problem can be understood as a 
rational solution, because, at a suitable level of abstraction, any event can be delimited by a 
timer. Though a rational solution to the problem, the solution has a series of unintended 
consequences—consequences not represented in the abstract problematic—like the shift in 
the style of competition. The rational solution actually makes the style of time-efficiency 
coordinate more of the game in practice, and many would experience some disorientation 
in becoming familiar with this new way of playing the game. To take a contemporary 
example, suppose someone was so fed up with copious emails that he built a system to time 
emails—one minute to read and one minute to write. Such a system would seem to violate 
the integrity of written communication for many. But if adopted, the system of constraints 
would engender a new style of writing. In such cases, one simply acts on the basis of what 
counts as “facts” at a certain level of description, without regard for implicit and 
contextually sensitive knowledge, but the act still opens up “new action.” Whether or not 
these cases are considered cases of creativity in reason, so to speak, again depends on the 
familiarity of those involved with the facts with which they work and their relations.       
Second, DNW mistakenly contrasts detachment and engagement. Detachment 
neither undermines familiarity nor engagement, but rather changes its parameters. The 
phenomenology here is fairly complex.  
89 
  
To understand this point, it is helpful to note the difference between detachment 
and abstraction. In detachment one suppresses elements of one’s experience in situation, 
rather than removing (what are taken to be) accidental elements of a situation. Detachment 
acts on the experiencing person; abstraction acts on the experienced object. Detachment 
changes how one attends to objects; abstraction changes what in an object one attends to. 
Both are cases modifying one’s sense-making in a situation, but in different ways.  
Put schematically, therefore, another form of detachment is to suppress clear 
thinking in favor of only the affective elements of a situation, rather than detaching to 
functional relationships between parts. Imagine having an engaged conversation with a 
loved one. In abstraction, one removes accidental elements of the situation—the restaurant 
setting and food, say—to try to get at a core of what makes the moment special. In 
theoretical detachment, by contrast, one suppresses some of the affective elements that 
make the moment special in favor of conceptual exchanges of meaning. Or in “emotional 
detachment,” one focuses on the affective qualities of the situation, while suppressing the 
actual communication in which it inheres. To draw the distinction figuratively, theoretical 
detachment is bad acting with a good script; emotional detachment is good acting with a 
bad script. Technically, then, detachment is unnecessary for abstraction, but sufficient for it, 
because every act of detachment removes details involved in the suppressed aspects of 
experience. But this abstraction is an effect of detachment, rather than its function. Both 
abstraction and detachment can equip one with familiar transportable experience—a 
concept to apply in another situation or a way of attending to a situation. So, for example, 
someone who has been hurt by those he trusts may carry an “anti-historical” distrust with 
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him into new relationships or someone who adopts an evolutionary theory connects 
behaviors meaningfully on the basis of the theory.  
In the DNW description of detachment, we actually see a ratcheting of intellectual 
detachment and abstraction. Contrast the tutor working day to day with individual 
students, addressing their needs with exacting attention, with the university administrator 
maximizing metrics for enrollment and retention. The path from tutor to administrator 
includes a detachment from the immediate pressures to respond to any specific student 
and an abstraction to what needs they hold in common, followed by a detachment from 
affective and traditional aspects of the situation and an abstraction to the instrumental 
relations between certain events and desired outcomes. This process can undermine one’s 
internal familiarity in favor of external familiarity. DNW correctly recognizes that 
movement, but fails to see how one can establish new internal familiarity, new internal 
goods, and therefore a new identity. In other words, the tutor who becomes an 
administrator gradually changes his identity. And the administrator achieves a new 
engagement with the content of his practice—no longer people, but “numbers,” as we say—
by gradually moving from working with people to working with numbers. DNW represents 
the scientist or the military general as “detached” rather than “engaged” in a situation. But 
the best scientists and generals are actually fully engaged; they just engage with objects 
that no longer fully represent the familiarity with which they began their development. 
Consequently, (1) modifications on the basis of a “theory” can and do imply effects at the 
level of meaning, though they do not necessarily understand their own effects, and (2) 
creative work can and does proceed throughout all areas of human involvement, whether 
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“detached” or not. Or, rather, the fact that one is detached, on a certain description, is no 
argument against the possibility of creativity.  
2.3.3 Disclosure 
From what has been said, the explication and criticism of the disclosure account 
proceeds relatively briskly. Disclosing requires, most generally, two kinds of skills: first, one 
must be able to detect and work with disharmonies in one’s practical world; second, one 
must skillfully change practices to remove disharmonies.72 The former sensitivity allows 
one to grasp the requirements for change; the latter enables one to initiate a change. I will 
take each skill in turn. 
A disharmony is the experience of a poor coordination of practices in our lives on 
the basis of one’s style. When one is frustrated or stymied in the course of everyday life, 
there is a disharmony—a lack of seamless integration in the practices in which we live. We 
might overlook these disharmonies through inattention, struggle through them on the 
assumption that “this is just how things are,” or detach to a theoretical stance in an attempt 
to solve the disharmony as an intellectual problem. But none of these strategies is likely to 
be successful for a disharmony that requires an underlying change to the way practices are 
coordinated. One may easily detect disharmonies by carrying an uncommon style into a set 
of practices, when an office manager takes his style home to his family or a teacher takes his 
professorial style to a weekend with high school buddies. But normally disharmonies are 
harder to spot, because one does not easily notice that one’s style has changed or that the 
practices one engages in resist the style. DNW offers the example of a romantic relationship 
that falls into a disharmony, because partners begin to feel out of step with each other and 
                                               
72 DNW, 22 
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unable to sustain what was once vitalizing. To deal with the disharmony, they must 
intensify, rather than abstract from, their practical engagement. This active intensification 
constitutes the first skill of disclosing by more fully developing and situating a disharmony 
within the particular, local features of one’s everyday living. Rather than an abstract 
inspection of their relationship, the partners work vigorously to bring the disharmony to 
perspicuous relief and search for a new arrangement of practices or emphasis in their 
relationship that resolves the tension. For example, by exacerbating and holding on to the 
disharmony actively, the partners may discover a situation in which the tension is relieved 
in the presence of children, enabling them to recognize a mutual affection and desire for 
children that had not been prominent. Thus they resolve the disharmony by having 
children. Disharmonies, therefore, are best explored through an “involved experimentation” 
that remains ever-engaged in the particular features of a situation.      
Naturally, on my view, “disharmonies” are most closely related to negative 
familiarity. But two points about the example should be kept in mind before proceeding. 
First, the DNW account of disharmony here implies that disharmonies arise on the 
background of changes that are already taking place—the changes in one’s background 
sense of what a family should be. Second, the solution to the disharmony is a readily 
available and familiar form of life. Thus, the local history of a romantic couple changes 
toward a different possibility, but not one that did not already exist within the purview of 
their familiar world. This is even clearer in the DNW description of the second skill of 
disclosing.      
  The second skill involves changing a style that coordinates our meaningful 
engagement in practices. We do this by being sensitive to the disharmonies showing up in 
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our everyday lives, and working to reorder our practices until the disharmony is resolved. 
In order to make this change meaningful and intelligible, any change to the ordering of our 
practices must be experienced as continuous with earlier orderings: 
The continuity [of history] is provided by the fact that change is organized 
around taking a practice with which people have some familiarity and 
making it more important.73  
 
Without this continuity, according to DNW, change is experienced as unhistorical; this 
condition is therefore essential to the disclosure account. And as a result, history disclosing 
skills may take only three logical forms, each assuming familiarity with some practice that 
is given a more pronounced role in the coordination of practices. First, articulation: in this 
form, one recovers, revives, or emphasizes a particular ignored or implicit practice in order 
to give it greater importance. For example, a jack-of-all-trades may refine his diverse 
interests in favor of one particular trade that gives him the greatest satisfaction, leaving 
behind many hobbies. Or, on the DNW description, Martin Luther King Jr. articulated 
Christian charity in a way that gave social inclusiveness a more pronounced meaning in the 
lives of citizens, undermining competing styles of exclusion. Articulation typically enhances 
one’s sense of integrity, focus, and coherence. Second, cross-appropriation: in this form, a 
practice otherwise alien to a coordinated set of practices is introduced to resolve a 
disharmony and effect a change in style. For example, the practice of using the Internet, 
developed originally for the efficient transmission of scientific data, has been appropriated 
into everyday social life to change the style of social interactions; the feminist cross-
appropriation of masculine practices effected a change in the meaning of gender identity. 
This is the reverse case of conventional relocation described above. An experience of 
                                               
73 DNW, 168 
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enhancement, I claim, typically accompanies cross-appropriation, like a spice used to 
enhance the dormant flavors of a meal. Third, reconfiguration: in this form, some marginal 
practice coordinated by a style is made dominant, again changing the dominant style. For 
example, the style of disposable objects was given greater dominance with Gillette’s 
introduction of the disposable razor blade, which largely dismantled the centuries-old use 
of straight razors and contributed to the demise of a style of care and maintenance for one’s 
objects. As experienced, reconfiguration initially enhances one’s sense of fecundity or 
possibility. According to DNW, no other form of history-making is possible because there 
are no other ways in which our practices can be reorganized on the basis of a previous 
familiarity.         
Important as it is for changing the overall organization of a world, however, 
disclosure can never actually open up “new spaces” of action, transmute values, or disclose 
a new world any more than the non-creative theoretical position it criticizes. The disclosure 
account does not give us the resources to account for revolutions in our culture or everyday 
lives that do not have their basis fully in features of our world, internally variable and fertile 
though they may be. This position is forced by the principle of familiarity, in virtue of which 
only practices with which we already have some familiarity can be admitted into 
continuous historical change. As a consequence, it has no resources for explaining the 
introduction of genuinely new practices or styles or how they can be experienced as 
continuous with world change. The enhancement of sensitivity and history-making skills of 
articulation, cross-appropriation, and reconfiguration are merely ways of making us more 
attuned to the dormant features and possibilities of our world. The promise of granting 
more prominence to the role of entrepreneurs in shaping the specific course of history is 
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met only in the restricted sense that they help select one of the many possibilities our 
culture offers to us. Citibank helped shape the history of feminism, but any other historical 
path, even one denying feminism altogether, would have been historically continuous in 
equal measure.   
The history of a world, on this view, is a closed system, a system of shuffling and 
reshuffling the inheritance of practices we already have. To disclose a world is to develop an 
old world, where the only new aspect of that world is the pursuit of its different extant 
possibilities. Hence, the introduction of a new practice from an historically unrelated 
culture, the accidental production of a practice, or the creation of a new practice within a 
culture can only be experienced as non-historical, as a break in the familiar ways of acting 
in and understanding one’s world, and thus frequently as a source of anxiety. Disclosure, 
therefore, is a powerful simulacrum of genuine creativity, but it is not creativity. Disclosure 
is a motor for change between possibilities in a world, but not for change of the total set of 
possibilities of a world.     
Moreover, were disclosure the most we could do, then we would have no way of 
making sense of genuine historical discontinuities, nor a way of coping with them. For 
example, the Roman conquest of Germania interrupted the histories of numerous tribal 
regions, enforcing a new regime with different values and different concrete practices. 
American Manifest Destiny undermined and destroyed the centuries-old historical 
continuity of Native Americans. In a more local case, eminent domain can strip a family of 
land owned and continuously developed for generations. First, the disclosure view cannot 
represent these historical discontinuities as genuine, because it has no grounds for showing 
how genuine difference could ever originate in the first place. Disclosure makes no new 
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practices or styles that could constitute such a radical difference. As long as a world 
proceeds through continuous transformation on the basis of familiar practices, nothing like 
a different, new world could emerge, because worlds cannot diverge in any essential sense. 
Different histories, or different worlds, on this view, can only be represented as alternative 
realizations of original possibilities. On the one hand, were this the case, then it must then 
be possible to overcome apparent incompatibilities between resulting histories through the 
history-making skills DNW describes, by reorganizing practices and their priority until a 
shared world is realized and continuity reestablished. But Native Americans did not 
experience a disorientation, followed by a gradual retrieval and reorganization of practices 
and the familiar styles they afford in order to recover a continuous history; their history 
was broken in many ways; a new history began that refers to the impact of a radically 
different world. On the other hand, assuming that such different worlds do exist, the 
disclosure view can make little contribution to the ability to mend historical discontinuities 
or to adopt a different world. Of course, this is not the intent of history-making skills. But 
acclimation is possible. This process of acclimation, of coming to understand a new world, 
is much like the adoption of a new style. One does the things one normally does in that 
world, gradually grasping the links in the effective arrangement of practices, seeing how it 
enables a form of life. One becomes sensitive to problems that this arrangement answers to 
and develops an identity that makes sense in new terms.       
2.3.4 Creativity 
Through creative acts, one introduces novel meaning into a world, simultaneously 
unfamiliar and historically continuous. How can this be? 
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I explore novelty in greater detail in the next chapter. Suffice it to say here that, for 
something to be novel, it must necessarily be unfamiliar in a specific way. This does not 
mean a novelty is unintelligible, weird, or uncognizable. But if something is encountered (in 
the third-person) or produced (in the first-person) without some unfamiliarity, then one’s 
range of responses to it or uses of it are limited to past responses and uses. Novelties are 
discontinuous with one’s past. One recognizes that in the creation there is a divergence in 
meaning from the past, rather than a mere reproduction or re-coordination of meaning. The 
variations in how we encounter new things are subtle, and it is worth exploring through 
some examples before summarizing. 
The unfamiliarity we typically experience in a creative novelty lies at threshold of 
our current meaningful world, advancing beyond it. If one sees an old farm implement 
rusting in a yard, it may be largely unfamiliar. One may not even know what it was used for, 
let alone how to use it. One nonetheless has a general, contextual familiarity with the kind 
of thing it is—though there is of course room for reasonable doubt about the accuracy of 
any judgments one makes. More importantly, though, one perceives the implement as a 
thing of the past. This is not a matter of interpreting the rust to place it in the past. Rather 
the problems to which it was a solution are no longer our problems. We recognize that it 
was a part of our world we have superseded. Toilets, on the other hand, have not changed 
much in decades. Even a broken old toilet, sitting in an abandoned lot, is immediately 
recognized as a current element of our world. Here we have not realized problems with the 
toilet, or we have not yet introduced something that seeks to change our lavatory practice.   
What we have is a Goldilocks problem, where creations must be neither too soon nor 
too late, and neither reduced to old familiarities nor so radical that they are disconnected 
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from familiar meanings. This fit is a function of both the new thing and the context into 
which it is introduced. Furthermore, the creativity can even lie on the side of consumers, 
rather than producers. The appropriation of social media by the masses, for example, far 
outstrips the initial vision of a site for college students, and several social media platforms 
had to fail before one finally succeeded.  
When something achieves this fit, we often observe conflict and disruption—
Schumpeter’s creative destruction—in the meanings we take for granted. Take the advent 
of crowd-sourced encyclopedias. Historically, the encyclopedia—itself an exceptional 
innovation—has been the work of expert scholars. One way to treat an online, non-peer-
reviewed encyclopedia (e.g. Wikipedia) enforces the same expectations one developed for 
the past. One wants to use the encyclopedia in exactly the same way one has always used an 
encyclopedia, and in fact levies criticisms based precisely on what is innovative about the 
new encyclopedia. One’s familiarity with past encyclopedias includes a style of authority, 
confidence, and integrity that the new encyclopedia cannot accommodate. The new 
encyclopedia requires a style that sees knowledge as the responsibility of many people, 
ever-changing in response to new developments, and rife with disagreements that require 
mediation. We find other examples in the transition from books to electronic readers or, in 
the past, from typewriters to word processors, or horses to cars, or transcribers to printing 
presses. In music, consider the disruptive shift from hearing noise to hearing atonal 
composition.   
The crucial condition for meaningful creative change is negative familiarity with the 
problematic limits of meaning in a world. A world familiar with the limits and 
contradictions implicit in its meaningful practices can embrace those new creations that 
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expand or reconcile meaning, because, however discontinuous or radically novel a creation 
is with antecedent conditions, it nonetheless offers a fit with the historical development of 
a world that preserves the continuity of meaning. The creation itself is unfamiliar, a novel 
achievement, but the problems to which it responds are familiar. And when a creation 
resolves a problem, it instances continuity with our history that needs no reduction to 
positive familiarity. Creativity can transmute values and introduce new meaning precisely 
because its results are unlike anything that preceded them; but these results remain 
accessible to those who would make use of them. The function of disclosure and the 
historical continuity it provides are therefore entirely different from the function of 
creativity and its historical continuity. Creativity introduces new possibilities for a world.  
This emphasis on negative familiarity helps explain puzzling features of change in a 
world. For example, first, whether or not someone recognizes a creation depends on one’s 
negative familiarity. Someone who does not share a sensitivity to the problem of expressing 
a certain style in music will not find atonal music newly meaningful; failing to satisfy 
familiar ways of appreciating music, it is noise. One will typically not recognize the 
creativity of a new financial instrument like a credit default swap, because the creative act 
is situated in the minutiae of a financial analysis. Similarly, one will not recognize the 
creativity involved in a film, a philosophical account, or a scientific hypothesis, if one has 
not mastered a sensitivity to the problems it ultimately addresses. Without specific negative 
familiarity, one either misses what is new about a creation by reducing it to what is 
positively familiar or one finds the creation unintelligible. Second, history often records the 
independent invention of nearly identical things at around the same point in history—the 
invention of calculus by Leibniz and Newton or evolution by Darwin and Wallace, for 
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example. This fact is sometimes interpreted to represent the rational conditions of a world 
undergoing its necessary development, as if the specific contextual arrangement of 
practices and ideas determined what would come next. Once a creation is introduced and 
understood, especially in practical or rational work, it is tempting to see the creation as a 
necessary development of what came before it. There is some truth in this idea of cultural 
“ripeness,” because meaningful creative acts respond to specific contexts. But ripeness 
should not be understood to undermine irreducible creativity. Negative familiarity can be 
pervasive in a world or sub-world; specific problems get their focus in a particular 
historical era. But resolving these problems still requires an act of creativity that 
supersedes past familiarity. Two or more independent thinkers, working on shared 
negative familiarity, are more likely to create similar solutions—but this is still just 
historical accident. On the other hand, the underlying elements for the theory of relativity, 
for example, existed for a half-century before Einstein made the necessary creative 
connections. There is no necessity that creative work be done, only the necessity that it be 
done to overcome certain problems. Creativity deals meaningfully with the problems we 
have. Third, the possibility of pervasive negative familiarity explains the quick adoption of 
some creations. We quickly adopt a new object like a smartphone because of resolution to 
many problems apparently implicit in the coordination of our practices. We observe that 
possession of this device enables new ways of acting for those who possess it, and we seek 
to learn mastery of it ourselves. Those who resist, in certain contexts, soon find themselves 
in a world increasingly made difficult by their neglect of change.  
But how do we learn from others’ creations—how do we move from unfamiliarity to 
familiarity? Learning takes a variety of forms. Take rote memorization as a contrast to 
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genuine learning. Here one masters one skill of recording and reproducing 
representations—the times tables, say, or a sonnet. The problem, however, is that 
memorization lacks understanding and adaptability to new situations. It does not equip 
one with a new way of thinking or doing. Recall now the first time one really grasped a 
delta-epsilon proof or understood the meaning of a sonnet. A master teacher takes one as 
close as to the limits of one’s available meaning in a domain as possible, and provides the 
path to an answer, but one must always make the final connection on one’s own through a 
creative act. The teacher senses when the creative act has failed when a student cannot 
apply the new way of thinking in a different context. (This method is complicated in 
mathematics by the fact that routines can be memorized, and not just statements). Creators 
are the first to make these connections. Successful transmission of a creative work, 
however, requires drawing others in close to the meanings the work supersedes, and letting 
them create the connection themselves. There are of course other kinds of learning—those 
offered through hyper-conventional exploration, rational problem-solving, or disclosure. 
But learning that opens up new meaning is creative learning. When a teacher offers a “path 
to an answer,” the teacher offers something with which a student is externally familiar—a 
set of behaviors that can be copied to achieve a desired result in specific case. The hope of a 
teacher is that a student make the required connections—whether in math, or poetry, or 
chess, or bicycling—to achieve skillfulness in the domain, and creativity is often necessary 
in this process for achieving even competent extrinsic knowledge—useful, but perhaps 
substitutable knowledge. Intrinsic knowledge and internal goods, by contrast, always 
require a more robust integration into meaningful identity, and where learning is creative, 
this integration must be too.  
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Hence, when we think about discontinuity between worlds, and the destruction of 
one world by another, the problem is not simply one of unfamiliarity or discontinuity 
between practices. A world, in becoming new, or a person, in creatively learning, regularly 
deals with unfamiliarity and discontinuity. The problem is more precise. First, the 
difference between two worlds often reflects a history of differing creative resolutions to 
problems. Many of these problems are meaningful, but non-rational; therefore, even if 
rationality provided a common basis for mediation of some things (knowledge of physics, 
perhaps), it would provide no guidance for mediating other meaningful differences in styles 
and practices. Second, because of the underlying differences in world history, the negative 
familiarity detected in one world can vary widely from another world. What even counts as 
an important problem or a valuable solution cannot be easily communicated. One world 
can care about whether one works on Saturday and another world can care about building 
pyramids for their dead—the problems that occupy them and the creative solutions they 
generate will not necessarily coincide. Third, in every world, what is often most at stake in 
confronting difference is the possibility of preserving one’s meaningful identity. A self need 
not be thought of as fragile, inflexible, and fixed. But when the conditions for one’s most 
central and most shared practices are undermined, one is unmoored from a meaningful life. 
This is what we see in cases like Manifest Destiny: the relatively wholesale dismantling of 
the conditions for identity, for which people are willing to fight, and the forced requirement 
that a world either assimilate or create itself anew. Within a world, where disruptive 
developments encroach on selfhood—as when a new technology displaces workers—we 
tend to see a fight.               
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History is not simply the shuffling of familiar practices. Creativity introduces 
unfamiliar meaning into a world, but the promise of this new meaning for dealing with the 
problems we face can ensure its adoption and its continuity with our past.  
2.4 CONCLUSION 
 The tautology at the heart of this chapter is that creativity must introduce meaning if 
it is to be meaningful. The effort has been to show how creativity can introduce meaning 
that is both disconnected and different from past meaning, while maintaining the 
continuity necessary for history. In long form, this has been an answer to Meno’s Paradox as 
it applies to creativity. The short answer is that, as with a posteriori knowledge, we can 
know what we do not know. But for some problems, we also know that we cannot know. My 
a priori claim is that we have a capacity to create new meaning that overcomes this 
incapacity. This claim, however, could not have made sense without putting it in context. 
Nonetheless, a great deal of work remains to justify this claim, to show that more 
philosophically rigorous methods cannot reduce creative novelty in standard ways to 
orders of explanation.  
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CHAPTER 3 
NOVELTY—UNDERSTANDING NEW SENSE-MAKING 
  
 Novelty is the lynchpin of creativity. A creative act brings something new into being, 
and the concept of newness one develops determines the entire scope of philosophical 
investigation for creativity. Hence, novelty cannot be given short shrift. I argue that creative 
novelty is the newness of a new way of making sense. Creativity acts on how we make sense 
of our world, and realizes new possibilities with each creative act. We make our world—
with new alternatives, inventions, theories, or art—based on how we give it order through 
new sense-making.  
3.1 SENSE-MAKING AND POSSIBILITY 
 I will be arguing based on the phenomenological concept of “sense” and its relation 
to things, where a phenomenological concept is defined through orienting or ostensive 
descriptions in phenomenological practice. A phenomenological concept has a name, which 
serves in a descriptive system for orienting others toward reception of a phenomenon.74 I 
put the phenomenological concept of sense to work to claim that creativity realizes—makes 
real—new possibilities. My claim about new possibility bears some initial explanation if it 
is to be found sensible when I get to it. 
I mean “sense” roughly as we use it in sentences like “that makes sense,” “I make 
sense of …,” or “the sense of this….” We have a sense for everything from the color blue and 
shovels to fashion and political systems. We make sense of math problems, poems, and 
                                               
74 See Chapter 1 for further discussion. 
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relationships. Thus the concept I use is sweeping. But I note that making sense is not at all 
restricted to linguistic or “intellectual” activity. Though we read and make sense of words 
on a page, the basketball player also reads the court, the tracker reads the forest, the doctor 
reads the X-ray scan, and the art critic reads the painting. Things show up to be meaningful 
if we can make sense of them. Skills and values also inform this sense-making. So I do not 
intend to exclude further cases where natural language breaks down. Riding a bike, playing 
a guitar, or fitting a puzzle piece into a puzzle is sense-making, as is grasping the inequity of 
the way a pie is sliced, whether an apple pie or an economic pie.    
Within phenomenological description, senses do not exist apart from our 
consciousness of objects and objects do not exist apart from consciousness except insofar 
as they disclose this independence. The minimal sense of existence depends precisely on 
this structure of consciousness and its object—even dreams and imaginary objects bear 
this minimal sense.75 Consider the difference between a feeling, a physical object, and a 
number. There is plenty of room for dispute here, but an initial phenomenological 
description could point out: that a feeling exists only as long as one experiences it; a 
physical object resists some but not other ways of making sense of it, that it affects us, and 
is therefore external (because this resistance constitutes the sense external); and a number 
exists ideally and eternally. Senses express the order and coherence of consciousness, both 
in how we understand our world and in how we change it to fit the senses we have for it. 
For example, my sense of a hammer is to put it to use in carpentry; my sense of a pile of 
                                               
75 This is where, were this an investigation of “existence” we would need to distinguish the existence of 
dreams from the existence of perceptual objects to avoid the at bottom terminological dispute resulting 
from a claim like “the objects of dreams do not exist”—the latter misunderstands the claim that even 
dream imagery exists in some minimal sense, even as spontaneous fabrications in consciousness or the 
like.  
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wood is its possible use in a carpentry project. The former is just a sense of a thing; the 
latter indicates the carpenter’s way of making sense of things. Existence sometimes 
challenges how we make sense of it, and we sometimes experience existences to be not only 
external, but foreign. Hence, existence does not just confirm our sense-making in an idealist 
circle, but rather often challenges it. This latter point is to emphasize that senses are not 
purely “subjective” or intellectual phenomena; nor are they merely the recognition of the 
affordances of objects. In sense-making, we (the subjects) realize (make real) affordances of 
objects which they do not necessarily realize on their own.  
The objects of consciousness are often complexes of things and their relations. The 
isolated things, the relations, and the complex each have senses. For example, “1 + 2 = 3” 
involves numerous senses (numbers, arithmetic operations), which cohere in a complex 
sense. Where we do not recognize a coherence to obtain between our senses of things, we 
say “that does not make sense”: “A = ~A,” for example, or simply finding one’s keys in a 
place they should not be. Nonsense depends on a failure of relations between senses of 
things, just as, by analogy, one cannot ascribe poor grammar or poor writing from one 
word.76 There is only the relational nonsense of complex senses of things. This is because 
there is no consciousness without making sense of something. The basic sense of 
consciousness stems from its always making sense, even if the senses it makes do not 
always cohere. Consciousness possess at least this minimal coherence in the project of 
making sense; otherwise we suggest the experience of William James’s “great blooming, 
buzzing confusion,” a notion I can make no sense of except in terms of relational nonsense. 
                                               
76 I am ignoring potential disanalogies like misspellings or incorrect contractions.  
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Were consciousness dissolved into such nonsense, it would bear no resources for 
recovery.77  
I have already indicated that senses of things are distinct from ways of making sense. 
The ways we make sense tend to range over multiple things. To oversimplify, for example, 
arithmetic sense-making provides a way of recognizing and engaging numbers in the 
specific ways appropriate to them. Ways of making sense inform our experience flexibly, 
allowing us to adapt to the many things we encounter. To prefigure a bit, the difficulty of 
describing creative novelty often rests in this distinction. First, the sense that is new in a 
creative act often preoccupies us and overshadows the newness of sense, because new 
sense directs consciousness toward something (and not toward itself). Second, the 
newness of sense is distinct from the newness of the way of making sense from which it 
issues. For an orienting example, consider Archimedes Eureka moment. Here we have not 
only the coherent, reproducible sense of how to measure the volume of an irregular solid, 
but also the way of making this sense—i.e. the result of his actual creative act. What 
Archimedes seems most excited about, in fact, is the new sense—“I’ve found it!”—rather 
than the establishing, the “finding,” of it. What he finds is a new way of connecting objects in 
experience, which entails a new sense of things.  
This distinction between senses and ways of making sense is difficult to keep 
straight for another reason too. A way of making sense is that on the basis of which we 
change things or understand experience—the painter manipulates paint on a canvas 
                                               
77 Two points. First, this is not an attempt to characterize something inaccessible, like Kant’s thing-in-itself. 
This description relies (1) on detecting the limit of meaningful sense-making and (2) the description of 
relational nonsense. Second, there is some relevant ambiguity, explored later as anomaly, between 
nonsense and an incomplete sense.  
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through a way of making sense, and an observer appreciates the painting through another 
way of making sense. But ways of making sense are themselves complex, nested, and 
interrelated phenomena. Within generic arithmetic sense-making, for example, one finds 
addition and subtraction, which will make sense of different cases. On the other hand, one 
may find relations to logic or reason more generally; or one recognizes values like 
simplicity or elegance informing the practicing mathematician. The generic sense of 
painting may well include housepainters and artists, but only at a cross-section, because 
above housepainters lies construction and above artistic painters lies art more generally. A 
person brings a vermiculate mass of sense-making to situations to which our vocabulary 
scarcely does justice in detail. Thus, I use Archimedes’ proclamation to point to another 
aspect of new sense-making, namely, that it arrives through an act on oneself: “I’ve found 
it!” The phenomenon of making new sense of things is most salient in just those moments 
sense-making is taxed the most. “Finding” a new way of making sense is not like finding 
some gold in one’s backyard; it is rather finding one’s consciousness transformed with 
respect to one’s object, in a way that also transforms the object. Without such decisive 
moments, I think we could amble through descriptions of senses and sense-making without 
really getting at the heart of the distinction that shows any promise for understanding 
creativity. Archimedes is transformed by his creative act and he no longer sees a bathtub in 
the same way.  
With this initial exploration of sense-making, I turn to the claim that through 
creative acts, we introduce new possibilities.  
From a conception of (a) logical, (b) physical, or (c) psychological possibility, for 
example, one may refute my claim based on the premise that anything presently real must 
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of necessity conform to (a’) logical law, (b’) physical law, or (c’) psychological law. Provided 
that these laws describe rules of transformation from one state to another, they define 
determinate parameters for all possible states in their domain and the continuity between 
states. So long as we have the correct, complete laws, therefore, we cannot encounter any 
“new possibility” not already implied by descriptions of antecedent states transformed in 
accordance with law. From the perspective of a determinate order, things may be necessary, 
or they may be possible, but they cannot be newly possible.  
But my investigation and its results are phenomenological, and they express what 
possibilities are for consciousness. By a new possibility, I mean a new way of making sense 
of things that confers on its objects new meaningful ways for them to be. My view as I 
intend it depends on the key premises of the argument:  
1. One can acquire new senses of some objects 
2. If one can acquire new senses of some objects, then some objects afford a 
multiplicity of senses. 
3. Some objects afford a multiplicity of senses (1,2) 
4. If some objects afford a multiplicity of senses, then one can make sense of 
objects in different ways. 
5. One can make sense of objects in different ways. (3,4) 
6. Ways of making sense of objects realize the possibilities of objects 
7. If (5) and (6), then if one can acquire a new way of making sense, then one can 
realize new possibilities of objects 
8. Therefore, if one can acquire a new way of making sense, then one can realize 
new possibilities of objects (5, 6, 7) 
9. One can acquire a new way of making sense 
10. Therefore, one can realize new possibilities of objects (8, 9) 
 
The argument is valid. Are the key premises true? 
(1) One routinely acquires new senses of things, minimally, by learning from others 
and investigating things in one’s world. One learns the sense of what some tool is in the 
context of work—e.g. a surgeon’s scalpel—or simply the structure of physical properties an 
object must have and the dimensions along which they can vary (shapes of blades, lengths 
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of handles) to count as a scalpel, as opposed, say, to a toy scalpel or utility knife or sharp 
rock. One way or another, we learn what is appropriate to say in a group of people, what 
multiplication is, and what makes for a good argument. Acquiring new senses of things and 
complex senses is an everyday part of experience. As far as I can tell, the only way to try to 
challenge this premise is to claim that senses are never “new” in any special or creative way 
for consciousness, and that all “new” senses are already implicit in consciousness in our 
ways of making sense of things. Nonetheless, I do not think this objection directly 
challenges the premise that we acquire new senses of things. I will be preoccupied with an 
investigation of newness and creative novelty in the next section.   
(2) Looking around the room for a doorstop, I might make sense of a bookend for 
the job. I discover something bookends afford, namely, serving as doorstops. When we 
make new sense of things, we find that they afford multiple senses. Senses do not 
necessarily assimilate, supersede, or replace each other—they reveal a new aspect of things 
and how they can be related to other things. Suppose a person possesses a normal 
arithmetic sense of the number one, but also the complex sense, “one is the loneliest 
number.” The number one affords this sense by functioning in—making sense in—this 
complex sense in a way it does not function in an arithmetic addition problem. The number 
one does not for this reason become an entirely different thing; rather it affords different 
senses, which show up in different ways of making sense. Although relations between 
things are infinite, I do not claim that anything can afford any sense. We just do not know all 
the senses things can afford. So, for example, I take the statement “the dog is the loneliest 
number” to be nonsense. A complex sense of this statement seems impossible, given the 
senses I have now of the loneliest number and dogs. Nor do I claim that the affordances of a 
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thing constitute its unique identity—what the thing is. Things afford much more sense than 
they minimally have to. So from the fact that we can acquire a new sense of some objects, 
we know that at least some objects afford a multiplicity of senses.    
A counterexample to the second premise would have one making sense of something 
in a way that the object does not afford. An object “affords a sense” when it does not deny 
the sense one makes of it outright. For example, the number one (and ten) will not afford 
the sense required for making arithmetical sense of “one equals ten.” As far as I can tell, 
such a statement is nonsense. Thus, I do not think we could find a case in which we acquire 
a new complex sense that does not also reveal a sense they afford. “One equals ten” makes 
sense in a conversion from dimes to pennies, but only with an additional complex way of 
making sense of numbers together with currency. However, my view is admittedly 
complicated in its response to other kinds of apparent counterexamples. For example, 
Newtonian physics does not seem to make sense of very small things, although we thought 
it did historically. Did it make sense of things in a way they did not afford? And does this 
deny a multiplicity of senses? I think not. First, we do not necessarily deny that Newtonian 
physics makes some sense of small things, but only that, after new objects appear in the 
course of investigation, and we attempt to make sense of them consistently, its sense 
gradually becomes incomplete. The initial assumption that Newtonian physics makes sense 
of atomic objects is an unwarranted generalization made without respect to the direct 
investigation of those objects. Second, there is a possible conflation involved in this 
counterexample in the way names refer to objects. “Small things” are not the same objects 
as quantum systems, for example, which do not even show up in the physical description of 
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Newtonian physics.78 Or, to make this point a different way, “The dog is the loneliest 
number” could show up sensibly in a spy’s code without referring to dogs and lonely 
numbers at all. Third, we can act as if things make sense when they do not through what I 
call compensation.79 Compensations ignore the resistance of objects to our sense-making, 
explicitly or implicitly; they conceal this resistance. I direct this third response more 
specifically at another apparent counterexample: illusions and hallucinations. It is true 
enough that a mirage or phantom limb affords a sense we do not allow them in another way 
of making sense of things. But, first, I see no problem in saying that a mirage really affords 
“looking like a body of water.” Mirages do not deny this sense, and one could counteract this 
sense only by making sense of it also as an optical appearance from which one cannot 
drink. Only at this point, once we have standard of comparison for “reality” from which to 
generate the illusion, can the counterexample be pitched. But then I note that, when the 
parched person moves toward the mirage, it is not from a lack of resistance from the object, 
but rather from an irrational hope for water that ignores the resistance.  
(4) When we acquire a new sense for an object, we necessarily also make sense of it 
in a different way than we do to achieve an old sense. The arithmetic sense of the number 
one, for example, bears no relation to loneliness, except through the complex sense-making 
of a different way of making sense of things. We do not find out something new about 
arithmetic in this case; that is, this is not just some unexplored dimension of arithmetic 
sense-making we already have, which makes sense of a statement like “one is the loneliest 
                                               
78 This example is quite a bit more complicated than I present here, given all the senses and sense-making 
involved: ideal (theoretical) things, the indirect evidence for things, ways of making sense of things linking 
them with everyday objects versus making sense of them through a mathematical description, and so on.  
79 I introduced this concept in Chapter 1.  
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number.” One may object that the number one is not at all the same object in an 
arithmetical statement (“1 + 1 = 2”) as it is in the poetic statement. But “one” is not 
substitutable by any other number or by “dog” to preserve the sense of the statement, nor 
is “one” code for something else. The statement reflects a complex sense of things, which 
requires some (though not all) of the arithmetic sense one makes of “one.” 
(6) For consciousness, reality is the set of currently existing objects and their 
modifications consistent with its ways of making sense of things. Consistency and 
coherence with sense-making ensures that that things are meaningful. In my usage, 
“reality” reflects the double-meaning we find in realization in, for example, “I realize my bag 
might still be in the taxi” and “my bag is really still in the taxi.” We realize possibilities by 
participating with things on the basis of our sense-making, and what we understand to be 
possible in a situation varies with the way we make sense of things.  
There are a lot of nuances to how possibilities are realized in situations, and I cannot 
attend to them all. However, there are three worth mentioning. First, our concerns and 
projects typically determine in detail what shows up to be possible and impossible, while 
there is also a broad range of possibility (on other sense-making) that does not show up at 
all. Second, one’s sense-making can constrain objects to specific possibilities, and objects 
can constrain additional sense-making. That is, senses and objects are in reciprocal 
relations, in which either may dominate. To illustrate these points, consider a framer 
constructing stud-walls for new home. He sees that a board does not fit into its space, 
because it is too long, and also understands the possibility of cutting the board to fit. Boards 
are the kinds of things you can make shorter, and this is part of the sense a framer has of 
boards. On the other hand, a short board will not fit at all—no one has yet invented a board-
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stretcher—and it is impossible to fill the space with it. The carpenter can of course graft 
another board onto the first one, but this is understood to be a different possibility than the 
impossibility of stretching the board. The framer also takes certain things to be fixed in his 
project, like the dimensions of the building. Thus, it does not typically even show up as a 
possibility to modify a space to fit a board, rather than modify the board to fit a space. By 
contrast, a woodworker with a prized piece of Brazilian rosewood seeks out the 
possibilities of the wood—what it can become—regardless of its size; the object constrains 
additional sense-making. In this context, the possibility of using the wood in a concealed 
framing structure does not even show up at all. There are, then, at least two ways new 
possibilities can becomes significant for someone: in the way something impossible 
becomes possible and in the way a new possibility becomes part of one’s understanding of 
a situation.     
Third, possibilities and impossibilities are of different kinds. If we go back to the 
example, “the dog is the loneliest number,” one can for example imagine that, in some 
circumstance like an improvisational comedy skit, this phrase would make hilarious sense. 
Similarly, one can “expect the unexpected.” In such cases, one maintains a sense of one’s 
limited sense-making. But one does not, for that reason, actually understand what those 
possibilities are or would be in any detail. The sense that “it is possible they will invent a 
board-stretcher” derives from our way of making sense of changes in what is possible—a 
sense, on my view, of ourselves as creators. Still, this sense of unknown possibility is among 
the most Janus-faced phenomena. On the one hand, it supports openness to experience; on 
the other hand, it supports compensation that denies one this openness. Consider a 
magician performing a spectacular trick, levitating a train, say. The dumb wonder of a 
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typical child supposes that, though he cannot understand it fully, magic must be real. The 
typical adult supposes that, though he does not understand it fully, there must be some 
specific explanation for the trick that makes complete sense of it. The difference between 
these cases amounts to this: the child mistakenly takes the “magical” object to constrain 
further sense-making, whereas the adult (correctly) takes his sense-making to constrain 
the object. Thus the adult immediately seeks to understand how the trick works with 
respect to his ways of making sense of things.   
I argue that creativity is our best human trick and seek an informed wonder with 
respect to it.    
We make a great deal of sense by drawing on the logical, physical, and psychological 
orders of things. These efforts to make sense get their constraints through participation 
with objects, in part determining what makes sense and in part responding to objects that 
set constraints on additional sense-making. Granted the controversies that already exist 
within and between these lawful orders—for example, whether the truths of logic are 
psychological states (psychologism), whether all psychological states are physical states, or 
whether logic must include the law of noncontradiction—I find it reasonable to question 
whether creativity must make complete sense in their terms, and I spend Section Three 
showing some of the limitations of that effort. 
(9) I take the soundness of my argument to depend, then, on the claim that there is 
an additional way of acquiring new senses of things, distinct from learning from someone 
or learning from objects. This additional way is to create new ways of making sense of 
things. To be clear from the outset, I have no problem with a claim that some of our new 
senses of things are implicit extensions or entailments of the sense-making we already 
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have, often made explicit. But we find the basic thrust of my objection to generalizing this 
view in an example. Consider that every day one says, writes, or thinks words in historically 
original configurations—“Nine books sit on a shelf three feet northeast of my computer 
monitor.”80 We can utter these unique configurations relying on an implicit sense of things 
we typically share with others. Such original configurations are easily produced and 
consumed. Yet one might claim that all our utterances are of this kind, and “this is the kind 
of arrant pedantry up with which I will not put,” as Winston Churchill reportedly said in 
another context. Those gifted with words—I would say creative with words—utter 
impromptu phrases that do more than draw on implicit senses of things. They challenge 
and rearrange our sense-making. Whether one claims that all speech is creative or no 
speech is creative amounts to the same thing: one either lacks the resources with which to 
distinguish Churchill from a hack; or, to preserve a distinction, one must either argue that 
such differences are illusory or that there are at least two kinds of implicit sense-making, S1 
and S2, where the latter is what we do in making apparently “new” utterances. The latter 
interpretation could be fine, but I see no great philosophical advantage between it and my 
view, but only the disadvantage that it tortures a description of the limitations of conscious 
sense-making to claim it is “always already” making sense of things it does not seem to be 
making sense of. On my view, consciousness is limited to the senses it has and creates new 
ways of making sense at these limits.    
                                               
80 If this is not original enough, I just need to add more conventional descriptors, of which there is no 
shortage.  
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3.2 INITIAL REMARKS ON CREATIVE NOVELTY 
 What is created in a human creative act—therefore, its creative novelty—on my 
proposed view, is a new way of making sense of things. Novelties involve a special kind of 
new conscious connection between things, which they could not have without one’s 
creative contribution. I of course want to accommodate traditional kinds of examples like 
paintings, but on my view, these are either the indirect results of creativity or, in more 
complicated cases, the medium in which new sense-making forms. A novelist like David 
Foster Wallace makes sense of things in a new way that informs his writing, but, in some 
cases, the new sense-making only forms as he writes. Hence, creative novelty appears 
differently at different levels of descriptions. My view should also enable one to understand 
the creativity involved in new invention, theory, or functional uses things. Finally, I want to 
accommodate putative examples of non-human creative novelty like new animal species, 
but only to the extent that these novelties are recognized through human acts of 
consciousness. Thus my aim is for a more unified account of creativity and its novelty for 
humans, but less of a comprehensive account than might be possible.  
 Regardless of one’s eventual considered position on novelty, however, the feature 
that most clearly initiates speculative interest is that some objects seem new in a distinctive 
way. These objects seem to differ from anything that precedes them. This difference might 
be encountered in a work of art, in a new piece of technology, or just in the casual 
observation of someone using a familiar object in an unfamiliar way. The entities or acts 
seem unlike anything one has seen before, and it is unclear how the creator came up with 
them. 
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One typical description given in psychological literature is that one expresses 
“surprise” in an encounter with novelty.81 Jazz improvisation may elicit surprise even from 
a performer.82 This description clearly leaves the particular features and evidential status of 
novelty left unexplored. So what if I am surprised by a string of musical notes? I am also 
surprised when someone slams a door behind me. If surprise is the best indication of 
novelty, it will not provide very good critical evidence for creativity. Nonetheless, pointing 
toward something “surprising” does help initiate the discussion. In this regard, a poem by 
Robert Frost helps guide my discussion of creative novelty throughout: 
Out walking in the frozen swamp one grey day Without so much as wishing him good-night. 
I paused and said, "I will turn back from here. He went behind it to make his last stand. 
No, I will go on farther--and we shall see." It was a cord of maple, cut and split 
The hard snow held me, save where now and then And piled--and measured, four by four by eight. 
One foot went down. The view was all in  And not another like it could I see. 
Straight up and down of tall slim trees No runner tracks in this year's snow looped near it. 
Too much alike to mark or name a place by And it was older sure than this year's cutting, 
So as to say for certain I was here Or even last year's or the year's before. 
Or somewhere else: I was just far from home. The wood was grey and the bark warping off it 
A small bird flew before me. He was careful And the pile somewhat sunken. Clematis 
To put a tree between us when he lighted, Had wound strings round and round it like a bundle. 
And say no word to tell me who he was What held it though on one side was a tree 
Who was so foolish as to think what he thought. Still growing, and on one a stake and prop, 
He thought that I was after him for a feather-- These latter about to fall. I thought that only 
The white one in his tail; like one who takes Someone who lived in turning to fresh tasks 
Everything said as personal to himself. Could so forget his handiwork on which 
One flight out sideways would have undeceived him. He spent himself, the labour of his axe, 
And then there was a pile of wood for which And leave it there far from a useful fireplace 
I forgot him and let his little fear To warm the frozen swamp as best it could 
Carry him off the way I might have gone, With the slow smokeless burning of decay.  
 (Robert Frost, “The Wood-Pile,” 1915) 
 
                                               
81 E.g. Berliner 1994 or Boden 2004 
82 Berliner 1994 
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In this poem, Frost describes an unusual encounter with a wood-pile. The pile surprises 
him and is initially unaccountable. Its presence undermines his expectations for his walk in 
the woods. His description of the walk indicates his familiarity; it is a congenial episode like 
many before. Yet he readies himself for something unfamiliar by continuing his walk into a 
new part of the woods. Still nothing demands much from him. He easily makes sense of his 
encounter with a bird, but then the bird leads him to the wood-pile. The wood-pile compels 
Frost to speculate about its origins. He develops an account of the wood-pile, one that 
enables him to understand it to his satisfaction. The poem then expresses Frost’s 
experience, presenting it to us for interpretation.  
I use Frost’s poem to examine novelty. The poem exhibits a distinctive experience 
one may have in encountering an object. The object of such an experience is, I claim, 
anomalous. It is not, at least temporarily, fully accounted for. At one level of description, to 
Frost, the wood-pile is an anomaly; to us, the poem itself may be an anomaly. Within the 
poem, Frost depicts that phenomenon I call compensation, the fortification of meaning 
through familiar ways of making sense of things, similar to the way we could give a simple, 
conventional interpretation of the poem that ignores its nuances. With this, he dispels the 
anomaly. Yet in writing the poem, Frost conveys a new way of making sense of things. He 
gives us rails along which to think through an explicit juxtaposition of words, which we 
might follow to come close to taking his meaning. Frost’s newly achieved way of making 
sense of things is, I claim, a precise example of creative novelty, embedded in his poem.  
My task is twofold: first to show that creative novelty is properly a new way of 
making sense of things, and second to explore the relation between two phenomena, 
novelty and anomaly. Let me give some preliminary framing for these tasks. Call those 
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concrete things we often take to be prime examples of creative novelty like paintings and 
poems embedded novelty. The virtue of such objects is that they are easily accessible for 
description and analysis. Yet there is also newness in our way of constituting experience—
newness of value, conception, or skill, for example—which I collectively call new ways of 
making sense of things. I argue that embedding novelty (as a creator) and recognizing 
novelty (as an observer) entails a new way of constituting experience.  
The first key idea is that new ways of making sense need not embed novelties in the 
same way, embed them with artistic qualities, or embed them at all, in all the domains in 
which we are creative. Quite the contrary, new theories, technologies, or use-objects, for 
example, do not at all appear in the same way as artistic objects. Lacking this key idea, some 
alternatives for someone who defends creativity include a Kant-like view according to 
which only artists are creative while the work of a Newton or an Einstein is not creative, or 
an assertion of creativity in rational or practical activity through strained descriptions of 
how these activities are like aesthetic production.83 I do not find these alternatives tenable. 
On my view, by contrast, some art, even some art worth keeping, is not very creative, while 
some rational and practical activity is creative.84 The reason is that, despite all the 
difference in embedded novelties, there is nonetheless a common condition for their 
                                               
83 There are other alternatives. For example, Irving Singer striates creativity into many different “modes,” each 
with its own distinctive features (Singer 2010). 
84 It is worth remarking that Kant does have a view of non-creative art—copying. But I think it is fair to say 
that Kant, along with many other commenters on art, prioritize the value of creativity in art. However, the 
creativity embedded in an artwork is an independent variable in the complete evaluation of a work as a 
whole. A statue of George Washington need not be creative, say, to be valuable in context. An irreverent 
statue of Washington on a commode may well be creative, but it is the way of making new sense that is 
valuable, and not simply the fact that the sense arrived through a creative act. The work of a Shakespeare 
of HTML (the content formatting language of Internet web-pages), whatever that might look like, could be 
valuable because of their creativity in a new medium, even if the new specific works did not represent the 
best possibilities of the medium. The point here is that creativity is one factor among many to consider in 
evaluating art, and I am not convinced creativity is a constitutive criterion for genuine, prioritized, or good 
art.      
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existence in a new way of making sense of things. This condition cuts across domains; it 
does not live in just one domain and it does not constitute one domain.  
The second key idea is that creative novelties are necessarily anomalous in 
experience. I call necessary anomalies disorder, and say that creative novelties are out of 
order. We cannot fully understand them or link them completely to orders of antecedent, 
rational, or teleological conditions; they fail to make complete sense. What complicates 
matters, however, is that: (1) creative novelties are not the only anomalous phenomena—
some embedded novelties like paintings can exhibit perpetual anomaly and new biological 
species or even everyday objects like wood-piles can be temporarily anomalous; (2) 
creative acts often respond to anomalies—creation is often our way of dealing with 
anomaly in experience, and is required when we face disorder; and (3) we can dispel 
anomaly and conceal disorder through creative acts, but only by introducing new 
anomalies. The creative act exemplifies a new anomaly, even when it makes sense of an old 
one.      
The main claims are worth emphasizing to avoid confusion later. First, I do not claim 
that anomalies are necessary conditions for creative acts, but rather that creative acts 
always exemplify anomaly. One can be creative regardless of whether an experienced 
anomaly precedes the creative act. Second, the creative novelty created in a creative act is a 
new way of making sense. Third, the specific expression of a new way of making sense in a 
situation is an embedded novelty—which may be anything from a new turn of phrase to a 
new theory or new painting. Embedded novelties are often only analytically separate from a 
new way of making sense, because sense-making often takes place only in a medium—for 
example, a new way of writing may not take form except as a writer writes. Also, embedded 
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novelties may or may not themselves exemplify anomalies—an artwork tends to exemplify 
anomaly while a new theoretical idea does not. Fourth, the demonstration or “proof” of 
creativity nonetheless requires highlighting persistent anomalies in experience, which only 
a creative act can deal with.   
3.3 PROBLEMS WITH ANALYZING THE CREATIVE NOVELTY OF CONCRETE ENTITIES 
Something is new if we have not experienced it before. This is a start, but there are 
lots of ways for things be new in experience. Experience, I assume, is constituted by 
consciousness, and consciousness is always consciousness of something—i.e. it is always 
directed toward and attentive to something or other. Different types of newness are 
possible experienced aspects of things, and may include, in my terminology, uniqueness, 
singularity, or individuality. Here I explore the limitations of investigating novelty directly in 
concrete things appearing for consciousness; I deny that they necessarily constitute 
creative novelty. Put simply, I argue against the view that creative novelty is primarily a 
property of objects like paintings or animal species, a property they might possess 
independently of our coming to make sense of them in a particular way. On my view, for 
example, it seems that nothing essential changes about a thing—a rock—when one takes it 
up in a potentially creative way—as a doorstop. The newness I attribute to creative novelty 
will not be fully described until I investigate anomaly, but the basic thrust is that such 
newness exhibits incomplete sense found in one’s own sense-making.   
 Let’s begin by removing a misconception. Creative novelty is not a matter of 
temporal priority, but rather of objects and the sense we make of them. To put this point 
dramatically, Pachelbel might still be considered creative in writing his Canon in D even if 
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an extraterrestrial wrote a sonically identical piece one billion years ago, quite 
unbeknownst to him. Or closer to home, both Wallace and Darwin can create the theory of 
natural selection independently—and the same goes for Leibniz and Newton with calculus, 
Gutenberg and Bi Sheng with the movable-type printing press, or independent prehistoric 
tribes and hand axes. To draw the distinction, temporal priority is part of the conception of 
originality in some frame of reference. The question of originality presupposes a question 
about the identities created, viz. whether they are actually identical. But even this question 
is impertinent to a study of creative novelty. More pertinent is the sense-making involved 
and the character of objects.85 The one observation I make use of below, regarding 
originality, is the relative lack of examples of independent creation in art—of artists 
creating the same style or artistic piece independently. Why this should be the case 
suggests some distinctive features of artistic creations.  
 Among things, one might claim that something is novel if it is unique, and something 
is unique if it is one of a kind. Multiple phenomena satisfy this imprecise definition of 
uniqueness, however. I consider three. What I call uniqueness, proper, is just self-identity. In 
what follows, an identity is the thing disclosed when we make sense of it a certain way. 
If uniqueness is just self-identity, then it does not distinguish anything peculiar 
about some things over others. Frost’s wood-pile is a unique wood-pile, but this does not 
make it novel. As I noted in Chapter 1, every grain of sand is unique on a sufficiently refined 
descriptive system. A single grain is the only grain like this. These grains can be uniquely 
                                               
85 Note that this distinction between creativity and originality claims nothing special for creativity. A similar 
distinction holds even if one argues that creativity is just a kind of making. Then the question of who made 
what first would still be distinct from the question of what goes into making, so long as those makings are 
independent. 
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identified by both their differing intrinsic properties like mass or purity and extrinsic 
properties like spatial or temporal relations (whether considered absolute or relative). 
When entities cannot be distinguished based on intrinsic properties for one reason or 
another, perhaps like water molecules or quarks, we rely on extrinsic properties. Or, where 
neither intrinsic nor extrinsic properties seem accessible or appropriate, we tend to draw a 
type/token distinction—e.g. the song playing on the radio now is the same as the one on 
the radio yesterday. There are lots of different things and kinds of things and many puzzles 
in their analysis. But simply encountering a unique identity is no guarantee of novelty, 
because the uniqueness involved must be assumed for everything properly called an 
identity. One more paper cup added to the universe is not a creative addition, nor is one 
more seeing of a paper cup, nor thinking of a cup. A unique wood-pile, in and of itself, is 
nothing novel.  
But why are unique entities experienced this way, to be both unique and non-novel? 
I offer two initial reasons, both rooted in the claim that new numerical identities need not 
imply any new sense or anything unfamiliar. First, in many cases of uniqueness, we bear the 
same overall set of relations to one thing as we bear to another thing in identifying it. That 
is, we make sense of each unique entity in the same general way. Two paper cups are the 
same, positively, in how they share many of the same attributes. But, negatively, they are the 
same in how they differ from each other and other things. I call this identity of difference. 
We find most identities differing along lines with which we are just as familiar as the 
positive attributes we encounter in things. If grains of sand are typically distinguished by 
mass and purity, there will not be cases of novelty no matter what additional, unique mass 
and purity we find. All such unique grains of sand are prefigured by how we make sense of 
125 
  
them. But if we find sand differing, not in mass and purity, but in some new way based on a 
new physical theory, then we have a non-identity of difference; we make sense of sand in a 
new way. This is particularly true of some artwork, where what matters about it is not its 
familiar similarities and differences from earlier work, but that it demonstrates a new 
(appropriate) way of being different—e.g. the differences that define new historic styles 
like realism or impressionism. We typically encounter unique objects to be familiar and 
fully meaningful just in case they satisfy familiar identity conditions, including conditions 
for identity of difference. Two dogs, side by side, are nonetheless unique dogs, because they 
vary within acceptable, familiar ranges.  
Second, distinct things typically constrain our ways of making sense to ensure that 
they are both unique and fully familiar. Suppose I stipulate that genetic difference is the one 
criterion for distinguishing uniqueness among dogs. In this case, twin dogs would 
nonetheless remain unique dogs, because each dog calls for a different way of dealing with 
it—for example, to reach one dog I must turn to the left, and for the other I must turn to the 
right, or engaging with one does not seem to involve engaging with the other. These ways of 
dealing with an entity can be fully familiar to someone, even as one verifies a unique entity 
on their basis. As a consequence, merely unique entities can be accounted for on the basis 
of what we find fully familiar. The oddity of my claim here, of course, is that in it I contradict 
the initial stipulation that only one variable (genetic difference) counts in determining 
uniqueness; on this criterion, it seems, there is at most one dog with the same genes, and 
we are forced into a type/token distinction between a unique genetic type of dog and its 
multiple instances. The phenomenological point here is that one’s conscious involvement is 
the one inextricable relation to things. Where the identification of uniqueness is concerned, 
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there is no getting outside some relation or other to things, and through this relation things 
can demand more from us than what we stipulate for them. To bracket this relation to 
things immediately produces an abstract object—the “dog as determined by genetic 
structure,” which one could only mistake for an actual dog. The imagined stipulation is 
incoherent so long as we are encountering dogs and not abstractions of dogs. The coherent 
entity here, which generates a non-problematic type/token distinction, is unique genetic 
structure, which has only a contingent relation to its instances in unique dogs. What we see 
here is a convoluted commingling of entities and our relations to them on the basis of our 
sense-making. When we abstract, we can lose the chance to find differences that things 
themselves offer to other aspects of our sense-making or dealing with them; on the other 
hand, when entities succumb to our typical ways of making sense of them, then they are 
destined to remain unique in just those senses we have. I do not mean that entities cannot 
be unique in their own intrinsic ways apart from our relations to them—in fact, we rely on 
entities themselves to show us what they are by resisting our ways of making sense of 
them. But I do mean that entities do not claim their own uniqueness. Grains of sand, songs, 
or entire situations just are what they uniquely are; making sense of these things taken 
together and drawing their distinctions falls on the experiencing person who meaningfully 
encounters and makes sense of them. And because we often make sense of new unique 
entities through completely familiar relations to them, there is not necessarily anything 
creatively novel about them, assuming that novelty is inconsistent with full familiarity.  
The crucial premise, then, is that full familiarity undermines creative novelty. 
Familiarity implies continuity with some system or process—knowledge, skill, or 
experience generally—which provides the basis for understanding an occurrent object or 
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situation. We can and do encounter unique objects, but, when fully familiar, we find them 
continuous with systematic connections between things, whether by causation, implication, 
reduction, or meaningful extension. Anomalies, then, are an experienced discontinuity or 
break in a system or process. Imagining an omniscient being as best we can, I hope, helps 
illustrate what this discontinuity must be. For such a being to find something anomalous, 
that thing must necessarily either exemplify a difference from the totality of knowledge—
i.e. it must be different in a new way—or the thing must be something of which knowledge 
is impossible in whatever maximal way we can imagine—else we contradict the premise of 
omniscience—or both. This case suggests a different type of newness, one either 
discontinuous with knowledge or unknowable, which an omniscient being must encounter 
to be unfamiliar with anything. On the other hand, to such a being new uniqueness could 
not constitute a meaningful category at all, because, as part of a continuous system of 
knowledge, each unique identity already possesses its full determination and is already 
fully familiar. As Carl Hausman puts a similar point, if one fails to acknowledge the 
discontinuity of creative novelty: 
One would necessarily suppose newness to be present throughout the continuum, and, 
if all processes are continuous, newness would then be continued as present from all 
time, past, present, and future. Consequently, no distinction between the old and the 
new could be made.86 
 
To the extent that we are familiar with things, our familiarity serves in exactly the same way 
for us as it would for an omniscient being. We must encounter something outside the 
boundaries of the processes we understand to attribute discontinuity to it. We are tempted 
to call a unique paper cup “new” as it rolls off the assembly line only because, in contrast to 
                                               
86 Hausman, 37 
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the imagined omniscient being, we have not fully explored the implications or extensions of 
meanings involved in the systems of knowledge we already have, or we have not fully 
completed the processes in which we are involved; i.e. our knowledge of what we will find 
familiar is finite.87 If discovery and craft (techne) are just applications of our knowledge to 
find or make new unique entities, then they are not creative.  
 To avoid confusion, I should clarify this discovery further. We do find anomalies 
unfamiliar, but something simply being unfamiliar or someone being inexperienced is not 
sufficient for an anomaly (see below for fuller discussion of anomaly). A baby is unfamiliar 
with most things. But, first, a baby also lacks many of the additional ways of making sense 
to encounter discontinuities as we do, and the limits of her meaningful engagement will not 
be our own—she lives in a much “smaller” world. Yet, second, babies explore their worlds 
based on the perceptual, motor, and intellectual aptitudes they develop very quickly, which 
tend to fit the demand of things for learning about them. What matters for anomaly is not 
simply the initial unfamiliarity of a thing, like a mathematical addition problem one has not 
solved before, but rather the inadequacy of even one’s familiar ways of making sense to 
address a thing. When babies explore their worlds or we explore mathematics based on 
familiar skills, we quickly transform unfamiliar objects into familiar one’s, and there is no 
discontinuity here.         
 One might object in three ways. First, because our knowledge is finite, one may 
object that discontinuity always depends on ignorance. On the further assumption that we 
only overcome ignorance through systematic or rational extension of knowledge, then there 
                                               
87 With paper cups and other manufactured use-objects, there is also the distinction between new and used, 
which is probably the entirely conventional sense of the thing we care more about. 
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are no grounds for arguing for discontinuity in our systems. My fuller response to this kind 
of objection comes later. But I indicate here that the history of scientific knowledge includes 
occasional breaks from the accretion of data and theory extending a prevailing system of 
thought, turning instead toward new systems of thought that reinterpret past data. This is 
Kuhn’s “scientific revolution” that we see in the Copernican revolution or quantum theory. 
Such theories largely replace earlier theories in their domain, rather than amend them. 
Thus, in at least some cases, familiar systematic work provides no sufficient basis for 
overcoming ignorance. We see this “revolution” in more local cases of scientific work too, 
and in everyday problem-solving.88 A great deal of new knowledge depends not on new 
data or theoretical hypotheses to test, but rather on making sense of the data we already 
have in a new way.     
 Second, one may object that creative novelties are illusions, hallucinations, or 
delusions of some kind. Based on what I have claimed so far, novelties must be something 
other than just a numerically new thing, and they must somehow involve a discontinuity. 
The present objection states that, however we happen to experience creative novelty, this 
experience includes no reference; it is a connotation without extension. Like a desert 
mirage, the thing we claim to see is not really there. The first point to make here is that, if 
this objection is made in an attempt to explain creativity, then not only must novelty be 
shown not to be, but the consciousness of novelty must be explained as well. As Hausman 
again observes, however, the basic problem with this objection is that novelty does not 
appear for consciousness in at all the same way that unreal objects do: the objects of 
illusions appear to be like something they are not; novelties appear to be unlike what 
                                               
88 See Chapter One on rational problem-solving. 
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already is.89 Ghosts and phantom limbs are unreal versions of real things (i.e. illusions), 
whereas creative novelties are real versions of unreal things, in the terms available for such 
an objection. Hence, whether this objection is literal or metaphorical, it already possesses a 
deep formal implausibility. As I see it, then, if one accepts the existence of novelty, an 
argument consistent with the typical structure of illusion would come in its defense: 
something is an illusion when it fails to meet a standard for what counts as real, and if 
novelties exist, then the illusion would be to reduce novelty to antecedent conditions. Thus, 
the existence or nonexistence of novelty must be established separately from any argument 
about illusion. Otherwise, we beg the question.          
Third, one may acknowledge the existence of discontinuities but find little evidence 
for them in the shortcomings of a person’s sense-making. If I cannot make sense of a 
something (a situation, a logical proof, the value of an object), but you can, for example, it 
seems that the anomaly bears no existence apart from my subjective take. Or if I cannot 
reduce an artist’s painting to earlier styles, but you can, we seem to disagree on the 
continuity of the artist’s work. In short, people differ in what they find fully familiar. But I 
do not find this relativism to matter much for the argument, unless origination is at stake, 
rather than creativity. Even if something is fully familiar to you, I may require a 
discontinuous act of creativity to achieve the sense of a thing that you have. And when we 
share the experience of a discontinuous novelty, there is no independent criterion available 
to tell us that it actually is continuous with antecedent conditions—that is precisely what 
                                               
89 Paraphrased from Hausman 76. In this section, Hausman provides a more than adequate argument against 
using the concept of illusion to explain novelty. I need not repeat the argument here.  
131 
  
we lack—so we could only assume this criterion, and that would yield a compensation in 
experience that just makes the discontinuity go away ad hoc.  
Now we turn to additional characterizations of new entities. In addition to 
uniqueness, we can experience the singularity of objects and situations. Symptoms of 
singularity include the absolute irreplaceability, unrepeatability, and unsubstitutability of 
one thing for another. To get this sense of a thing, we might distinguish between austere 
identity and complex or messy identity. The meaning of a thing is relatively complex or 
messy to the extent that it involves relations to other entities that may be separately 
identified by redirecting consciousness or through analysis. A singularity is a synthesis of a 
unique identity and its relations into one unified identity; the mess is concealed in this 
synthesis. So, for example, I relate to my father’s old hammer in many ways—as a physical 
object with certain specifications, as a relic with a sentimental value, as a use-object—and 
the synthesis of all these relations yields a singular object. Calling it a hammer is just an 
introduction to the singular thing it is (for me). Every grain of sand possesses not only the 
uniqueness of its identity, but also an infinite set of relations, consciousness of some subset 
of which yield a singular identity. Based on this phenomenon of singularity, one may insist 
that every entity or situation can, when given adequate attention, exemplify newness of a 
different type from mere uniqueness, one that elevates a Romantic sensibility to a 
conception of creative novelty. This singularity is found in concrete objects, of course, and 
exemplified through artistic works like poems.  
But this view is mistaken if it attributes creative novelty to something based solely 
on its singularity. Singularities, on their own, do not exemplify a type-difference from 
uniqueness so much as a difference in frame of reference and meaning. The significance of 
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singularities is afforded by the abundance of meaning synthesized. For example, seeing the 
oldest existing wheel in a museum or mentioning 9/11 evokes a great meaning. In both 
cases, we handle complexity through a synthesis. Yet the recognition of novelty runs 
orthogonal to whether or not it is a singularity. The crucial condition, again, is whether or 
not the thing is familiar on the basis of one’s ways of making sense of things. Consider a 
short bit of 9/11 poetry: 
I can do only two things for [those who jumped from burning floors]— 
describe this flight 
and not add a last line.90      
 
I take it for granted that in reading these lines, one makes a meaningful, if vague, 
connection between the act of the poet and the singular photos of people jumping from the 
Twin Towers. But the lines can do so much with so little, not because they draw attention to 
an existing singularity, but because they create a new one. Another poet, by contrast, could 
elaborately describe a single sunset for pages, for a book, without being creative. One could 
synthesize all 592 pages of information in the 9/11 Commission Report into a singular 
sense of the event without thereby encountering novelty. Finally, note that it is not just the 
newness of the singularity doing the work here, but also the fact that it makes sense—that 
it is meaningfully integrated into experience. We can, I take it, creatively synthesize an 
infinite number of oddities—say, a lampshade and a train—in imagination, and one could 
even make a sculpture of whatever one imagines. If we say such things meet the conditions 
for singularity, it remains the case that they make little integrated sense. This is not to say 
we could not make further sense of the synthesis eventually, but it would take additional 
                                               
90 Excerpted from Wislawa Szmborska, “Photograph from September 11” 
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creative interpretive work, and whatever way we create to make sense of it further would 
not be what gave rise to it in the first place.  
 For similar reasons, I object to Carl Hausman’s account of creative novelty, which is 
the most perceptive and sustained account I can find. In its simplest terms, on Hausman’s 
view, a creative novelty is a new kind of thing.91 His view depends on another variation of 
uniqueness, which I call individuality. Individuality refers first to a different type of 
“structure” characterized by an organic unity—the synthesis, in my terms—of its parts.92 
Consider the identity of an everyday object like a pencil (his example). As we have already 
seen, one pencil is unique even as it shares characteristics with other pencils. On 
Hausman’s description, the intelligibility of the pencil depends on recognizing in it the 
exhibition of a structure synthesizing the concrete items essential to being a pencil. 
Recognizing an object to be a pencil implies disregarding all items inessential to this 
structure. To identify a pencil, we disregard whatever singular features it might have (a bite 
mark, a torn eraser) in favor of those positive items of a pencil’s structure. By contrast, 
consider a painting. The identification of a painting involves a progressive movement 
toward finer and subtler discriminations of characteristics. To regard a Ce zanne painting to 
be the painting it is, we strive to include more, rather than fewer, characteristics in a 
description. A painting possesses its own intrinsic ordering of elements in a structure, all of 
which contribute to the thing it is in an organic unity. In this sense, then, a painting 
introduces a new, specific kind of thing through an immanent concrete structure. Hausman 
further argues that, while the new structure is a unity of concrete particulars, its coherence 
                                               
91 Hausman, 8 
92 Ibid, 24 
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must simultaneously exemplify a new Form, because otherwise the individual painting 
could not meet identity conditions: “if it is to be an identity, it cannot be wholly dependent 
on what it identifies.”93 Individuals, on Hausman’s view, instance a new structure and Form: 
“It exhibits a new structure which newly exemplifies a Form.”94 Here a Form refers to “that in 
virtue of which a cluster of items—a group of things or of already identified 
characteristics—cohere sufficiently to be recognized, identified, and subsequently 
characterized.”95 The Form and the structure, on his view, are importantly distinct. A radical 
departure in structure is necessary to disclose a new Form, and though the Form does 
depend on the new immanent thing for its existence (burning the painting destroys the 
exemplification of Form), the Form nonetheless functions independently from this thing. So, 
for example, a painting may exemplify the Form of a new style we come to call “Post-
Impressionism,” that can include additional paintings. In this way, Hausman largely 
reproduces the traditional Platonic view of the Form of Beauty, which is distinctive for its 
instantiation in concrete particulars, and extends this view to all creative novelty.      
 Hausman identifies new individuality with creative novelty. His view is, therefore, a 
thing-focused view, where what gives us the important hints about creativity derives from 
our study of things like artworks. This is a reasonable enough place to start, I think, but 
such a start distorts the creativity we recognize if we start elsewhere. Consider the 
creativity involved in a casual conversation, when someone makes a particularly striking or 
witty comment, which makes a new point well. Or consider someone who offers up a new 
alternative or act in an unfamiliar, but appropriate way, like an elementary school teacher 
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94 Ibid, 28, his italics 
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who solves the “problem” of kids making fun of a child undergoing cancer treatment by 
shaving her own head.96 There is, in addition, invention and innovation in practical matters, 
and revolution in scientific practice, which do not at all provide the same starting model for 
their objects as a work of art. Finally, even among artworks, whatever we find creative in 
Duchamp’s Fountain is not at all reducible to the urinal. I mention these cases to indicate 
the wider concerns I have. The premise I assume is that these examples are just as viable as 
candidates for creative novelty as a painting. Hausman’s view should be able to account for 
them. Let’s see if it does. 
Individuality, I claim, is neither necessary nor sufficient for creative novelty, at least 
when given a precise enough characterization to make individuality a useful concept. To 
make my case, I start by diagnosing some issues with the characterization of individuality. 
Suppose I ask for a pencil, and my friend brings me a nine-foot long pencil with a 
one-foot diameter. The pencil, we might say, counts as a pencil by satisfying the structure of 
a pencil; yet it diverges from what I took myself to be asking for. If it meets conditions for 
the structure of a pencil, the big pencil nonetheless leaves a remainder for me to 
understand. The object denies the sufficiency of the cluster of items we take for granted to 
recognize it as just a pencil. On the other hand, we might say that relative size should be 
considered a previously unacknowledged element of the structure of a pencil, which the big 
pencil fails to satisfy. In this second case, I think Hausman must postulate a newly 
exemplified Form—Big Pencil—because, despite its size, Big Pencil is intelligible to us, and 
because he must account for its oddity somehow in the object. But this postulation has 
some problems. First, Big Pencil is not an individual in the same way that an artwork is, 
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because it does not rely on the organic unity of increasingly many characteristics of the 
object to exemplify a Form. It does not matter whether it is tan or blue, for example. It is 
just a pencil, except very big, rather than a painting that requires us to scrutinize each of its 
elements in detail. But if Big Pencil does exemplify a new Form, then there must be 
something wrong with the phenomenology that requires a new organic unity of structure 
to introduce a Form. This point might push Hausman back to finding little pencils and big 
pencils intelligible on the basis of one Form, but without settling the remainder for 
understanding. Even if one allows that the big pencil exemplifies a new Form, this does not 
make it creatively novel—it is, rather, a disconnected oddity. Though the pencil bears some 
eccentric relevance to what I asked for, and though it is intelligible, it does not make sense 
in the situation. The key point, then, is that however we construe the Form in the situation, 
there is no temptation to attribute creative novelty.   
So let’s vary the case. Suppose I set myself to some difficult writing task, and find 
myself overwhelmed. I ask for a pencil, and Big Pencil arrives. In context, I might connect 
Big Pencil with an exhortation to “think big,” and find myself moving forward on my project. 
In context, then, Big Pencil functions in establishing some new, potentially creative, 
connections, but it must be noted that the new Form, if it is one, does this only within a set 
of complex relations in a situation—whatever is creatively novel in the situation is not 
reducible to the newness of Big Pencil. Or suppose I have a nervous habit of chewing 
pencils while I work. I ask for a pencil, and my friend brings me a hand exercise ball. Here I 
might credit my friend with a creative insight I had not previously achieved, granting that I 
take the ball and channel my nervousness in a new way—that I, too, grasp the connection. 
But here there is no new Form at all. I am fully familiar with my nervousness and with 
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exercise balls, but I had not built this connection between the two. The key point here, then, 
is that creative novelty can appear by varying the meaningful elements of the situation we 
make sense of, holding objects constant.  
Hausman might respond that I mistakenly identify what counts as the new structure 
and Form in my examples. He states that “instances of Novelty Proper necessarily vary with 
respect to the kinds of processes from which they issue.”97 So, for example, he mentions 
that new structures of painting will differ in character from new music, and new art will 
differ from new moral ideals. By extension, one might imagine a structure involving me, 
writing, pencils, and Big Pencil as items in an organic unity exemplifying a new Form. But 
this stretches the notion of a Form to something else—Forms become more like messy 
singularities rather than self-contained individuals. There is indeed new coherence to a 
situation often attributable to a creative novelty, but this coherence is not necessarily the 
coherence of an organic unity disclosing a Form. As Hausman himself remarks, “not every 
object or group of objects exhibits a pattern that is recognized in terms of an intelligible 
identity. Not every aggregate is sufficiently coherent to appear as exemplifying a Form.”98 
But these aggregates are not necessarily meaningless in relation to each other, since they 
could compose a meaningful singularity. The minimal appearance of creative novelty is not 
the disclosure of a Form; rather it is a new relation, even if between fully familiar relata. 
This is the case in the exercise ball example. There is no additional need to postulate a Form 
exemplified by this structure, because after all it is not necessarily the identity of the whole 
that is at stake, so much as the link between parts. 
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On my view, the accurate description of Big Pencil is simply that, in encountering the 
big pencil, we extend one familiar way for pencils to be unique—to be different in size—to a 
new limit. We discover something about pencils and their possibilities. Compare a case in 
which one encounters the Grand Canyon or a skyscraper for the first time. This case yields 
discovery, and perhaps awe, but neither creative novelty nor a mysterious remainder for 
understanding. They are not necessarily odd. When we experience Big Pencil as an oddity, it 
is because of the nonsense it makes in the situation.   
 Making a new link between parts in a situation is a new way of making sense of 
things. A new way of making sense may contingently be quite narrow and limited in scope 
with application to one and only one unrepeatable situation. Or it may be broad in scope, 
ranging over large swathes of repeatable situations. This difference does not imply a 
difference in types of sense-making, one including Forms and one not. It depends rather on 
the senses and entities involved and their generality. I frankly do not know what 
implications to draw for Hausman’s metaphysics or phenomenological Platonism, but I do 
not find it worthwhile to stretch the notion of a Form to range over cases that do not meet 
its basic characterization. In short, Hausman presents an overly specific account of one kind 
of identity, drawing on the example of a painting, and uses the results of this investigation 
for interpreting all other creative novelty. When it comes to something like a moral ideal, he 
leaves it unclear what would count as all the correlates with the artistic case. Even a Big 
Pencil seems to challenge the view. 
 From the deficiencies I find in different characterizations of the newness of things, I 
conclude that the primary focus for understanding creative novelty should be on our 
making new sense. This shift in focus moves away from an attempt to derive a concept of 
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novelty simply from what we find in external entities toward our ways of participating with 
entities through sense-making. Thus, concrete entities or embedded novelties are still 
relevant, but they get a different analysis in their relation to sense-making. Because of this, 
now these objects may vary in radical ways depending on the senses involved and how 
things achieve embedded novelty. To develop my view, we must next investigate the order 
of things when they make sense, and the anomalies and disorder of things when they do not 
make sense. The latter, I claim, are constitutive of the discontinuity involved in creative 
novelty.                  
3.4 DESCRIBING ORDER AND DISORDER 
As a motif for this section, return once again to Frost’s poem: unlike the bird, Frost 
does not initially make sense of the wood-pile. He certainly recognizes it, without a 
problem, to be a wood-pile, and even a unique woodpile. But he does not understand 
initially why it would be there in the condition it is in. He experiences an anomaly.  
By order I mean the way things make sense on the whole range of background 
knowledge and skill one can draw on, given a chance, in a situation. By disorder, I mean the 
deficiency of that whole background to make sense of a situation. Necessarily, however, one 
only focuses on a subset of one’s skill and knowledge in a situation. When things appear in 
order based on that subset, one finds the situation familiar. Otherwise, one finds an 
anomaly, which one might eliminate by drawing on additional ways of making sense, so 
long as they are adequate for the task. An anomaly becomes disorder when one’s resources 
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for making sense of something prove inadequate, when anomaly is insurmountable given 
current resources.99  
In Chapter Two, I described the general phenomena of positive and negative 
familiarity in a world. Positive familiarity includes the entire range of meaningful 
experience we can have given our ways of making sense, the order of which I describe here. 
Normal problems are those we can solve by using our mastered ways of making sense of 
things. Negative familiarity is familiarity with the limits of our sense-making, which call for 
creative acts. But this general account is inadequate for present purposes, because in 
specific situations it is not always clear whether something is merely a problem with an 
available solution, or whether it is intractable given our (positively) familiar ways of making 
sense. The complexities go deeper than this too, but it is important to note up front that 
anomaly functions as a bridge concept, including both unsolved, everyday problems and 
intractable problems in those moments where it is unclear just what we are dealing with.   
The phenomenon of expectation indicates how anomalies arise in attention. Briefly, 
but imprecisely, expectations are what we think is going to happen. To be more precise, 
they are what we are primed or conditioned to experience. So I expect to go to work 
tomorrow; I expect a basketball to travel in a regular arc toward a basket. The latter 
indicates that expectations are not necessarily “intellectual” or propositional; they include 
what we take for granted in our involvement in a situation. Moreover, expectations vary in 
specificity and intensity from anticipation to readiness to openness. We get a glimmer of 
these distinctions from, for example, a basketball player who anticipates a pass, who is 
                                               
99 There is room for additional distinctions, which I will not draw in detail. For example, I mentioned the 
“perpetual anomaly” of an artwork above, which characterizes art so long as we continue engaging with it 
through interpretation. 
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ready for a pass, or who is open to being passed to. Or, in the latter case, it is perhaps 
clearer to speak of the sideline player who is open to going in the game, who thinks he 
might go in, and will not be surprised if he does. One kind of surprise results from unmet 
expectations. One expects a pass that does not come; one expects a job promotion, but does 
not get it. At its most intense, this surprise can be coupled with disappointment, depending 
on the kind of expectation and the values involved. Frost might have been disappointed by 
his trek into the woods, had he not encountered the wood-pile, because he expected (or at 
least hoped) to find something new. However characterized, the structure of unmet 
expectations has little to do with creative novelty, so we leave it behind. 
A second kind of surprise indicates an occurrence of something unexpected, rather 
than the failure of something expected to occur. A hopeful, rather than expectant player gets 
in the game, someone throws a surprise party, or I unexpectedly meet a friend on a busy 
street. Frost might have been surprised, in this sense, by the sudden presence of a mountain 
lion. To clarify this phenomenon, note again that one focuses on a situation with only a 
subset of available sense-making. A purpose typically delimits what one attends to and the 
skills, values, and knowledge operative in a situation. Now, were my purpose in a woods to 
hunt, I would likely be unsurprised by a wood-pile, because I would resist having my 
attention drawn away from my quarry. Similarly, I may fail to be surprised in meeting my 
friend on the street if I am rushing home for my child's birthday party. The dramatic 
limiting effects of one's purpose has been experimentally demonstrated in the invisible 
gorilla experiments, in which participants are given the specific task of counting the 
number of passes made by a basketball team in a video. In the video, a person in a gorilla 
suit walks into the middle of the team, beats his chest, and walks off screen. Yet participants 
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in the experiment failed to recognize the intrusion of the gorilla in more than half the 
cases.100 These are cases of “attentional-blindness.” The experiment participants expect to 
see passes, and that is what they see. They are surprised later when the experimenter 
redirects their attention to the gorilla. In this different context, the participants overcome 
attentional-blindness and attend to a different aspect of the video. Physiological surprise—
elicited by the sudden slam of a door, for example—often works in much the same way to 
redirect attention. It does not arise on the basis of one's purpose, but rather redirects one 
from some purpose to another. On the basis of one’s full set of skills, values, and knowledge, 
in such cases, one is typically capable of handling this redirection and the new situation, 
making sense of it. That is, one shifts from one familiar situation to another. Or, in the case 
of the invisible gorilla, one shifts from something familiar to something unfamiliar.  
Now we can note the distinction between surprises in attention versus those that 
redirect attention. Imagine that, while counting passes made by a basketball team, the 
basketball disappeared in mid-air. This would elicit a third, different kind of surprise, 
because expectations are violated among the objects they directly attend to. Like 
disappearing balls, anomalies are most perspicuous when experienced within the field of 
one's attention. As an aspect of our attention, anomalies can persist as long as we attend to 
them, eliciting wonder or perplexity or sublimity, until we find or create the sense that 
dispels them. But because they show up on the basis of a specific purpose in a situation, 
they can also disappear because purposes shift. Thus, (1) we will need to examine the key 
phenomena in attention and (2) be mindful of how shifting purposes can undermine the 
appearance of these phenomena.  
                                               
100 Chabris, 1999 
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Let’s attend, then, to order and disorder. Things are in order when they make sense 
taken together. A sequence of numbers, for example, exhibits order when some known rule 
accounts for the sequence. The rule is an explicit statement of how one makes sense of the 
numbers. Consider some example sets: 
1. {59, 13, 373} 
2. {13, 59, 373} 
3. {2, 3, 5, 7, 11 … } 
4. {59, 13, 372} 
 
The sequence of prime numbers results from the rule that a natural number greater than 
one be divisible without remainder by only itself or one. This rule makes sense of sets (1-3), 
though they come under progressively more rules of order, adding sequence (least to 
greatest) and completeness. We know that the set of all primes is infinite, which (3) 
represents with an ellipsis. Perhaps the most we could say about (4), however, is that it is a 
set of natural numbers. 
  As a matter of how we understand these sets, I cast the curious difference between 
the rules describing (3) and (4) as a difference in necessity and sufficiency conditions. The 
prime number rule establishes order decisively in (3)—making sense of all and only prime 
numbers. The rule makes sense of each number’s presence in the sequence (sufficiency), 
and shows why its absence would be a mistake for the whole sequence (necessity). So long 
as one is occupied by the ordering principle for prime numbers, there is no question that 
the numbers in (3) belong. 
  Applied to set (4), however, a rule to collect some natural numbers cannot make 
complete sense. Each number belongs as a natural number, but they could be otherwise—
any other natural number. They meet a sufficiency condition, but not a necessity condition. 
We might also look at (2) for an incomplete sense—each of the selected numbers is a prime, 
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but the prime rule does not answer the question “why these primes?” The prime number 
rule alone is inadequate to account for these numbers and no other. Thus, some orders 
appear insufficient or unnecessary. Their rules are incomplete or they incompletely rule. I 
call this lack of complete sense anomaly.  
   Anomaly is normally a transient property, dependent on what sense we bring to an 
object of experience. We add additional anomaly to (2) by failing to recognize them as 
primes, and we add it to (3) by asking why there should be an infinite series of primes at all. 
That is, we change the frame of reference significantly for the way we make sense of the 
series. Or one removes the anomaly of (4) by understanding it to be the set of counts of 
marbles in three different jars. As long as this count is our primary concern, the anomaly 
disappears. Anomaly is therefore first of all a phenomenon of human participation in a 
world of concerns and projects, whether in doing mathematics or counting marbles. But 
both the object and the sense-making matter in this interaction. We get a further indication 
of this by noting that, with the rule of primes, I could construct a series of primes that 
embeds this order and share it with others—in this case, I am a maker. Or I could encounter 
a series of primes produced elsewhere and make sense of it—in this case, I am an observer. 
And in the case that, as an observer, I cannot make complete sense of the series, the series 
itself demands work from me.  
Consider the sequence {1, 3, 8, 18, 38 … }. One may initially find the sequence 
anomalous, if one expects a pattern and does not see it initially. Now, first, suppose 
someone just tells one the ordering rule for a pattern. Here one adopts a new sense of the 
series and understands its order. But note that the newness of the sense is neglected, 
because what one attends to is the series itself, and not the newness of sense. But, in fact, to 
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grasp the pattern-order of the series presupposes that one grasp a new rule for ordering 
numbers and test it against the series. Even if, on the other hand, one works out this 
pattern-order oneself, one may neglect the newness of the rule that makes sense of the 
series. Nonetheless, by attending to this rule, one finds something that was not there 
before, a new sense of the numbers.   
  Order is the absence of anomaly, or the presence of necessity and sufficiency 
conditions. Of course I mean this in a strictly experienced sense, rather than a logical sense. 
Logical order is one species of more rigorous order. When we experience order, we have a 
working grasp of our situation apparently adequate to our concerns. We make sense of 
what we are doing, roughly why we are doing it, and who we are doing it with. The order 
we experience may not be the same as robust knowledge, and a Socrates can come along to 
poke holes in it at any point. Indeed, when Socrates challenges Euthyphro's sense of piety, 
he brings anomaly to the concept. But even general order is more rigorous than mere 
intelligibility, because it requires making sense of different objects together. And order can 
apply to any number of relations we bear to entities, be they intellectual, instrumental, 
conative, or evaluative. Thus, in much of our experience, order is everywhere. A courtroom 
exhibits order so long as its rules range over all the conduct (and arguments) it sees. A soda 
machine is in order as long it dispenses a cold drink when I pay and push a button. A 
parking lot is in order so long as drivers abide by the painted stripes. For causal 
explanation, order is exemplified in the confirmation of a predictive hypothesis. One 
coordinates interests, skills, knowledge, and values in situations which tend to fit with their 
expression, and one situation flows seamlessly into the next. Under these conditions, we 
have no need for creative work. 
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Anomalies, by contrast, show up in a variety of ways, but always falling short of 
making all the sense we seek in them. They are intellectual or moral problems, or just 
oddities like big pencils. There must always be something minimally intelligible in a case of 
anomaly, or else there would be nothing to actually attend to in the case except, perhaps, 
abstractly—e.g. we can give a name like “chaos” or “pure spontaneity” to something we find 
to be intrinsically unintelligible or inaccessible. Creative novelties are intelligible, I claim, 
but they are also necessarily anomalous in their inception.  
When Frost encounters the wood-pile, it is initially anomalous. But he draws on 
further familiar ways of making sense to craft a likely story for its presence. Yet, were there 
a point or were something at stake, one could poke holes in this account, since there is no 
evidence of someone “turning to fresh tasks.” The situation permits Frost to make sense of 
it in this way, but it certainly does not require this sense on any standard of rigor. 
Nonetheless, the account permits Frost to dispel the anomaly and continue on his way. This 
is the process of compensation. Frost compensates for the unavailability of evidence by 
contributing typical ways of making sense of things in the situation.  
We can recognize compensation in even the highly structured domain of 
mathematics. The mathematician James Milgram describes a case that serves the point, 
related to our earlier pattern-recognition cases.101 Consider a sequence of dots: 
 
The mathematics problem is this: “Assume that the number of dots added at each step is 
more than the number added in the previous step. How many dots in the 20th term?” On 
                                               
101 Milgram, undated 
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the assumption that there is a regular pattern, the expected solution is 20 X 21 = 420. But 
this assumption is unjustified, given the constraints of the explicit problem, which does not 
ask for a pattern. At most, one could calculate a lower bound. Thus, in arriving at a specific 
solution, one fortifies the sense of the problem with a compensation. Mathematical rigor 
demands that one must be satisfied without a specific solution.  
 It must be acknowledged that “seeing a pattern” and “accounting for a wood-pile” 
still require constructive effort on the part of the observer to make sense of their objects—
they do not imply a spontaneous “intuition” into things. They make sense through familiar 
ways of making sense. If one is skilled enough in mathematics, the process of making sense 
of the above problem without compensation will be equally familiar. The difference is that 
this way of making sense yields fidelity to the object, whereas the compensatory pattern 
recognition does not. Nonetheless, the problem will not announce that one has made a 
mistake in the same way that, say, incorrectly cutting a 2 X 4 stud for a wall does when it 
does not fit. One may just move on from the problem without reservation, as Frost does 
from the wood-pile. Yet there is an additional difference between the compensation of 
seeing a pattern and Frost’s wood-pile: while one who recognizes a pattern typically leaves 
the problem with confidence in the solution, Frost can easily recognize his account to be 
carving out one possibility among others, and therefore not a necessity at all. Thus, while 
Frost’s compensation provides sufficiency conditions, it does not provide necessity 
conditions for making sense of the wood-pile, and the account remains open to revision if it 
ever needed it. Not all anomalies require full order for us to deal with them; in fact, most of 
them do not. However, because the range of possibilities for making sense of the anomaly 
are all well-ordered (by hypothesis)—that is, each revised account of how the wood-pile 
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got to be there would issue from an equally familiar or “reasonable” way of making sense of 
it—this status as provisional or open to revision excludes a recognition of disorder.       
 There is no single description of what art calls for. Unlike the math problem, the 
9/11 poem above does not raise an explicit question or call on a reader to work for 
understanding. It expresses a singularity, the key sense of which one may grasp 
immediately. Nonetheless, owing to the language, one may explore its possible meaning in 
many ways. Unlike mathematics, it does not set rigid constraints on the sense one can make 
of it—though it does nonetheless have constraints. For this reason, one can not only make 
sense of it in different ways, but one can even offer a new way of making sense of it through 
a creative interpretation. Frost’s poem is trickier, however, because, with some exceptions 
(“the slow smokeless burning of decay”), the poem offers little to discourage an utterly 
conventional reading to an unskilled reader, as though it is just a well-expressed record of a 
walk in the woods. Read as an anomaly, however, the poem demands interpretation, which 
may range from fairly superficial (e.g. the poem is a comment on the vanity of human 
activity) to quite sophisticated (e.g. the poem raises questions about the activity and value 
of writing).102 Were we to examine additional art forms—painting, film, music—we would 
find large variations in the ways they deliver new senses of things or require one to engage 
in sense-making. But what is common among them, at least among the creative works in 
each medium, is that they do indeed engage us in this way, helping or challenging us to 
grasp a connection between things. Thus what is distinctive about art, at least a great deal 
of art, is not at all that it stands apart from us as new alien kinds, but rather that it expands 
                                               
102 This latter interpretation I owe to Jay Parini, personal conversation, Middlebury College, June 2013.  
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our understanding, whether through discovery or creation. Creative art is embedded 
novelty. It gets its novel character precisely from being anomalous.               
We turn now to disorder. Some anomalies are less easy to cope with than those we 
have seen so far. One needs to lead a group of people, but a Gordian knot stands in one’s 
way. One needs to establish the structure of a benzene molecule, but no existing principles 
of molecular composition work. One wants freedom and security, but sees no way of having 
both. One needs to express something in music, but this Western tonal system cannot be 
made to do the job. Like Captain Vere, one faces a dilemma—allegiance to the State or 
allegiance to the ethical call of a situation—both of which attract one’s moral commitment. 
Call these kinds of problems “disorders.” Disorder appears when our ways of making sense 
of things are deficient to cope with an anomaly.  The attempt to understand the sets of 
natural numbers with which we began indicates relatively mild anomaly compared to what 
we can face. 
 We put our minds to work on these problems by combining parts into wholes, 
breaking wholes into parts, and putting parts and wholes into relationships. We search for 
and discover relevant facts and theories that aid us in our work. We learn as much as we 
can from our conventional ways of tackling problems. Understanding gives us the elements 
of logical, causal, or practical order, and by its work we try to solve the problems we face. 
We draw deeply on our familiar ways of making sense of things to dispel an anomaly once it 
appears. But there is no guarantee of success. Despite hard work, a Gordian Knot stays 
tight, the molecular structure of benzene remains intractable, and the Western tonal system 
will not diverge from the ultimate consonance of a home key. One may know that a choice 
must be made, but all choices appear equally weighted and mutually exclusive. Such 
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anomalies may not even be clearly presented; one may have no grasp of even what would 
count as success with respect to an anomaly, or what questions need to be asked.   
 I raise these extreme examples to orient us to disorder, but anomalies tend toward 
disorder in many everyday cases as well. There are important constraints operating on us 
when we cope with a situation that ensure we must experience disorder. There are first of 
all the constraints that we take to be fixed. Alexander was constrained by the idea that he 
must untie the Gordian knot, as tradition demanded. But in everyday life, if I lock my keys in 
my car, I might easily miss the idea that I could break a window. If I realize that I could 
break a window, I might easily realize that I could just break the smallest window—and 
that might be just the connection I need to enable action. There are also time-constraints 
that work on situations—if one must make a choice now or act now, rather than later, one 
must draw on only those ways of making sense one has. At a moment’s notice, for example, 
one must find a way to patch a hole in a roof before a storm hits or make a striking analogy 
in an impromptu speech. 
 My thesis is that one must respond to disorder with a creative act. One must respond 
with a new way of making sense of something, even if it is just to remove a constraint on a 
situation or propose different constraints. Alexander created a way to make sense of cutting 
the Knot. Nonetheless, in order to avoid oddity, weirdness, or incoherence, new ways of 
making sense must in every case be connected to and constrained by something in the 
situation. In the case of a genre-filmmaker, nearly all of the constraints may be shared with 
other films in the genre, yet films like Blade Runner (1984) or Invasion of the Body Snatchers 
(1956) embed novelties that challenge us to think differently. In everyday cases of 
ingenuity, for example using compacted Styrofoam containers as a building material, there 
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is a new way of making sense of these things operating in the background, which turns 
waste into a resource. What the creative painter does with paint on canvas, the tinkerer 
does for things lying around—the specific senses at work, and the types of novelty they 
embed differs, but not their shared task of making new sense of things.  
 The thing created in a creative act is, minimally, a new relation between things, 
which enables us to cope in a situation—by understanding, acting, or choosing differently. 
This is a new sense of things, which embeds the creative act in the world. Creativity is, 
properly, the making of this relation, for which there is evidence in the embedded novelty. 
And we see the necessity for such acts only where we must cope with disorder, because 
there is no alternative way to cope but one we newly make. The creative act is therefore an 
anomaly. A creative novelty is both visible in the embedded novelty and invisible in the act 
that gives rise to it; it is both connected to familiar things and familiar constraints, and yet 
unbound by those things in introducing a way forward that did not exist before. For Frost, 
experience demanded something from him, something in the themes of human activity and 
the incorrigibility of nature, which set a task for him to turn to. The most general argument 
in favor of an account of creativity that claims discontinuity with the past is that, without it, 
there would be no importantly new ways of making sense of things. The existing order of 
things would always make sense of the present, were we only to know it well enough, and 
imply a future. But by introducing new ways of making sense, we change the order that 
makes sense of the present and its possibilities.  
 Nonetheless, in each of the cases I have been calling creative, there is a temptation to 
emphasize what is familiar and ignore what is unfamiliar. One can comment on all the 
influences that go into making a film and how they express an overall Zeitgeist. Or one can 
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point to the gradual assimilation of familiar skills and ideas by an inventor that accumulate 
over time to determine an invention at the right place at the right time. In response to these 
objections, I must insist that no matter how “close” the proximity of senses, there is no 
necessity to their synthesis, and that a creative act introduces a discontinuity from the 
determinations of the sense antecedently available. On the other hand, lacking this 
necessity, one may be tempted to call creative acts spontaneous, lacking any necessary or 
determinative relations to the order of things, as if one could escape one’s Zeitgeist entirely 
and introduce a novelty from outside. In response to this objection, I must insist that the 
creative act maintain meaningful continuity with antecedent conditions. This is the 
requirement, examined in Chapter Two, that creativity respond at least to negative 
familiarity.  
3.5 CLARIFYING CREATIVITY IN RESPONSE TO DISORDER 
 To argue for my position, then, I need a minimal case of creativity that walks a 
tightrope between full determination and pure spontaneity, while indicating the 
insufficiency of those positions. I argue that, when faced with disorder, we must respond 
creatively in order to make sense of a situation, where making sense is more than just acting 
spontaneously. If successful, I take this to be (1) strong reason to define creative novelty to 
be a new way of making sense of things and (2) strong evidence for our ability to be 
creative precisely by introducing this novelty.  
To make my case, I need to clarify a specific situation in which we (1) deal with 
disorder and (2) draw a distinction between spontaneity and creativity. Furthermore, this 
situation must factor out alternative characterizations invoking (a) a conceptual or rational 
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scheme, (b) empirical psychological principles, or (c) skillful, practical involvement. This 
move is necessary in order to isolate a case in which one must necessarily act in a way that 
bears no reduction or explanation by reference to these alternatives. We can then 
investigate whether a difference remains between creativity and (d) spontaneity. 
  The alternatives to creativity I factor out must be understood in specific ways, but I 
think my understanding of them is standard and fair. (a) By a conceptual or rational 
scheme, I mean a coherent set of rules or procedures that coordinate one's thought or 
actions. Such a system allows one to solve problems by drawing inferences from available 
information. The view of rationality I have in mind is sufficiently broad to include 
subconscious and unconscious intellectual procedures. The procedures themselves must be 
logically related and unambiguous. 
  (b) By “empirical psychological principles,” what I have in mind are principles of 
association, innate forms of species-specific rationality, and habituated or conditioned 
forms of behavior. So, for example, these principles describe the tendency to associate 
smoke and fire, and act on the basis of this constant conjunction (to use Hume’s phrase). 
But we also observe tendencies to form different rational connections in an environment in 
different species. So, for instance, foraging species (e.g. rats) tend to avoid areas where they 
have found food before, a behavior that may strike us as irrational until we recognize the 
practical benefit for the forager of engaging its environment in this way. Empirical 
psychological principles explain an organism’s activity by reference to its specific biological 
or practical circumstances.   
  (c) Skillful, practical involvement refers to one's engagement in a situation or 
environment in terms of complex learned abilities, the manipulation of available 
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equipment, and a set of purposes. To engage in an environment skillfully implies that the 
engagement can be done better or worse, with greater or lesser effectiveness, sensitivity, or 
refinement. Success based on skill contrasts with success based on chance. For example, 
chess typically requires great skill for success in winning a game against an experienced 
opponent, although chance (or luck) may play a role among novices. Playing the lottery, by 
contrast, requires no skill. Poker seems to be a mix of skill and luck, a matter of how one 
plays the hand as it is dealt. Depending on the activity, skillful involvement may also peak 
due to the structure of the activity. Tic-tac-toe, for example, requires skill to a point, after 
which matches between experienced players always end in a draw. 
  I just used the concept of chance in a fairly commonsense way. In the chess case, a 
“lucky” move is a fortuitous move made despite an inadequate grasp of the game—a good 
move made despite ignorance. In the lottery case, “chance” indicates elements of a system 
beyond one's control.  
(d) By contrast to these everyday uses, the reference to spontaneity or chance 
considers chance to be (1) a meaningful explanatory principle or (2) a way of describing 
how one acts. It is important to recognize that (1) is here understood to deliver the 
concrete sense we bring to an act in order to explain it. We often try to understand our acts; 
one way to try to understand is through meaningful explanation; and a reference to 
spontaneity or chance may be part of that explanation: all of these elements may occur as 
an aspect of one’s attempt to understand a situation. For example, I might say, “I drove to 
Chicago, because I acted on a whim.”103 Here spontaneity is supposed to be a reason for my 
                                               
103 To refer to spontaneity or chance in an explanation is not necessarily to undermine the possibility of 
explanation, but it does ultimately require a philosophically coherent conception in metaphysics to 
support it. For example, the propositions “The bridge collapsed by chance” or “the species evolved 
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action. In the second case (2), spontaneity is described more directly without an attempt to 
explain anything so much as offer an irreducible aspect of the situation—the phenomenon 
of spontaneity. As an initial characterization, spontaneity is impulsive, making one think or 
act in way that bears little relation to what one was thinking or doing before. One might 
have the sudden idea to drive across the country or one might make a snap judgment on an 
important matter. From the former example, I note that a spontaneous act need not 
introduce anything new—it is more a dramatic shift from one purpose to another, but 
without an external stimulus. There could be, I think, a great deal more description of 
distinct phenomena. For example, one may describe another kind of spontaneity that 
responds to an implicit sense of a situation, rather than some blind impulse. But I do not 
think belaboring this description is necessary, because I argue for principled difference 
between creativity and spontaneity in an embedded novelty that connects antecedent 
conditions in a new way. The more spontaneity offers in this respect, the greater the 
argument for calling it creative, but also the more reason to distinguish it from other 
conceptions of spontaneity.     
 My case is a game of coin-flipping. I select this example for its familiarity and clear 
theoretical description.  
  My friend asks me to call heads or tails. How do I go about making my call? Suppose 
first that I am an amateur coin-caller guided only by past experience, the results from 
which provide positive reinforcement for a particular selection. As I proceed from one call 
to the next, past successes influence each new guess—a series of heads, successfully called, 
                                               
spontaneously,” taken literally, require a metaphysical conception of chance. In scientific explanation, I take 
it, chance is typically not understood in this way, but is rather used to indicate ignorance of causal 
connections or to describe probabilities. 
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elicits the guess of heads because heads has been positively reinforced in several 
repetitions in experience. Thus, we can articulate the cause of my selection from a 
psychological principle of association. And yet I may fail in the next round, when tails is 
revealed. Through many episodes, I discover that the system of coin-flipping is not 
ultimately tracked by accreting my experience in this way. This discovery is not a matter of 
conscious or deliberate assessment, but rather a stabilization of my network of 
associations, which leaves me unsure how to proceed. The result would be the same if I 
adopted the strategy of calling tails after a long series of heads—surely a tails is due. But 
the game does not work that way. 
 The game equally fails to be effectively navigated by skillful involvement, for similar 
reasons. The problem is that no amount of experience or knowledge can give me a skill here 
at all, because one precondition for skill is that something can be done better or worse. As 
in the lottery, the result is in principle outside my control. There are ancillary skills that 
might complicate the case—e.g. noticing the way one tosses the coin or attempting to 
doctor the coin to weight it one way or the other. And there are skills that serve as 
preconditions for the case, like perceptual skills, the ability to engage in a game, and so on. 
But none of these play a role in the base case.  
  After abandoning associationist or skillful strategies, I advance to reason. I may at 
first employ all kinds of fallacious reasoning getting no further along than my earlier 
associationist attempts: again, with eight heads in a row, surely soon there will be tails.104 
                                               
104 In both the association and reason case, to the extent they can be made different, I should note that what 
counts as “reasonable” can vary. Since I have a fairly stringent view of reason here, I direct this comment 
just at association. In normal human cases, we are likely to check locations where we have found food in 
the past to find it again. Foraging species (mice and rats, for example), by contrast, tend to avoid places 
where they have previously found food, because, we might say, they “know” there is no food there. Such 
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The use of this kind of reasoning may initially guide my action as long as an answer seems 
more likely or unlikely, attractive or repulsive, reasonable or unreasonable. But, again, if I 
am attentive to the evidence and reason well, the structure of my concepts will eventually 
stop delivering a solution to my problem, and no further evidence will count in generating 
an act. Once I learn the appropriate probability theory, for instance, I can see the 
shortcomings of any guides to action for successfully navigating the game (rationally, 
psychologically). This is not to say that the game becomes irrational for this reason, but 
only that, from the perspective of the agent who must act, it makes no difference whether 
there are two equally rational choices or no rational choices at all: neither helps issue in an 
act.  
At this point, we move from mere anomaly to disorder. This disorder is an 
experienced structure of environmental conditions in which an agent is involved and an act 
is solicited, but in which the most perspicuous and relevant elements of the situation 
cannot determine any act. The elements of such disorder include not only environmental 
factors and a person’s concepts and rational processes, but also emotions, skills, habits, and 
values—one’s ways of making sense. The problems this disorder poses are no longer 
“problems” in the conventional sense, to be solved and dismissed, but are rather barriers to 
acting, thinking, or expressing at all, provided one continues to be motivated to face the 
situation. In the coin-flipping example, one option is to ignore or abandon the solicitation 
for action, and to change one’s purpose; but elevated conflicts of value or problems of 
survival cannot be so easily jettisoned. I presuppose some motivation for continuing to play 
                                               
idiosyncrasies in association or reason do not matter for the case of coin-calling, because there is no order 
(rational or otherwise) that makes sense of it.  
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the coin-flipping game at this point. But I have removed our reasoning abilities and mature 
experience from our resources for effectively governing our behavior within the structure 
of the game itself. 
  The essential problem with disorder, in its developed form, is that it inhibits action, 
rather than rewarding increasingly successful action. It sustains deliberation indefinitely, so 
long as acting agents remains within the conceptual or experiential structure provided by 
the system. It moves one from action to inaction.   
 Nonetheless, a direct description of spontaneity may offer the most insight into how 
we deal with calling coins. We turn to this investigation. Can we experience our coin-calling 
as an act of spontaneity?  
 Of course we can. In everyday circumstances, if someone asks me to call a coin, or 
pick a random number, or perform any number of such trivial acts, I can usually respond 
effortlessly regardless of an intellectual or skillful development that cannot support the act. 
If asked why I act as I do, I have no problem saying I act spontaneously. There is not much 
more to the act than this. One finds oneself moving in one direction rather than the other, 
calling heads rather than tails. And immediately following the act, one finds oneself 
unchanged by the act, primed to call again spontaneously.  
 But consider the further development of this response. First, offering up spontaneity 
to describe why I act the way I do is vacuous. The key here is that there is nothing in the 
selection one makes that makes sense. This point is made clearer with the second 
observation. There is no added complexity or additional possibility or existence added by a 
spontaneous selection in this case. Constrained as the case is, this lack of complexity is not 
surprising. But it is an important point to make to deny a claim that spontaneity introduces 
159 
  
anything creatively novel. To appear sensible, spontaneity may only act in one of two ways, 
neither of which leads anywhere new. Of course, one may take a more comprehensive look 
at a person engaged in such a game, one who selects “neither” or marches away from the 
game, but then it is not the spontaneity of his act that yields interest, but rather the new 
sense one makes of his act that will deny its spontaneity, provided one can make this sense. 
In cutting the Gordian Knot, Alexander cannot be taken to act spontaneously within the 
“rules;” he broke the rules. But his act still necessarily found its sense only with respect to 
those rules, as broken. By contrast, a spontaneous aberration from the rules of flipping 
coins can normally be recognized only as incoherent or as a failure to play the game—and 
that is from the perspective of the agent, and not just the audience for the act. It would take 
a special set of circumstances for making new sense to diverge completely from the rules of 
coin-flipping; but then the divergence would not be spontaneous because of this sense. 
Finally, the spontaneous act lacks permanence. Nothing results from it that lasts. There is 
no difference impressed on the world, no novelty embedded, and no new possibility 
imprinted for oneself or others. One may just as easily spontaneously select another option 
on the next turn. On these grounds, I describe spontaneity as dissipative; the act dissipates 
the moment it ends. Any sense it has self-destructs instantly. Thus, it seems that 
spontaneity framed to offer meaningful insight into one’s experience fails to offer much of 
what we might hope to get from it, and would serve only the most anemic description of 
creativity.   
 In its defense, I must mention that spontaneity can of course lead somewhere, and 
even somewhere interesting. Spontaneously calling heads, where much depends on the call, 
certainly has its effects in the world. Many football games have their tones set by a 
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spontaneous act; spontaneously calling a phone number initiates many of the world’s 
romances; and a spontaneous trip across the country can be formative. We see in these 
cases some of the sense of drawing attention to spontaneity of this kind in contributing to 
meaningful experience. But in these cases, it is important to note that spontaneity serves 
only at nodes threading multiple possibilities together, with the risks and reward for each 
possibility obscured in the bundle. The spontaneous act itself does nothing to generate 
those possibilities, nor does it bear on the content of the possibility selected—that 
possibility would remain the same whether selected spontaneously or as a matter of 
course. The spontaneous act dissipates and the mark it makes is mere trivia.     
 From an alternative characterization of creativity, however, we get much more. To 
the extent that we can find creativity in coin-flipping or number-calling, for example, we 
find it in those who actually do have something concrete to say in response to the question, 
“why?” To appreciate a superfluous aesthetic quality of a system, for example, tethers 
inessential properties to the essential properties of the static system: I may call tails 
because I like the look of that side of the coin. Or I may select a specific number because it is 
“lucky.” In these boring examples, something remarkable occurs. At the inception of one of 
these ways of acting, one generates a synthesis that could not be suggested by the static 
system on its own. One gathers disparate features of one’s experience into a new sense. 
This synthesis has a new status in existence; it does not dissipate like the act of spontaneity. 
Acting on the basis of superfluous aesthetic qualities offers a new way of acting, which one 
may replicate and share. Indeed, at its inception, such a synthesis sets a precedent; it does 
not follow one. The reference to this synthesis in explaining one’s reason for acting, 
however, could not have caused the act, because the synthesis did not yet exist. “Causation” 
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then is not an apt concept, for then we would be driven to a view of backward causation. 
Rather, the creative act brings a new sense into being, one that repairs the disorder in the 
service of action. It puts a Band-Aid on a puncture wound, so to speak. And yet, in this case 
at least, the synthesis contains no reason, no justification, apart from its service to action.  
 With respect to a creative synthesis, some ways of calling coins that look “more 
rational” are structurally identical to “less rational” ways. The strategy to always call heads 
(or always tails) because it conforms to the probabilistic theory involved in coin-calling is 
no more or less effective than always calling heads because one likes the look of it. But 
those strategies—and even the strategy to always call spontaneously—are nonetheless 
creative syntheses. They do not explain the act; the strategies are created in the act. The 
difference between an aesthetic call and a probability-maximizing call rests in the content 
synthesized. In the former, something external to the static system (the look of heads) helps 
break the stasis; in the latter, however, the concrete features of the system are, so to speak, 
folded back on themselves to produce a new way of acting. This result looks “more rational” 
because only the features of the system inform how one deals with it. And indeed there may 
be good reason to designate this way of dealing with the system as realizing new 
knowledge of the system; but it is not for that reason any less creative. Creative acts that 
refer to external content, I call “open syntheses;” those that refer only to themselves I call 
“closed.” This distinction I propose between open and closed syntheses parallels my earlier 
investigation of uniqueness and singularity. Closed syntheses result from a focus on the 
essential features of an object of consciousness, in this case the coin-flipping as a type of 
game with many tokens. A teacher, guiding a student through considerations about coin-
flipping, will recognize a tipping point for a student when she says, “It does not matter what 
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I call; I have no grounds for making a choice.” The student who produces the rule to always 
call heads at this point demonstrates a mastery of the knowledge of this object with a 
synthesis that reinforces this understanding. The open synthesis, by contrast, produces a 
singularity by referring to something inessential to the disorder, the look of the coin.  
 I also distinguish between making a choice and creating an alternative, affirming one 
option over another and creating a new alternative. Acting creatively enables one to 
reinforce a choice in a new way by building a synthesis with greater permanence in support 
of that choice. When faced with equally weighted, mutually exclusive options, one creates 
the “reason” or sense to pick one—whether it is one’s allegiance to freedom over security 
or the selection of something from a restaurant menu. In the latter, trivial example, it is 
helpful to recall the struggle for reasons that can come up short in so simple a case—“that 
one seems healthier,” “I’ve never had this kind of vegetable before”—when all one is doing 
is discriminating additional characteristics of the options in blind hope that something one 
stumbles upon will matter. They typically do not matter, and it is just an intellectual 
exercise that makes no connection to one’s values. So when the server comes, one either 
selects spontaneously or one reinforces some choice by connecting it anew to, say, the value 
of health. One might object that this final choice was always implicit in the situation and 
that, so to speak, one was destined to choose health after all the hemming and hawing. But 
this interpretation both ignores the skirmish of value that could condition a new 
commitment and depends on a choice made implicitly which, in its own formation, could 
have been creatively conceived.  
 Making a choice is minimal form of creativity because background sense-making is 
inadequate for determining an action and making a choice entails a specific difference from 
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spontaneity. In making a choice, one generates a new way of making sense of the situation 
to guide action, though the action one takes is no different than had one acted 
spontaneously or been guided by faulty reasoning. Thus, making a choice realizes a new, 
specific possibility no more than dissipative spontaneity. Once one makes a choice, one 
proceeds down the possibility selected, hopefully to a winning football game or satisfying 
romance. However, making a choice subtends those possibilities in a way that bears on 
future action, because one introduces new sense-making that survives to guide another act, 
another day. The football captain who chooses heads through a creative act may always call 
heads, and that fact leads to a specific difference from pure spontaneity. Creative choice-
making introduces the novelty of a new way of making sense of things, which can affect 
what possibilities are subsequently pursued.   
Creating an alternative, by contrast, breaks the rules or denies some of the 
constraints in a situation in a way that remains sensible within the situation, like Alexander 
cutting the Knot. That one orders off the menu provides a fitting metaphor here, provided 
one makes reference to the menu and synthesizes a choice based on what one sees. A 
creative alternative realizes a new possibility entirely, one that appears unpredictable, even 
“impossible,” with respect to the way one understood the situation beforehand and the way 
the options were specified. To follow this alternative is necessarily also to choose it. Yet an 
alternative, unlike a choice, challenges the world into which it is introduced to embrace it 
based on what it finds sensible once presented in an embedded novelty. Alexander, in his 
story, found such a world. But in what world would we call the football captain who 
swallows the coin more creative than mad? The constraint on meaningful action he breaks 
is one we are not ready to abandon. Hence his act is an oddity.  
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 Open syntheses create alternatives in ways that closed syntheses do not. They 
provide a relation between two otherwise disconnected things, two non-rationally or at 
least non-habitually related elements. The synthesis provides a bridge one might cross 
between the two without further ado, without the necessity of finding some distant, 
intrinsic connection. One need not look for a further connection, a further ground, between 
the elements of a disordered system and the external relatum other than one’s dependence 
on that relation in order to act. The creative act forges a link for which there is no 
determination, no necessity, and no sufficiency, one relatum to the other. What matters is 
that the link could be forged at all. In the creative act, one does not simply realize an 
existing possibility; one brings a new possibility into existence. For Alexander, cutting the 
knot made sense, not because he revealed a loophole in the rules, but rather because in a 
stroke he created a connection between the constraints of the situation and the genuine 
authority of a leader. Both sides were part of his and his “audience’s” familiar experience 
beforehand, but never before had they been linked. Alexander never changed the rules; he 
built a bridge between meanings which others could cross with him, making the rules 
irrelevant.  
Open syntheses open up more than just a single relation, because the act of creation 
brings into being not only the relation, but also the elements related as possible relata. 
Prior to the creative synthesis, its elements are not necessarily realized as relata at all. The 
preference for certain “looks” is not realized as an aspect of experience one might bring into 
relation with other experience. Bringing it into relation with a creative synthesis gives this 
way of making sense a new general reality, which becomes available for further sense-
making. This is why even open syntheses that appear to serve as mere choices nonetheless 
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create an alternative, for they open up experience outside of the immediate situation 
necessarily through the relata they form for the first time. For example, by realizing specific 
“looks” as relatable to one’s preferences, one opens up a schemata for future action, an 
open relation with a variable waiting for fulfilment in a situation. (E.g. where the situation 
affords it, other things being equal, I will prefer things based on how they look.) Open 
syntheses bridge a gap that may range over more experience than the occurrent situation 
and others that share their form. That is, they introduce a new way of making sense of 
things. At bottom, the only difference between the two types of open syntheses—one that 
looks like a choice and one that clearly opens up an alternative—is the “direction” one 
travels along the relation, to put it metaphorically. The coin-caller starts with his problem of 
acting and brings an aesthetic feature into the disorder to resolve the problem; Alexander 
starts as a leader and brings that to bear on his problem. Both enact a relation with no 
intrinsic reason. 
 Whether open or closed, creative syntheses are fodder for further elaboration. They 
may be rarefied or clarified, and they may serve in further creative syntheses. Choices 
embolden a way of thinking and doing, which is transferrable elsewhere through another 
open synthesis. Even a style of acting spontaneously or acting through aesthetic 
preferences may take hold as a fixture of one’s way of seeing and doing. That is, one may 
creatively choose acting spontaneously to be one’s typical way of dealing with disorder—
and thus become habitually flippant. As elements of a situation lock into place, fulfilling the 
new sense of a creative synthesis, one may extend it anew. Alexander cuts to the banks of 
the Ganges before his bridge ends. In the grand sense, this is what it means to realize new 
possibilities through a new way of making sense.  
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 The key conclusions are (1) that the novelty of creativity just is a new way of making 
sense of things and, further, (2) that we actually can be creative in this way, realizing new 
possibilities.  In these everyday engagements, we connect with our world in ways that 
rarely require creativity. Disorder, by contrast, affects us differently, but if and only if we 
respond to it as creators. In these systems, the world offers no cues for differential 
selection, and this necessitates a precise focus on the “inner world” of our sense-making, on 
the skills and values by which we connect to the world. The creative act modifies those 
skills and values; it builds new connections that finally enable us to make sense again. None 
of this happens if we simply respond to disorder spontaneously. But because we do create 
new sense-making, the possibilities we realize in our world change too. 
 Based on my examples, it would be easy to misunderstand some key points. First, 
the idea of disorder in coin-calling is helpful for illuminating the reality of creative acts in a 
way that factors out alternatives to creativity. But this does not imply in the least that 
disorder is a necessary condition for creative acts. Rather, actions in response to disorder 
which form a new and lasting synthesis are sufficient for verifying the existence of 
creativity, on my view. But once we recognize that these distinctive kinds of acts are 
possible with respect to disorder, there is no principled problem with acting creatively in 
other situations. Creativity is, as Koestler puts it, a matter of “thinking aside”—to which I 
would add “doing aside”—that one may enact in any situation. But without a clear case of 
disorder to prove the point, one may always rightfully suspect that we always follow 
implicit connections rather than create them. Second, the arguments so far should not be 
taken to imply that the embedded novelties of creative acts are inherently non-rational, 
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irrational, or otherwise disconnected from other orders. These adjectives apply more to the 
act than the object. Some examples should help here.  
August Kekule  first formulated the theory of chemical structure and the notation 
system by which organic molecules were represented in chains with lines representing 
atomic bonds. Owing to the clarifying power of this notation, organic chemistry quickly 
emerged as an important scientific field. Representing molecules in chains became the 
dominant norm. Nonetheless, the new notation could not represent the structure of the 
benzene molecule, despite years of devoted research. The way of making sense of molecules 
in chains could not represent its complexity. But Kekule  solved this problem too, arguing for 
a ring-structure for benzene. Kekule  reported in his 1890 address on the conception of the 
structure of benzene that, after years of devotion to representing benzene in a chain, he 
dreamed of an ouroboros, a snake eating its own tail, and connected this with the structure 
of benzene. In retrospect, that such a simple modification to the chain-structure marked 
one of greatest scientific achievements of the 19th century can seem absurd. Yet we must 
acknowledge the evidence that early organic chemists, Kekule  included, could not see past 
this way of making sense of molecules. Rejecting this linear constraint in a creative 
synthesis was the only way forward with a new alternative, though this alternative seems to 
represent a completely rational solution to the problem. What we create often fits perfectly 
into established orders like puzzle pieces. Similarly, Einstein diverged from the ways of 
thinking of his contemporaries in a creative act, but nonetheless delivered a theory that 
integrates disparate phenomena into new positive knowledge.  
In music, we find the introduction of new alternatives at critical changes in music 
style. Figures like Stravinsky and Schoenberg rejected the home key of traditional Western 
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composition to introduce atonal music, a new way of making sense of sound. This music 
does not necessarily depart from the familiarity we have with rhythm, instrumentation, 
register, or repetition, but it does shift the coherence or centrality of a work to these 
attributes, rather than familiar tonal structures. More recently, the rock band Nirvana 
introduced an unexpected sound that set the precedent for 1990s rock music. The 
established pattern of development in rock music before Nirvana—hence what one took to 
make sense of this music—included technically sophisticated guitar solos and vocals. In its 
music, Nirvana broke from these dominant features with simple, dissonant solos and 
limited vocals that nonetheless made new sense for a generation of listeners.  
We would find difficulty in all complex real-world cases, from science to art to 
everyday life, in distinguishing the influence of old sense-making from what is creatively 
novel, and distinguishing little creative events in a genre to big events introducing a new 
style. Making headway on that set of questions is a matter of intensive interpretive work. 
But the fact remains that, without such events, one must claim that nothing really happened 
in these changes. But because somewhere in the development we begin making sense of 
things in a new way, a new creative synthesis must exist in the mix somewhere that 
explains why.  
Finally, a description of spontaneity bears little relevance to a great deal of that 
activity we call creative. In the activity of the artist, the philosopher, or the theoretical 
scientist, we find a great deal of work—even if done with enthusiasm—to enable new 
thought and practice. Nor would a description of mechanical problem-solving always be 
adequate to the phenomenon. Intense thought and practice at the edge of conventional or 
habitual ideas places one in the grip of anomaly with unclearly presented problems, inapt 
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tools for thought and expression, and unclear meanings. Here we find the creator wrestling 
with sense-making at the terminus of their possibility. Either “problem-solving” is 
genuinely creative, or it does not solve these kinds of problems at all.  
3.6 THE ANOMALY OF CREATIVE NOVELTY 
 My final claim is that, when we try to understand creative novelty by fitting it into an 
order of causal explanation or, more loosely, a reduction to earlier meaningful sense-
making, it resists. Creative novelties are themselves anomalous. This result explains how 
new sense-making is discontinuous with earlier orders of things. On the other hand, I argue 
for the partial continuity of creative novelty that ensures we can find it meaningful and 
constrained by prior experience. Thus, I intend to position creativity between reductionist, 
theoretical accounts and more radical accounts that would detach creativity from 
determinate constraints on meaningful sense-making. I consider in turn a number of ways 
we might try to understand creativity and challenge their sufficiency. 
3.6.1 Anomaly in Explanatory Accounts 
One stringent order entails the predictability of all events. Consider an attempt to 
explain creativity by offering a theory that predicts acts of creativity. If successful, such a 
theory would demystify creativity, making it consistent with the rationally coordinated 
elements of a deterministic view. Yet we know there are specific physical phenomena we 
cannot predict. Turbulence or noise of all kinds, for example, or any number of stochastic or 
chaotic systems seem to deny predictability in practice, if not in principle. Quantum 
interactions must be modeled probabilistically, which renders its predictions probabilistic. 
Certain phenomena cannot be predicted with certainty either because of the effect of 
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measuring them or because of something essential about the phenomena. I call this 
particular unpredictability. This term describes the failure of a predictive explanation 
offered through a reduction of some experience to basic units (the original sense of atoms), 
together with a theory relating these units.105 Thus, one might wonder whether creativity 
could be of this type: an ingredient in a system of basic units or an emergent aspect of a 
system, which is itself inherently unpredictable or intractable on any analysis.106 If so, then 
advocates for a radical account of creativity gain a strong negative argument (negative 
because they do not offer a positive position).  
But to approach creativity in this way would be a mistake; thinking that creativity 
hangs on the predictability of phenomena within a granular analysis would mislead both a 
defender and a critic of the thesis. The chief reason is that, in striving to understand 
creativity, we seek an understanding at the level of meaning at which we encounter them, 
rather than through theoretical objects and their relations. This is not to deny that we 
encounter the elements of theory as meaningful, nor that our theoretical work cannot make 
a meaningful difference in our relation to those macro-objects the theories are theories of. 
But for the theorist, the burden is to ensure this meaningful connection, and for anti-
theorist, the burden is to ensure its denial.  
                                               
105 It is worth noting the distinction between models that instance chaotic characteristics and events (like a 
hurricane) which exhibit these characteristics, and which seem appropriately modeled by as a chaotic 
system. Both cases are reductive. The difference in the latter is that the units in the model are taken to be 
representative of some aspects of the event.  
106 Margaret Boden makes suggestions along these lines. “Occasionally, the [creative] choice is random, or as 
near to random as one can get. So it may be made by throwing a dice (as in playing Mozart's aleatory 
music); or by consulting a table of random numbers (as in the jazz program); or even, possibly, as a result 
of some sudden quantum-jump inside the brain. There may even be psychological processes akin to GA-
mechanisms, producing novel ideas in human minds” (Boden 1995). Clearly, however, explaining one 
unpredictable phenomenon by reference to another helps only to reinforce unpredictability.   
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Let’s consider this issue through the cipher of an argument offered by Henri 
Bergson. On Bergson’s view, the effort to predict a novelty always fails to provide a 
complete explanation, because each prediction must itself be predictable in a series of 
predictions interminable by any finite being. Prediction is itself an act that must be creative. 
I take Carl Hausman’s synopsis of this argument as a starting point, and I defend the 
argument. However, I deny both Bergson’s and Hausman’s specific interpretation of its 
importance:   
If, on the basis of certain data, a logic, a hypothesis, and a theory, something “new” is 
predicted, that “newness” must be referred to in the prediction statement – the 
“newness” must be already known. And to the extent that it is already known either it is 
not “new,” or, if it is new, it is a creation achieved by the predictor, in which case, 
explanation of novelty is complete only if the prediction could have been predicted – 
and so on ad infinitum, unless foreknowledge is attributed, ultimately, to an omniscient 
being.107  
   
Call this the regress argument. This argument concludes that only an omniscient entity at 
some n-order of a regress could make complete explanatory sense of a first-order creative 
novelty, where predictive abilities are understood as a necessary condition for 
explanation.108 To understand this argument, we must tease out some different ways 
interpreting it. On face of it, the argument makes some faulty inferences and accepts some 
false premises. I work to revise the argument into a stronger form.   
Bergson, as I interpret him, intends his argument to make a point about the 
uniqueness or singularity of things (he does not make this distinction). He refers to the 
                                               
107 Hausman, 72. Hausman presents a good summary of one of Bergson’s key arguments in The Creative Mind, 
“The Possible and the Real”. 
108 Two points: first, I acknowledge that some explanatory approaches do not claim an ability or interest in 
prediction; second, one might find prediction possible without anything clearly like an explanation in this 
sense (e.g. predicting tides with a tide- or lunar-table).   
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“continuous creation and unforeseeable novelty” of all things, and uses, as an example, the 
unpredictable detail of something as trivial as a dinnertime gathering.109 But I do not credit 
this view, for the same reasons I deny that uniqueness constitutes creative novelty. The 
advocate of particular unpredictability would claim too much about creativity if his 
argument simply pertains to uniqueness (or singularity), because even if new uniqueness is 
often unpredictable, this is not enough to make it creatively novel—indeed it is not 
anomalous at all. No matter how unpredictable a unique identity is, we still usually find it 
completely familiar. The view that makes everything novel and indeterminate, yet defends a 
view of creativity, must distinguish creative novelty from non-creative novelty. And if we are 
asked to see all events as creative, then this both trivializes the concept of creativity and 
denies us grounds for the basic task to, for example, understand the difference between a 
creative artist and her first copycat—or a unique dinner party and a creative one. Thus, 
even if Bergson motivates the regress argument, he does it in a way that fails to distinguish 
creative novelty. His version of the argument claims too much.    
 But Bergson offers a stronger argument, depending more on the singularity of 
events. On his view, a prediction of events can never be adequate to a situation, because 
prediction depends on a causal description, causal descriptions require identity between 
cases, and no two cases are ever completely identical. For example, no two swings of a 
pendulum are ever identical. That is, on Bergson’s view, one of the fundamental conditions 
for prediction can never be satisfied. He uses a mental event as an example: “Take [...] the 
simplest feeling, suppose it to be constant, absorb the whole personality in it: the 
consciousness which will accompany this feeling will not be able to remain identical with 
                                               
109 Bergson, 73 
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itself for two consecutive moments, since the following moment always contains, over and 
above the preceding one, the memory the latter has left it.”110 Because of memory, no two 
mental events can ever be the same, and if mental events are non-substitutable, then they 
cannot function in an explanatory prediction attributing like effects to like causes.  
The response here is to deny that Bergson has the correct theory of explanation, or 
at least that there is an alternative theory that does not make the mistake he ascribes to 
explanation. A traditional positivist view of explanation, according to which a statement of 
observed regularities suffices for explanation provides just such a response. Arguing 
against Bergson, Bertrand Russell contends that explanation has little relevance to a 
determinist project of linking together all particulars in a network of causal necessity. 
Rather, explanation serves to describe the relation between different kinds of events. “If 
[one] could foresee that A was going to murder B, [one’s] foresight would not be invalidated 
by the fact that [one] could not know all the infinite complexity of A’s state of mind in 
committing the murder.”111 Statements of causal law should, on this view, propose constant 
relations between kinds of causes and kinds of effects. “[I]f a body falls freely, there is 
constant relation between the height through which it falls and the time it takes in 
falling.”112 Russell, I think correctly, criticizes the particularist view of prediction for its 
austerity: kinds of causes connected with kinds of effects is enough to meet most critical 
demands. If we embrace the positivist view of explanation and couple it with my objection, 
there is strong reason to reject Bergson’s interpretation. 
                                               
110 Bergson, 137 
111 Russell, 230 
112 Ibid, 231 
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Yet Hausman rebuts by emphasizing the individuality of things, rather than their 
uniqueness or singularity. To Hausman, the positivist conception of explanation excludes 
precisely what is of interest when applied to creative work. Predicting that a kind of person 
(Picasso the painter) will make a kind of object (a painting) may well be sensible. But for 
Hausman, our interest falls entirely on the instantiation of a new kind of thing, in the 
particulars of the individual. We are interested in Guernica and its organic unity of details, 
and not the mere prediction that a painter will paint. Trying to understand creativity 
demands greater specificity than the relations between kinds of events used in a positivist 
prediction. Even in the case of Russell’s murderer, “A,” if he is a serial killer, a good detective 
will understand that the generic prediction that A will kill again is not enough to catch the 
killer. Thus Russell has simply ignored creative novelty, rather than predicted it. In my 
terms, Russell compensates for the phenomenon of novelty, because he constructs a theory 
that cannot suitably address its existence.  
Hausman’s problems lie in another direction. I already argued against his conception 
of creative novelty, and I find his view faulty here for taking new Forms to be the 
paradigmatic examples of creative novelty. Neither Russell nor Hausman make much sense 
of embedded novelties like Kekule ’s diagram of a benzene ring, because they do not fit the 
mold of physical explanation on which they are focused. Here Russell might at least point 
out that Kekule ’s diagram is the necessary condition for advancing organic chemistry and 
seek its rational development from antecedent ideas, making (on my view) a different 
mistake. But for Hausman, by relying on special new kinds of things to motivate the regress 
argument, he makes the argument claim too little.         
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 Let’s take an example to get the intuitive thrust of the argument as I understand it. 
Suppose I am faced with the problem of hanging drywall on a ceiling alone, and I develop a 
new way of hanging it. Were a predictor predicting my innovation, he would have to include 
this new method of hanging drywall in the prediction claim. To make this prediction, the 
predictor must have a grasp of the conditions operating in the situation (causes) and what 
will result from my activity (effects), because one reasons from causes to effects in a 
prediction claim, and because the logical form of a prediction requires a specific statement 
of both the cause and the effect, both based in the knowledge of the predictor. Then, if the 
predictor recognizes this method as creatively novel, in the same way I do, he could then 
ask what accounts for his ability to predict this new method. How did he predict this? The 
force of this question runs in two directions. First, the predictor typically reasons from like 
causes to like effects, and within the point of view of a predictor newness implies an unlike 
effect—that known causes result in a previously unknown effect or that previously 
unknown causes result in this new effect. Either way, the successful prediction depends on 
acquiring new knowledge not from the event, but rather before it. Thus, more than just 
predicting something, the predictor would have to recognize in his prediction, minimally, an 
additional new sense-making. Additional secondary and tertiary, etc., predictors would 
have the same experience in a chain until one (an omniscient being) already possessed the 
relevant knowledge of cause and effect to make the prediction without recognizing any 
novelty in the situation. Second, but related, is that the prediction may be made in one 
reductionist sense-making scheme, while the novelty appears in a non-reduced form. But 
the predictor cannot just predict neuron-firings or physical interactions or behavior—this 
is precisely the level of description that would fail to be predicting a novelty. While 
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predicting neuron firings, the predictor must also make sense of, say, a specific brain state 
to instance precisely this creative novelty, which, again, would reproduce a creative novelty 
in the experience of the predictor.  
 The key point then is to notice what actually drives the regress. The regress does not 
proceed simply on the basis of a recursion in prediction, the particularity of the prediction, 
or the possibility of a successful prediction. The regress proceeds only on the basis of a 
continual recognition of meaningful novelty at each of its levels. If we drop the attention to 
new sense-making at any point, then the prediction could (in principle) be complete, but 
then we have dropped the anomaly of the case through a compensation. Once a predictor 
realizes he has predicted something creatively novel, new anomaly is introduced, because 
he too has created something. I grant that this point can seem more like clever trap than a 
serious point. To reduce this sense, we should keep in mind what is really at stake is the full 
claim that one order of understanding wants to make over new meaningful sense-making, 
while forgetting to account for one’s own role in generating this understanding. When 
trying to make complete sense of creativity, we often disregard precisely what is creative in 
the act—its novelty—and turn toward the sense we have just achieved. This point applies, 
mutatis mutandis, to attempts to understand past acts of creativity as well, rather than to 
predict future ones. Insisting on the order of a nexus of determinate causal relations at any 
point, past or future, requires one to disregard the novelty one finds at the center of the 
nexus.    
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3.6.2 THE NON-TELEOLOGY OF CREATIVITY113 
 Generally, teleology is the study of phenomena exhibiting purposes, aims, intentions, 
or tendencies to develop toward an end state. A teleology answers the question why, as 
opposed to how, in an account of something. I focus on two fairly proscribed strains of 
teleological description and analysis of creativity, inspirations and intentions, where 
inspirations are the figurative pull of something inchoate and largely indeterminate to be 
realized and intentions are the push of an agent’s ways of making sense of things in 
producing something. I argue that, though intentions structure our activity and inspirations 
offer motives for activity, neither concept quite captures the creative act. Creative novelties 
themselves are not intentionally produced, if by an intention we mean an object of 
consciousness that guides each step of a production. Rather, creativity is an unintentional 
act of production that transforms the object of consciousness. In a classical sense, I mean 
that creativity lacks foresight, which is to say again that, whatever possibilities project from 
one’s ways of making sense, creativity is precisely that act by which a different possibility is 
realized. On this view, too, the sense that inspires is often a creation, or a creation in 
process. One may be driven by purpose to create, but one cannot create on purpose.  
 In a dominant trope, creators describe their work as matter of giving form or 
expression to something inchoate, of bringing faintly perceived value or being into concrete 
existence, and of being led by an indefinite identity. Others describe creativity as a matter of 
channeling, or serving as a medium for some other productive agent. One is inspired by a 
Muse, for example. Or, in another take on creativity, one experiences a rush or flow—an 
experience of peak performance—in the production of something new. Taken collectively, 
                                               
113 Special thanks to Richard Mohr for his comments on this section. 
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such “inspirational” views, coupled with the idea that being has its own intrinsic positive 
value, serve to explain the motivation of a creator. Again, I turn to Hausman to express a 
version of this view: 
The future determination that ought to be given determination does not provide rules; 
it does not display criteria for accepting or rejecting ideas or elements. But it does 
appear as a “requiredness,” a demand, and a foundation for the inevitability of the 
specific Form to be made definite. Thus, the dim presence of a Form as such, before the 
specificity of the Form is recognized, is an aim that lures the creator. The creator is lured 
by it because, as a vague and as yet undetermined Form, it marks the beginning of the 
being of something, something that can have a definite intelligibility and specific 
value.114 
 
On this view, something as yet unreal pulls the creator in its direction.  
 But such a description must be enriched. The development of a new way of making 
sense realizes new possibilities to explore, and the objects of consciousness immediately 
express this pregnancy. It is as though, after a long time in a maze, one turns a corner to 
faintly perceive an exit and gradually works toward it. This is an experience of wresting 
something inchoate into being. Or one turns a corner to fully face an exit—the “rush” 
toward a creation. In both cases, the perception of a way forward is the major act of 
creation, and not the character of one’s approach to it. The author who envisions a new plot 
twist may indeed be “pulled” toward it ecstatically (or laboriously), to realize it concretely 
and in a detail it does not have at its inception. But this additional work should not be 
confused with the inception that makes sense of the directed activity.  
 In my terms, the basic points for explaining inspiration are, first, that what serves to 
inspire action is often the creation, the object of a new sense-making, and the inspired 
activity it guides is the creator’s effort to embed this object concretely, as in the case of 
                                               
114 Hausman, 50 
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realizing a plot-twist. Second, when the object of inspiration is inchoate or vague, this 
indicates either that constitutive elements of the object are themselves vague and need 
refinement—“imagine a world with no more scarcity”—or that the sense itself is of a 
special kind, which requires a temporal or spatial extension for its realization—e.g. music 
or sculpture. In other words, descriptions of inspiration often presuppose a creative act or 
mistakenly generalize over one kind of experience. I grant that a great deal of creative work 
bears the character of inspiration. One gets a glimmer of something and gradually zeroes in 
on it or one ecstatically seems to produce without a clear sense of oneself as the productive 
agent. But since most characteristically inspired states seem possible in non-creative 
contexts—think of a basketball player “in the zone”—I do not see how inspiration can be 
essentially related to creativity.     
 On another analysis, or even in the same analysis (cf. Hausman), intentionality is 
considered a necessary condition for creativity. Intentionality must structure or guide what 
one does if it is to be rooted in prior conditions and be one’s own creative production. 
Moreland Perkins expresses this view in his analysis of creativity: 
That the conception of what she makes must be the maker’s, that she must in effect 
invent what she makes, entails, in turn, that creative work is purposeful, deliberate, 
intentional.115 
 
Put in such stark intellectualist language, many creators are likely to be dissatisfied with 
this claim. This is not because one wants to deny the importance of intentions or purposes 
entirely—the creator is a motivated, intentional being who typically grasps a situation in 
which she works—but rather because a creative novelty is precisely what is not known 
ahead of one’s creative act. Perkins is aware of this, and offers a qualification: 
                                               
115 Moreland Perkins, “On Creativity” in Singer, 2010, Locations 2697-2701. 
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The agent intends to make a certain kind of thing; what she makes is the kind of thing it 
was her purpose to make. I say the kind of thing, because it won’t do to say of creative 
work that always the worker intended at the start to make exactly the specific thing she 
succeeded in making. For this suggests that she knows ahead of time exactly how it is to 
come out, which is often—perhaps usually—not true. But the kind of thing she makes 
she must be engaged in trying to make if she is to be credited with creativity. This much 
is implied by the condition that the conception must be hers.116 
 
I pursue the question of how we relate to our “own” creations more fully in Chapter 4. Here 
I want to acknowledge that a great deal of creativity does indeed proceed as Perkins claims. 
Much of the time we act in situations structured by our intentions and purposes. A painter 
sets out to paint a particular kind of painting or a scientist works on a particular kind of 
problem. The specificity of this “kind” is determined by the specificity of the intentions 
involved, including, in addition to cognitively articulated goals and propositional 
knowledge, also one’s perceptual- and bodily-intentionality, skills, know-how, and values.  
 But this focus on a kind of thing does not distinguish creative activity especially well 
from other kinds of activity. It does not distinguish the thoroughly conventional mobile-
home manufacturer from a creative architect, because both may aim at a kind of thing. Only 
an intention of the more specific creative novelty would distinguish the cases on an 
intentional analysis. Moreover, it seems there are cases that do not clearly follow Perkins’ 
analysis. Consider, for example, the case of doodling. Doodling serves as a metaphor for 
moving from one thing to another without any overly specific goal, purpose, or problem to 
solve.117 Such cases can certainly exclude a preoccupation with anomaly. In a concrete case 
of doodling on a piece of paper, one might just aimlessly move a pencil from place to place 
and fill in planes here and there. There is a game-like characteristic to doodling, but without 
                                               
116 Ibid., Location 2701  
117 Thanks to William Schroeder for introducing me to this example.  
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necessarily possessing even the intention to play a game. In my discussion of singular 
identities, I mentioned imaginatively synthesizing a lampshade and train—here we find a 
doodle in the play of ideas. The production of these doodles is relatively non-intentional 
and unconcerned with producing a certain kind of thing. But they can amount to something 
when, in a creative perception or interpretation of what one has done, one finds it serving a 
new meaningful extension of possibilities. To be clear, on my view, the doodling activity 
itself is not creative without a new way of making sense of it. By analogy, breaking a bunch 
of multi-colored glass into a pile generates a doodle of sorts, which may achieve creative 
significance in one’s survey of the mess. But, alternatively, one may make sense of a doodle 
in conventional ways as well, seeing that one has doodled a giraffe, much like one sees 
familiar shapes in clouds. Doodling becomes creative only if one sees something new in the 
doodle.   
 The main point, then, is that we arrive at a moment for creativity from multiple 
angles of activity. Intentions, purposes, or concerns are required for most human activity 
we recognize to be meaningful, but the embedding of novelty can come before as well as 
after the creative act. This point may seem odd until we characterize acts of so-called 
accidental creation. Louis Pasteur’s vaccination for chicken cholera arrived by accident 
when a spoiled sample of bacteria failed to kill birds injected with the sample. Vaccination 
itself was not a new idea at the time, but familiar understanding led researchers to focus on 
finding naturally “weaker” strains of bacteria, as Edward Jenner did with smallpox and 
cowpox. Pasteur’s lab assistant moved to throw out the sample on grounds that it had 
simply gone bad—an important example of the lack of a creative insight—while Pasteur 
made the creative connection between weaker strains and spoiled samples. Pasteur had the 
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experience to perceive in the situation a solution to a problem that had not yet been fully 
represented, but which his experience may never have represented from below, so to speak, 
based on his intentions.   
 Other “odd” angles for creativity exist as well, in, for example, the practice of 
brainstorming, open-ended questions, constructing metaphors, and so on. When these 
practices lead to creative novelty, rather than just waxing on existing ways of making sense, 
it is not enough for someone to say they “know it when they see.” It is more accurate to say 
they “see it when they know it.” Intentions play the role of embedding someone within 
meaningful practices and a larger world, and only someone with the appropriate 
intentional preparation (ideas, goals, skills, experience) will be equipped to both 
understand and meaningfully connect a novelty to earlier meanings, both establishing a 
continuity and realizing a new possibility. For this reason, I have not insisted that anomalies 
are necessary conditions (as motivation) for creativity, but the established connection 
between a creative novelty and earlier meaning is necessary.  
 Creative acts do typically have some orienting intention that frames them and the 
relevant sense-making involved to a “kind” of sense-making. Moreover, intentional activity 
often structures the entire sense-making context in which a new creative novelty is formed 
and with which it newly forms a continuity. But creativity cannot be reduced to the 
functioning of this intentional structure in a situation, when the acts themselves are 
modifying their objects. There is in creativity a conjoining of standard intentional action 
and modifications of one’s way of making sense. To get oriented to this synthesis, consider, 
on the one hand, a joke: 
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A traveler rests in the home of a friendly man to avoid a storm. With water pouring in 
through the roof, the traveler asks, “Hey, why don’t you patch that big leak?” The man 
responds, “Well, I can’t patch the roof when it’s raining. And the roof doesn’t leak when 
it’s sunny. So what can I do?” 
 
What is funny about this joke is the shortcoming of the man to draw connections between 
situations and form a new intention. He does not have the sense to fix a problem in one 
situation that only appears in another. On the other hand, consider the Vogelkop bowerbird, 
a New Guinea species of bird that makes elaborate, ornately decorated nests to attract 
mates. Now if we are to describe this activity in non-teleological, behavioral terms, as 
biologists often do, we must rather say that the bowerbird is entirely absorbed in its 
activity. It does not “make a nest to attract a mate.” 118  Instead, it “acts nest-making-wise 
such that mates act attracted-wise”—or some such. The bowerbird will not detect that 
there is anything like a “leak” in the nest (which often has a roof) to be fixed later. Rather 
the bowerbird can only detect deviations from the order it is compelled by instinct to 
produce. A hole in the roof may be patched, but not because it leaks; rather patching 
demands to be done in accordance with the pre-given form of activity. The man in the joke, 
acting like a bowerbird, would patch his roof on a sunny day, not because it will one day 
leak, but because his instincts demand that the house satisfies a specific form. Human 
intentionality therefore puts us both above and below non-human animals: above because 
humans take things as intentional objects and draw connections between them; below 
because humans can fail to make or act on these connections when instinct would guide 
much better.119 But when a man intends to patch a leaky roof, all the specific action lay 
                                               
118 I am trying to make a serious point about human creativity, rather than a serious point about non-human 
animals. I do not know whether other animals are creative and will not pursue that question here.  
119 Max Scheler, I think, makes a similar point in his discussion human instincts and drives: “Only in man does 
the capacity to isolate the drive from instinctive behavior and to separate the state of pleasure from 
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ahead of him, as yet unintended in its detail. He intends a “kind of thing.” And with familiar 
sense-making leading him he may patch the roof without a problem. But the matter is quite 
different for a painter or a scientist working at the extremes of established meaning. With 
the kind of object(ive) abstractly in view, perhaps something as general as a “solution to X,” 
the required sense-making does not yet exist that would achieve this end. Creative acts lie 
underneath our intentional acts, as though instinctive, but never quite “natural,” filling in a 
domain never before populated with the objects of conscious life. Creativity places new 
instincts in the service of an intention. By the time one intends what one does, the creative 
work has already been done.  
 I have been focused on identifying a central lack of intentionality in the creative act. 
If intentionality fully structured creativity, then one could intend to be creative, not just 
formally, but in content, which implies a density to our intentional lives that it does not 
have. On their own, intentions have hiccups, smoothed over by skillful coping120 or creative 
synthesis. Creativity therefore remains refractory to an intentional analysis. Of course we 
have intentions to do, make, and think things, and our intentions, shaped by how we make 
sense of things, keep us acting more or less effectively in situations. We may even be guided 
by an unknown, and not just indeterminate, ideal—the sense that something, an ideal 
skyscraper, may be possible, like a board-stretcher (cf. Section One). But we cannot intend 
to create anything, except as an aspiration without specific sense. Creativity yields 
                                               
functional enjoyment assume such monstrous forms that it is quite correct to say, man can be either more 
or less than an animal, but never an animal” (Scheler 1968).  
120 One might introduce the concept of body- or perceptual-intentionality at this point (cf. Merleau-Ponty), 
which I would welcome on fuller description. My key claim here, however, is that perception and bodily 
comportment can face ambiguity or anomaly as much as any other relation to the world.  
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intentional connections only in retrospect, where we then put it at risk of reduction to the 
order it just made of things.  
3.6.3 An Overreach of Metaphysical Principle 
 Finally, creativity might itself be taken to be a constitutive ingredient in a system to 
account for creative novelty. I take Alfred North Whitehead to provide an example of this 
view, though Whitehead’s full account is incredibly complex, and I would be dishonest to 
claim I give him an adequate treatment here. Thus I draw on his work only to make a 
general point, rather than provide a full exposition of his view.  
 Whitehead seems to argue that one must assume a principle of creativity in order to 
explain the newness of events that cannot be derived from antecedent conditions. This 
principle may be interpreted as a productive principle or as a generalization over claimed 
instances of novelty. As Irving Singer describes Whitehead’s approach, whereas Hegel 
affirms a distinction between being and becoming and sought to show how becoming 
progressively approximates being, and Nietzsche denies the distinction solely in favor of 
becoming, “[Whitehead] claims the creativity that characterizes, and even unites, all reality 
underlies not only the Becoming of what exists but also its transcendent Being.”121 In 
Whitehead’s words, indicative of this point: 
There is a becoming of continuity, but no continuity of becoming. The actual 
occasions are the creatures which become, and they constitute a continuously 
extensive world. In other words, extensiveness becomes, but 'becoming' is not itself  
extensive.122 
 
                                               
121 Singer, Location 124 
122 Whitehead (1978), 35.  
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On this view, there is indeed a world that exhibits continuity retrospectively, and there is 
the being of this (past) continuity. There is the being of creatures, but as beings these 
creatures contain within themselves a principle of becoming. The extension of being 
coincides with what comes about (or “becomes”) through creativity. In many ways, 
Whitehead’s position is consistent with my own; the becoming of continuity describes the 
effect of a creative act. What worries me, however, is the absolute denial of the continuity of 
becoming—i.e. that present conditions could actually ensure a specific future being. In this 
respect, Whitehead bears a strong similarity to Bergson. Both suppose that present 
conditions bear an essential indeterminacy that makes the future unpredictable.   
 Irving Singer responds to Whitehead by redirecting the investigation. We must 
acknowledge that the metaphysical position (or cosmology) offered by Whitehead cannot 
be confirmed or denied through observation. Rather, the metaphysical view must be 
understood as its own “conceptual work of art”123 and as its own kind of creative product. 
As an artistic production, one may indeed use the metaphysical view to enrich one’s life and 
understanding of the existence. But this should not be mistaken, on Singer’s view, for an 
explanation. For Singer, the metaphysical doctrine cannot explain anything any more than a 
Monet or a Picasso can.  
 One may credit Singer with elegance or charge him with gross oversimplification at 
one’s preference. For an example of the latter, taken as a generalization, Singer’s view 
undermines metaphysics and any philosophical pursuit of rational coordination and 
argumentation that does not depend on empirical evidence. He poses a false choice 
between a demand for causal intelligibility on the one hand and aesthetic production on the 
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other hand, and casts metaphysics in the latter. No doubt Singer is sensitive to and 
supportive of the promise of aesthetic sensibility. But Whitehead would surely rebel against 
the choice Singer poses.  
 Nonetheless, there is a significant insight in Singer’s view, which I can recast in 
different terms. Recall the regress argument offered by Hausman and Bergson. There the 
regress terminated only in an omniscient intelligence. Denial of novelty at any other level of 
the regress where it can appear constitutes an explanation with compensation—a neglect 
of the novelty at that level. In Whitehead’s case, however, the case is reversed. By positing 
an ineliminable principle of creativity at any level, he neglects the possibility of genuine 
prediction offered at that level. To claim there is no “continuity of becoming” is precisely to 
reject the coherent sense and repeatability we do experience to extend into the future; he 
brings this coherence into question without addressing the concrete demands that often set 
that sense-making in the objects of experience. And this is a piece of “aesthetic” production 
that can be neither confirmed nor disconfirmed, for it bears on experience only externally 
to our ongoing pursuit of sense-making. There is no question of the in-principle possibility 
of meeting those demands for coherence at any level of the regress; the point is that in each 
prediction of a novelty, a new novelty supersedes it at a different level of analysis. The 
omniscient being would predict, not a novelty, but a necessity. At least within acts of 
prediction, Whitehead extends the regress artificially. Thus we can see one way that 
Whitehead potentially offers an “aesthetic” production that delivers creativity at the cost of 
continuity that might constrain it. The constraints on creativity about which we might 
legitimately care are made to disappear at the bald assertion of a creative principle.  
188 
  
 I must repeat a common refrain. Even if we cannot step into the same river twice, 
this will not in itself make the river unfamiliar. We master differences between rivers as 
much as their similarities. And if a new river counts as creative in one’s metaphysics, then 
we will need a new word for the differences that actually matter. To state the point with 
some hyperbole, with respect to meaningful existence, I can coherently claim that I will rise 
tomorrow like on any other day and fulfill that claim. To deny me that meaningful claim 
with an insistence that there is no continuity of becoming deprives us of the meaningful 
coherence we do after all experience.   
3.7 OBJECTIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS 
 My position remains to be clarified in response to two lines of questioning.124 
 First, how, in the abstract, can creation be distinguished from non-creation? On my 
view, we must draw a categorical distinction between those acts that develop lines of 
possibility already available in extant ways of making sense from those that produce a new 
way of making sense—i.e. creative acts. The basic worry is that the same act can fall on 
either side of this distinction depending on the details of one’s characterization of the case. 
At its extreme, this is a worry that can push an account of creativity back toward the two 
positions I have attempted to avoid, namely, that all acts are creative or that no acts are 
creative. On the one hand, for example, the local case of Kekule ’s new way of making sense 
of benzene may nonetheless be characterized as a possibility implicit in atomistic 
chemistry more generally, implying discovery rather than creativity. On the other hand, the 
latest three-chord rock song playing on the radio may introduce a new take on something 
                                               
124 Thanks to Arthur Melnick for raising the questions that guide this final investigation. 
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quite narrowly construed. And there does not seem to be any principled reason, then, to 
extend some element of creativity to most if not all experience.  
 Second, how is the phenomenon of creative novelty to maintain its generality across 
different domains, when novelties exhibit different characteristics in each domain? I hinted 
at such differences in my earlier coin-flip case, for example, in “more rational” and “more 
aesthetic” creative resolutions to cases, where one kind of creative synthesis depended on 
none other than the minimal or essential features of the case (a closed synthesis) and 
another related features of the case to “external” non-essential characteristics (an aesthetic, 
open synthesis). Science, on one characterization, strives for generally, if not universally, 
applicable descriptive or explanatory frameworks, while art often tends toward individual 
or singular works. Perhaps as a consequence, new scientific paradigms often supersede 
older, deficient paradigms, whereas Bach and Schoenberg peacefully coexist with three-
chord rock groups. That is, even if we see Bach to be a developmental step in music history 
necessary for Schoenberg’s atonal music, we are not tempted to replace Bach with 
Schoenberg, or call the latter “better” for that reason. Classical composition does not offer 
itself as a problem to be solved in the same way as a scientific anomaly challenges a theory.  
 This second question relates to the first, and demonstrates its importance, insofar as 
different kinds of novelties or domains could suggest a response to the first question, but 
will not answer for all novelties. For example, if creative novelties consistently make us 
sensitive to what we take for granted in our world—in a way that discovery does not—and 
art deals with anomaly as part of its constitutive concern by exhausting all its current 
possibilities and creating new ones—i.e. if one aspiration of art is to create—then we can 
perhaps distinguish a three-chord rock band from a Schoenberg (when the band does not 
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meet the first condition of exposing convention) and categorically distinguish creativity in 
art. But this response is possible only because we can depend on art to challenge its current 
practices; reproduction of the past is an intrinsic anomaly of art practice, which aims at 
creating something new. Even if we could clarify and defend this way of providing a 
criterion for creation in art, it is unlikely to work for scientific or many cultural practices 
that do not intrinsically aspire to create, because it looks like anomaly in those domains is 
contingent, rather than implicitly built in.  
   To retain the generality and integrity of creativity across domains, my view is that a 
way of making sense is a creative novelty if and only it is impossible with respect to 
antecedent ways of making sense at its inception. Margaret Boden expresses this view in a 
somewhat similar way when she draws a distinction between “impossible ideas” and 
merely statistically improbable ideas. Impossible ideas are those that some conceptual 
framework could not generate on its own.125 The systematic objection to her, analogous to 
the objection to my account, is that, for any conceptual framework P relative to which a 
relevant idea is impossible, one may postulate a higher-order conceptual framework Q that 
operates on P to make that idea possible. Thus, the impossible idea is fully possible on the 
combination framework of P and Q. To give this setup some catchier language, let’s call the 
enlarged scope of possibilities deep possibilities. So the deep possibilities of music history 
include Bach as well as Schoenberg. The deep possibilities of scientific knowledge include 
Kekule  and Pasteur. 
 To restate what I have been arguing: at least when it comes to human sense-making 
in a meaningful world, explanation by deep possibility runs out. The claims driving this 
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conclusion are (1) that our meaningful worlds are organized and limited (especially 
Chapter 2), (2) that our sense-making is limited, but can be extended (this chapter, section 
1), that a creative novelty is a new way of making sense (section 3), and (3) that alternative 
forms of explanation fail to account for all new sense-making (section 4). The other side of 
my work has been to show that, nonetheless, new sense-making connects with antecedent 
sense-making (often by resolving anomaly) to build meaningful continuity.  
 This continuity is what continues to generate the difficulty in seeing something 
“impossible” in the creative novelty. The key idea, however, is that however we characterize 
deep and antecedent possibilities, those possibilities are not realized for sense-making 
until the creative act. I have endeavored to show that sense-making is not cut off from 
existence outside it—I do not hold a simple subjectivism—but neither does existence 
simply determine the sense we make of it or the senses we can make. In creative acts in 
science we realize that the natural world is different than we previously realized was 
possible. In musical creativity, we realize that music can be different than we previously 
realized was possible.                
 None of this on its own, I think, necessarily undermines the theoretical arguments in 
favor of even deeper possibilities represented by a hard determinism or a teleology like 
Hegel’s. But it does suggest the limits of our sense-making participation within such 
systems. 
3.8 CONCLUSION 
 Creative novelty is a new way of making sense of things. Because of this, it cannot 
properly become the object of the orders that would seek to make sense of it. It is 
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necessarily anomalous. Creativity leaves us hints we can follow in favor of a mystery or 
ignore in favor of a new order. It is constrained in part by objects, the senses of things we 
already have, the values we presuppose, and the skills we enact. But it operates beneath 
these things, the ever-present possibility of changing our meaningful world, to “turn us to 
fresh tasks.” Though it introduces new order, new sense, and new possibilities, creativity 
exists out of order.  
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CHAPTER 4 
CREATIVE VALUE AND THE CREATIVE SELF126 
 
 
"Over the course of the last decade…we seem to have reached a general agreement that 
creativity involves the production of novel, useful products."127 
 
“The created object…must be valuable for its own sake. And its inherent value is the 
condition by virtue of which the created object may become instrumentally valuable in 
perfecting or advancing, or, in the most radical instances, creating a tradition.”128 
 
“It is a philosophical common place that creativity is highly valued.”129 
 
Here are three examples, one from a psychologist and two from philosophers, to 
indicate the establishment view that creative novelties are valuable, and that creativity is 
valuable for the function it serves in bringing novelties into being. Serious inquiry and 
popular consciousness alike embrace this value of creativity. More than disciplined, 
rational, and calculable people, we often desire creators: parents would have creative 
children; economists would have entrepreneurs; political regimes would have visionary 
leaders. The values rooted most firmly in artistic practice now appear in numerous 
domains – the value of novelty, change, difference, alternative, uniqueness, innovation, and 
revolution. The value of creativity often supplants such traditionally valued notions as 
reason, order, critical judgment, and conservatism in many domains of life, and we express 
this hierarchy of values through pop psychology imperatives to “think outside the box.”  
                                               
126 This chapter contains substantially revised content from my essay “Common Experience and 
Individuation,” Appraisal, Special Issue on Max Scheler, Vol. 8 No. 4, October, 2011. Used by permission. 
127 Mumford, 110 
128 Hausman, 50 
129 Kieran, “Creativity as a Virtue of Character” in Kaufman (forthcoming, 2014). In context, it is clear that 
Kieran endorses this commonplace, and that he takes it to be a consensus view.  
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 What grounds this affirmation of creativity? To embrace creativity categorically, one 
must claim that creativity or its products are always valuable. More precisely, one must 
claim that through creative activity, humans bring only positive value into being. Positive 
value is a criterial attribute of a created identity, which implies a uniformly positive value of 
creativity simpliciter. Put simply, creativity is always a good thing.  
 These claims contain a tiny core of truth. But they are extraordinarily misleading 
and short-sighted simplifications of the evaluation of creativity and its results. Like a good 
lover, one must know the shortcomings of one’s beloved. I dedicate this chapter to 
introducing and demonstrating some of the evaluative complexity of creativity. I derive this 
complexity, first, from the basic anomalous features of creativity and its embedded 
novelties and, second, from the constitutive role creativity plays in selfhood.      
Among traditional philosophers, I find Plato and Nietzsche most helpful for initiating 
thought about the value of embedded novelty and creativity.130 In their own ways, both 
thinkers link creativity to concerns about the self or the soul. From Plato, we get the worry 
of the effect of novelty on ourselves and others. From Nietzsche, we get the special 
consideration of value-creation. My thesis is that we find the minimal constitutive value of 
creativity just in the way a creative act opens up the possibility for additional thinking or 
doing for a creator, which did not exist before. But even these new ways of making sense are 
not essentially tethered to truth, beauty, or goodness. They are not, on a broader analysis, 
even essentially tethered to further usefulness. They are tethered only to what senses 
existence affords, which on rigorous orders of understanding may be false. Thus the further 
                                               
130 It should be understood that my interpretations ignore anachronism, and my goal is not to offer a 
definitive view of either Plato’s or Nietzsche’s thoughts. My goal is to investigate creativity, its value, and its 
ethics, and I find helpful resources in the work of these philosophers. 
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evaluation of creativity must always be found in specific senses involved, in their relation to 
a creator, and in their relation to the world into which they are embedded. Yet, on the other 
hand, creations can challenge the evaluative systems themselves that we leverage against 
them, thus complicating evaluation from the inside, so to speak.  
Plato’s Phaedrus provides an orienting example. In this work, Socrates criticizes the 
practice of writing, and thus mounts a considerable challenge to our own institutions, 
practices, and ways of life. We depend on his criticism being mistaken. The claim in 
summary is that written language undermines skills like remembering, speaking, and active 
thinking; it petrifies ideas so they are no longer responsive to context; it artificially 
constrains dialectical inquiry; and, because active thinking and dialectical inquiry are 
integral to the soul’s aspiration to wisdom, it threatens this highest goal discerned by Greek 
philosophy.  
In the dialogue, Plato has Socrates tell an Egyptian legend. The god Theuth invents 
many arts, geometry and astronomy among them, but is most proud of writing. Yet the king 
of Egypt, Thamus, rebukes Theuth for his uncritical optimism. Foreshadowed in this legend, 
we see already the perennial conflict between creativity and conservative principles:  
[Writing] will create forgetfulness in the learners' souls, because they will not use their 
memories; they will trust to the external written characters and not remember of 
themselves. The specific which you have discovered is an aid not to memory, but to 
reminiscence, and you give your disciples not truth, but only the semblance of truth; 
they will be hearers of many things and will have learned nothing; they will appear to 
be omniscient and will generally know nothing; they will be tiresome company, having 
the show of wisdom without the reality.131  
 
                                               
131 Plato, Phaedrus, 275a ff., Jowett trans. For my purposes, the complex literary frame can be ignored. 
Socrates rebuffs Phaedrus for caring about who delivers the criticism of writing, rather than assessing the 
criticism independently, and we can follow his lead.   
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The claim should strike us as astonishing, if we have the imagination to envision a world in 
transition from an oral to a written tradition. The critical investigation of writing serves to 
remind us that even the longest-lived, most edifying practices once had a beginning, a 
creative embedding in our lives, and that reflective minds can always bring controversy to 
their inception. On the one hand, this point foregrounds the importance of what we say or 
fail to say about new practices—social media, alternative energy, biotechnology, and so on. 
On the other hand, the proliferation of certain practices (like writing) can seem almost 
inevitable in retrospect, and the original criticisms can seem overwrought. Plato’s dialogical 
form of writing provides a nice counterpoint to many of Thamus’s worries.  
However we discredit the worries about writing, two general points remain. First, 
our creations affect each other and the world. Second, our creations can affect the ways our 
experiences are framed—the sense we make of things. The first point indicates effects 
narrowly conceived at the level of objective fact. Call these consequences. The second point 
concerns a more obscure effect—a modification of the self. These modifications occur at the 
level of one's background understanding, in one's capacities to engage in the world actively 
and intelligently, and in the form of life one finds meaningful. To put an ethical spin on these 
effects, utilitarianism may emphasize the consequences of factory-farming as a net 
reduction of happiness, where happiness is reduced to a particular brain-state of organisms 
with nervous systems.132 The practice of torture, on the other hand, indicates a 
modification to the self for both the torturer and the victim. One who succumbs to torture, 
on one account, finds his autonomy perverted, while the torturer must treat another human 
                                               
132 Cf. Singer, P., Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1993) 
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being as inhuman.133 Even if we fully understand the consequences of practices like sex-
enhancement drugs or social networking, it is unclear that we understand their 
modifications to selfhood. This, I take it, is the important point to take away from the 
Phaedrus. One must examine creations not only for their consequences, but also for their 
effects on the soul.  
The effect of writing on remembering is only one instance of a more general circus of 
creation, and it demonstrates only one relation among others that may lead to dubious 
results. Creations have effects that may impoverish human life, and only a careful analysis 
helps ensure that we evaluate them adequately and pursue the most fruitful ones. No 
staunch commitment to progressive or conservative principles will help in evaluating 
creative change, because both conceal as much as they reveal. Thamus and Theuth are both 
limited in insight.    
 Such is the context in which I consider human creativity. Creativity is a personal and 
cultural wild-card.134 There is no guarantee that creativity will have positive consequences 
or enable positive modifications. Neither can we assume that creativity does not introduce 
genuine positive value. How then can we deal responsibly and intelligently with creative 
change? My answer to this question will be limited to opening moves: we must first 
                                               
133 Cf. Sussman, David, 2005, “What's Wrong with Torture?”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 33: 1–33. See also 
Luban, David, 2005, “Liberalism and the Unpleasant Question of Torture,” Virginia Law Review, 91 (6): 
1425–61. For the utilitarian understanding of torture, see Dershowitz, Alan M., 2003, Why Terrorism 
Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge, Melbourne: Scribe Publications. 
134 This is because creativity is anomalous. Creative activity (1) resolves contradictory elements of one’s 
practical involvement, (2) selects one element over another, or (3) introduces contradictory elements into 
one’s practical involvement. I present and defend this conception of creativity earlier in this dissertation. 
The anomaly of creative novelty stems from the inability to link novelties to conditions with necessity and 
sufficiency, while the continuity of creative novelty stems from the conditions that are available. The 
inability to predict the effects of creativity support a conservative principle of epistemic limitation; the 
requirement that we deal creatively with our experience supports a progressivist principle of 
improvement. Hence the difficulty.     
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understand the constitutive value of creativity more accurately and second understand that 
our evaluation of creations is often an evaluation of a form of life embodied by a creator. 
With this in mind, then, I must emphasize that am not offering a position skeptical of the 
possibilities of incredible and enriching value that accompany creativity and creators. My 
view is closer to a neutrality with respect to a constitutive value of creativity, and works to 
serve as a corrective to the idea that we can just assume the positive value of creativity 
without doing the greater work of intelligently cultivating this value.  
4.1 CREATIVE VALUE  
 In the genesis of a new art style, the artist makes sense of experience in a new way 
and embeds this understanding in an artwork. This new sense-making is irreducible to 
antecedent conditions: we (or the artist) may discover all kinds of necessary conditions for 
the artist's activity (earlier styles, technical abilities), but never sufficient conditions; or we 
may discover sufficient conditions for the artist's activity (social or environmental 
circumstances) but never complete necessary conditions. To lack necessary and sufficient 
conditions is to lack a determinative cause, whether physical or teleological—it reveals an 
anomaly. Only after the fact do we assimilate the creative activity into a means-end analysis 
or understand the meaningful continuity of an embedded novelty. We describe the technical 
requirements for reproducing the artist's achievement on average, and we interpret the 
work as achieving certain ends. Finally, we stipulate a scheme of classification: for example, 
this new type, “impressionism,” shall range over tokens satisfying a particular list of 
conditions. To insist on a determinative cause for a creative act anywhere in this chain is to 
undermine its status as creative and assimilate it to familiar orders of meaning. If I reduce 
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the activity of an artist to a scheme of physics, biology, sociology, history, teleology, or 
theology, then the activity is appropriated by a theory that could ideally predict the artistic 
production and determine its meaning. But creativity is necessarily anomalous, so these 
schemes succeed fully only by denying creativity.  
 Within this process, the criterion of positive value is often stipulated for creativity, 
although it is not recognized as a stipulation. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, the motivation to 
include value in the definition of creativity serves to dispense with the production of 
eccentric, trivial, or accidental new identities. For example, if Jim throws a baseball through 
a window, he plays a role in the production of a new configuration of glass shards. On this 
view, even if Jim performed his act with the intention of producing something new, many 
would resist calling the ensemble of shards an embedded novelty (in my terms), because 
the novel identity may lack value or even be destructive, the putative opposite of creation. 
Or, to take another case, if Jim dresses in a radical way, one may wish to just call him weird 
rather than creative. The creativity-theorist wants the criterion of positive value to 
undermine these cases. This stipulation seems most prevalent among psychology 
researches presumably with the justification that it clarifies the concept of creativity. My 
own view (Chapter 3) handles these cases easily—the only criterion Jim must meet is the 
achievement of a new way of making sense. Breaking glass and dying one’s hair typically do 
not meet this condition, but the acts become interesting precisely when they do.    
 In any case, a stipulation alone does not have the power to separate medically-
advanced torture from medically-advanced treatment, propaganda from advertising, 
degrading art from enhancing art, or nuclear weapons from nuclear power. To the extent 
that one member of each pair may involve creativity, so may the other. With a stipulation of 
200 
  
positive value, one simply expresses a preference for the creativity in some cases over 
others. And functioning as a preference, the stipulation makes quick work of cases of 
weirdness or eccentricity without ever understanding them. In a discussion of creativity, 
the punk artist could be unjustly dismissed. The question, then, is whether there are any 
actual reasons supporting the criterion of positive value. 
One might argue that being itself is (or possesses) an intrinsic positive value. To be is 
to be positively valuable. Thus, to bring something new into being is to bring something 
intrinsically valuable into being. The claim that creations instance positive intrinsic value is 
defensible only if there is something of intrinsic positive value about being. Carl Hausman 
puts it this way: 
[A new being] is valuable simply by virtue of its being, where the term 'being' is used to 
refer to any determination or discriminable and identifiable object of consciousness. 
Accordingly, the created object is valuable because it is a determination or coherent 
structure which exemplifies intelligibility that was not previously known. And this is to 
exemplify the inherent value of determinateness as such, the value of being an 
intelligible object without consideration of the respect in which the new object is 
intelligible.135 
  
I agree that creative novelties, despite their anomaly, exhibit a coherence and continuity 
that justifies the attribution of being to them. The question then is whether there is any 
intrinsic value to “determinateness as such.” One may object that there are surely negative 
determinations of being. I quote Hausman's response to this kind of objection in full: 
Someone might, of course, object that not all new things are valuable merely because 
they are beings. Surely some of the destructive Nazi “innovations” were not valuable 
because they came into being. But this objection, I think, springs from the view that a 
thing, whether new or old, may be evil (may be a disvalue) without regard to other 
things. The view I am suggesting assumes that evil is distinguishable from the being of 
an evil thing and is identifiable only with respect to a conflict between the thing in 
                                               
135 Hausman, 50 
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question and some other determinate object. Thus, I wish to insist that coming into 
being is in itself of value and that there is no disvalue without a conflict of beings.136 
  
But this view of evil, even if plausible, does not support the value of being as such, but 
rather leaves its value indeterminate. Put another way, it does not show that being 
is positively valuable, but only that it is evaluable. The same considerations that attend the 
attribution of evil (disvalue) to identities must attend the attribution of goodness (value) to 
them. E.g. ‘Beings need not be valuable without a concord of beings.’ If the advent of a gas 
chamber does not have a negative value without its incorporation into a genocide, this same 
line of thought applies too to the invention of vaccines.  
 What is more clearly the case is that, when a creator brings something into being, 
the practices in which he works and the values that motivate him tend to help him select 
what counts as an innovation and mediates what works he follows through with. A torturer 
works in a medium of torture, and creations that overcome the problems he faces fall, at 
least initially, right in line with the negative value of his practice. New ways of making sense 
can go either way, positively or negatively, in synthesizing new senses. 
 I do not mean to claim that independent, embedded novelties, which presuppose a 
new way of making sense, necessarily reflect the positive or negative values of the creative 
novelty (sense-making). Part of Hausman’s misconception is his preoccupation with 
independent objects. The creation of a new weapon for nefarious purposes does not restrict 
that weapon to only evil uses. This is part of the complexity of new things that often seems 
totally missing from dominant conceptions of creative value. Participants in black markets 
and criminal organizations often create systems that can be put to different uses, just as the 
                                               
136 Ibid, 51 
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NASA space program generated technology of use in many other places (e.g. building 
materials). The specific kinds of creations of artists, I argued in Chapter Three, are often 
anomalous, and can be evaluated in many ways. The value of a piece can vary wildly 
depending on whether one recognizes irony, for example. I do not resolve these evaluative 
difficulties, but, in studying creativity, we need to keep them in mind.   
 When creativity is understood to be the act that introduces a new way of making 
sense, an account of its constitutive value proceeds quite differently than on the object-
focused view. Creativity realizes new possibilities in a situation by modifying our 
experience. We see things differently after creativity than we did before. The effect is an 
extension of meaning and a new way of thinking or doing that one did not have before. 
Here, in sum, is the only constitutive value of creativity—the value of further sense-
making—and even this constitutive value can be either positive or negative or, on some 
standard, true or false.       
I frankly do not know whether to call this an extrinsic or intrinsic (positive or 
negative) value. This situation results again from the anomaly of creative novelty and the 
fact that it is non-intentional—i.e. we cannot direct ourselves to create specific things, 
because that presupposes that we have already created them, though we can support 
enabling conditions for creativity and be attentive to experience. The artist who works 
creatively finds herself working along lines previously unknown to her. The scientist breaks 
through a wall in conceptualizing a physical phenomenon. The inventor makes sense of the 
value of some conjoining of parts to solve a practical problem. The rush that can accompany 
these cases derives from that sudden opening of a way forward in thought or action, which 
may be instrumentally for something or intrinsically for itself, not because of something 
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about creativity, but because of the sense-making implicit in the specific act. But this rush 
can equally accompany the person who creates a new way to manipulate others, for he too 
finds a way forward that previously did not exist. From this basic opening of a way forward 
provided by a creative act for the creator and beyond, everything about creativity is open to 
critical evaluation.   
We see an additional peculiarity of creative value through a brief investigation of the 
formal properties of value and their concomitants in evaluation. The most basic formal 
property is that values are positive or negative. Both values and disvalues are species of the 
class of value, and it would be a simple but decisive error to think of all value as positive 
value. Of evaluation, the most basic structure is attraction and repulsion, exemplified in an 
act of estimation or a response to features of value. This structure may be expressed in the 
simple prereflective experiences of finding something beautiful, desiring one food over 
another, or taking a jump shot rather than going in for a layup when playing basketball. In 
these cases, evaluation, in the sense of a differential selection of elements of a situation, is 
embedded in most of our experience. Alternatively, we can reflect on our experience, 
abstract from it, and deliberate about it in ways that make evaluation seem more 
cognitively articulated in the form of judgments. In both cases, there is only an ideal 
conformity of evaluation to value. For example, it seems that one may be repulsed by a 
positive value, due to resentment, or one may positively value a disvalue.  
Are there further formal properties of value? Max Scheler, following Brentano, 
identifies the following: 
1. The existence of a positive value is itself a positive value; 
2. The existence of a negative value is itself a negative value; 
3. The non-existence of a positive value is itself a negative value; 
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4. The non-existence of a negative value is itself a positive value.137 
  
According to these claims, we can distinguish between possible and existent values. 
Assuming, then, that a particular artwork is valuable, a world in which the artwork exists is 
more valuable than a world in which the artwork does not exist; similarly, the destruction 
of such an artwork removes value from a world in which it exists. These considerations 
then apply, mutatis mutandis, to practical objects (tools) or scientific objects (theories).  
We verify these formal properties in our evaluations of things. For example, we 
evaluate the burning of the Library of Alexandria or the destruction of the Twin Towers as a 
loss; we evaluate the construction of a new university as a gain. But the experience that 
validates these properties is teleologically structured, in the sense that values are only 
recognized on a background of presence and absence of objects we can consciously intend. 
Our evaluations of non-existence are retrospective (in the case of the Library) or 
prospective (in the case of a university to be built), but only those possibilities continuous 
with our available ways of making sense can be objects of consciousness in these 
evaluations. Creation therefore presents a peculiar case for evaluation, because one may 
well fail to recognize any particular 'absence' in the world, which a creation fills. I need not 
recognize the need for a new art style until an artist has already created it; the possibilities 
for aesthetic value may seem completely realized to me, the spectator, until I recognize the 
creative addition. Even those who detect the inadequacy of sense in a situation—who 
encounter disorder that calls for creative response—do not have the specific creation 
available to evaluate. The most one can say is that “a resolution to this issue would be 
                                               
137 Scheler, Formalism, Pg. 82. Scheler ascribes these particular claims to Brentano, but has far more to say 
about formal properties of values in this section. 
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valuable.” But, again, while a creative act introduces a new existence or possibility for 
evaluation, the created status does not guarantee that the creation must be positively 
valuable.  
The anomaly of creativity—the fact that novelties, after all, do not exist until the 
creator brings them into being—makes it impossible to evaluate creations with foresight. 
The conditions for foresight simply are not met. That is, one cannot suppress the creation of 
a thing, but only certain possibilities one foresees on the basis of one’s sense-making once a 
creation exists. This evaluative feature of creativity has some of its most important 
implications for creators themselves who both advance the meaningful possibilities of a 
world and endure a world’s censure.  
4.2 THE CREATIVE SELF 
The investigation of the creative self proceeds in three stages of increasing 
complexity. First, I consider the personal relation of creators to their creations. Creative 
novelty is primarily a modification of oneself and one’s way of experiencing. It modifies 
one’s own skills, knowledge, and abilities, extending what can be meaningfully thought or 
done. Creators own their creations. Yet how one relates to a creation can vary considerably 
from aloof disinterest to embodiment in oneself. The second stage of my investigation 
develops the more significant attachment one may have to a creation with a more robust 
conception of the self.   
Third, I consider value-creation. Perhaps the most important distinction bearing on 
the evaluation of creation is a distinction within creative novelties. All creativity changes, 
for the creator, how she can make sense of things. All creativity realizes new possibilities, 
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which become possible objects of evaluation. But an allegiance to familiar values remains 
part of the continuity implicit in most creativity. One shares typical creations, in embedded 
novelties, with others, and draws on shared values when communicating or expressing 
creativity in a new work. Our values inform the pursuits that are most worth undertaking, 
and our familiar skills or received expressions may be unsuited to that undertaking. This is 
the motivating condition for ‘common’ creativity. For example, we might see the creativity 
of the writer evident in a new horror novel, in the way it opens up new possibilities for the 
genre. Despites its creativity, however, such work typically reproduces the basic 
commitments of existing ideals and values. In other cases, however, values themselves are 
created; the values by which we make sense of experience are modified. This is value-
creation. In creating a value, however, one creates a new way of making our activity 
significant. A new value shapes our world by figuring into our practices, skills, and goals. 
For example, a writer may produce a work aimed at opening up a new way of valuing and 
committing oneself. The most distinctive general feature of value-creation is that it 
challenges familiar evaluation on its own level; it resists complete assimilation to earlier 
values. Value-creation therefore disrupts continuity in a more significant way than other 
creativity, because it disrupts the continuity of significance itself. For some hints of this, 
consider the difference between an artist who demonstrates beauty in a new way in a work 
versus the artist who demonstrates ugliness in a work, but insists it is art. The latter work 
challenges an audience to evaluate art differently, not simply on the basis of beauty. Or 
consider the evaluative dismissal Einstein made of quantum mechanics with the quip, “God 
207 
  
does not play dice with the world.”138 Finally, Nietzsche’s work to highlight, reevaluate, and 
supplant the value of asceticism discloses both a past value-creation and an effort to create 
a new value.139 I will work to understand how value-creation is possible. 
4.2.1 A Creation of One's Own 
 We are familiar with cases in which some ideas seem to be our own and other ideas 
seem to belong to someone else. For example, one attributes a particular literary idea to its 
author, but claims ownership of one’s personal reflections about that idea; one allows 
Descartes his conception of God, but claims a particular interpretation for oneself. In these 
typical cases, both the ideas of others and one’s own ideas must occupy a place in a single 
mental life, or else one would be unaware of their distinct senses. I contend that we find the 
first, minimal relation of a creator to her creation in this sense of ownership. We find that 
ideas or acts belong to us in a way they do not belong to others, because they indicate the 
creative act required to generate them.  
 To develop this view, I draw on an account from Max Scheler, for whom the best 
explanation for these distinctions refers them to a more basic shared social experience—
what I would call a world. Scheler argues that one’s own ideas are contingent achievements 
of a developmental process separating one from one’s shared world. 
 The suggestion that the individual self may be derivative or achieved arises in the 
context of Scheler’s discussion of the problem of other minds. The view that makes the 
perception of other minds a philosophical problem begins with the commonsense claim 
                                               
138 Hermanns 58. The fuller quote: “Nature doesn’t know chance, it operates on mathematical principles. As I 
have said so many times, God doesn’t play dice with the world.” Of course Einstein expressed reasons to be 
dissatisfied with quantum mechanics, among them its probabilistic, nonlocal (action-at-a-distance), and 
linear features. But his reasons appear on the background of a basic commitment to an ordered universe.   
139 Most directly, the critical part of this project appears in On the Genealogy of Morals. 
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that we are each aware of our own mental states in a privileged way.140 This starting point 
requires one to find lurking in the contents of one’s mind—perhaps in comparison of one’s 
perception of other physical bodies to one’s own—some necessary relation to others in 
order justify the knowledge of their independent existence. Thus, on this view, one must 
somehow connect representations of an other “inside” one’s mind with an actual other 
“outside” the mind, which opens the possibility of a skeptical wedge between the 
representation and the concrete other. Call this the “traditional view.” 
 Scheler’s key claim is that the traditional view begins with the faulty assumption 
that one’s mental states are always one’s own in a sense adequate to establish a distinct, 
individual self. This is the assumption, for example, that everything showing up in 
subjective reflection is one’s own, and signifies one’s own mind. But why should we identify 
the perception of a mind with the perception of one’s own mind? According to Scheler, when 
one attends to the phenomenological evidence without the presupposition that a “real 
substratum” (e.g. the nervous system) provides a reference point for identifying all and only 
those things that are one’s own, then one encounters a field of mental life differentiating 
between mental contents in a quite different way.141 For example, among my “own” mental 
states—thoughts, feelings, volitions—I constantly attribute some to another person. I 
express a thought in conversation that I got from a friend; I sympathize with a loved one’s 
pain; I do the will of some authority figure. These are experienced differences in the 
ownership of a mental state, which deny me a full claim to them. Traditional accounts, and 
many contemporary accounts, will not adequately accommodate the distinctive experience 
                                               
140 Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, 238. Henceforth “NS”. I draw mostly from Part III, “Other Minds,” in this 
text. 
141 Ibid, 245 
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of ownership, because their conditions for being a self are too inclusive. For example, the 
Cartesian cogito, simple subjective experience, or physical bodies do not have the resources 
to distinguish one’s ideas from others’ ideas at this level of examination, because both kinds 
of ideas relate to a “substratum” (or logical pole) on equal footing. 
 To account for this basic sense of otherness within one’s own mental life, Scheler 
considers an “immediate flow of experiences, undifferentiated as between mine and thine,” 
and a “stream flooding” over the self.142 I label this “common experience” to maintain 
fidelity to Scheler's text, but the structure of this experience itself is easily amenable to the 
description of worldhood offered in Chapter 2. To describe common experience, Scheler 
begins with the basic experience in which a mental state is given with an undetermined 
reference to oneself or another. Ideas in the air (political ideas, fads) or the pervasive mood 
of a rock concert could serve as examples. Such mental states are clearly enough presented, 
even if one has doubts about who “owns” them. One simply falls in with ideas or moods 
presented in this undifferentiated state, and is governed by them. The mental lives of 
children and traditional cultures provide exemplary cases of common experience for 
Scheler. Children are bound by a “family feeling,” or a dominant set of ideas, feelings, or 
tendencies handed over from their close relatives or community long before the capacity 
for the kinds of distinctions necessary for individuality develop. Traditional cultures tend to 
prioritize different possible experiences through communal norms, such that those 
experiences that might lead to differences are never taken up or explicitly pursued.143 
Common experience provides the grounds for shared understanding and a pervasive 
                                               
142 Ibid, 246ff 
143 The community “overshadows the private life of the individual” (Ibid 248). 
210 
  
background from which one can slowly begin to collect and organize experiences into 
distinct categories of self and other. By the time one develops the symbolic capacities 
necessary for distinguishing an individual self, one’s mental life is already filled with the 
mental lives of others. 
At least in this book, however, Scheler seems to consider the process of developing 
one’s ideas to be a matter of self-discovery, rather than creativity. Scheler holds that a 
unique person, a concrete whole, underlies all of our acts. Call this an “essential 
personality”. For Scheler, persons are always individuated as concrete essences: “the person 
is the concrete and essential unity of being of acts of different essences….”144 Because it is 
concrete, the unitary personality instances an ordo amoris, an ordering of value-preferences 
or loves, though these preferences can be distorted in concrete action through value-
inversion (ressentiment), self-deception, or, perhaps, by the influence of some external 
power. The question then is how one attributes some contents to oneself, and some to 
others. What is the criterion? Scheler describes the fact of this attribution, without 
explaining what makes something our own: 
“[undifferentiated common experience] represents the common starting-point for the 
elaboration of an ever nicer distribution of the material of experience so given between 
ourselves and other people; an ever more precise appropriation of ‘our own’ and 
repudiation of what belongs to ‘others’.145  
  
The reconstruction I propose for Scheler's position consists of an entity galvanized by the 
tension between one’s essential personality and one’s received values and ideas in common 
experience. It should be possible for one to bear a veridical relation to one’s essential 
                                               
144 Scheler, Formalism, Pg. 383. As a concrete essence, for Scheler, a person is also not merely a “network of 
acts”: “Abstract act-essences concretize into concrete act-essences only by belong to the essence of this or 
that individual person.”  
145 Scheler, NS, 246 
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personality, to be true of it.146 The unitary person thus provides an implicit criterion for 
judging the acts, ideas, and values presented in mental life for their authentic connection 
with a more basic, essential personality. With the right sensitivity to the “call” of this 
essential personality one may gradually articulate one’s authentic personhood. This 
achieved self is an uncovered or discovered self. It provides the meaning of being true to 
one’s own nature. 
Perhaps the closest Scheler comes to ratifying this position is in his Formalism, 
where he describes the “coming of age” of a child: 
The basic phenomenon of coming of age consists in the ability to experience insight into 
the difference between one’s own and someone else’s acts, willing, feeling, thinking, an 
insight which is already given in the immediate experiencing of any experience itself 
(the insight into the difference is not based on the content of the experience).147  
  
The parenthetical makes all the difference, because Scheler has still not explained the 
actual attribution of particular mental contents. How this concrete, particular idea becomes 
my own, how I may be jealous of another’s use of it, and how I may make a genuine claim to 
it still seems obscure. 
 Nonetheless, there is a strong reason to accept this account of one’s own thoughts if 
Scheler has accurately described common experience. He wishes to express a conception of 
the human person for whom authentic self-knowledge is always possible, and access to the 
mental lives of others is essential. On his account, common experience seems both 
extraordinarily deep and yet never deep enough to deny the possibility of personal self-
discovery. We can rely on common experience to guarantee that when one achieves self-
                                               
146 “Both self and body acquire their ultimate individual character from their evident connection with the 
unitary person” (Ibid 243). 
147 Scheler, Formalism, 478 
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awareness, one’s mental life comes replete with ideas and experiences of unrecognized 
origin, but shared intelligibility.148 And we can rely on one’s essential personality to 
guarantee that one always has a buoy above the surface conditioning the possibility of self-
discovery.149 The argument, then, is that once we acknowledge undifferentiated common 
experience, and once we characterize this stream as a deep background capable of (nearly) 
overshadowing one’s personhood entirely, then we must assert an essential personality to 
make sense of the basic fact of one’s own ideas. Or, to formulate this point differently: given 
common experience, if there are to be individual ideas, then there must be some essential 
personality making the individuating process possible. In brief, by positing a ground of 
shared meaning as strong and uniform as common experience, we must posit an equally 
strong ontological condition for the possibility of individual selfhood. For fidelity to Scheler, 
I should note that, on his view, this essential personality is not a transcendental ego 
operating behind acts, but rather embodied in acts of the person, where it discloses its 
essential order.  
 Yet common experience must be even “stronger” for Scheler in a different way, in a 
way that never permits genuine creativity. It is not just that common experience can 
dominate one’s mental life, but also that, it seems, all experience must in principle be 
common.150 Scheler’s brief commentary on art can bring this point into focus. As Scheler 
conceives it: 
                                               
148 One is “filled with ideas and experiences of whose real origin [one] is completely unaware” (Scheler, NS, 
247). 
149 Note Scheler’s qualified language: in family feeling, the child’s own life is only “almost completely hidden 
from him”; the private life of an individual in the primitive tribe is only “virtually” overshadowed (Ibid 
247ff, my italics). 
150 Scheler makes an exception here only for pure bodily sensations, which are genuinely private. 
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That is indeed the mission of true art: … to press forward into the whole external 
world and the soul, to see and communicate those objective realities within it which 
rule and convention have hitherto concealed.151  
  
Poets are adventurers into human experience. They “soar above the prevailing network of 
ideas in which our experience is confined, as it were, by ordinary language; they enable the 
rest of us to see, for the first time, in our own experience, something which may answer to 
[their] richer forms of expression….”152 While it is true for Scheler that artists make a 
contribution to possible self-awareness, they do not actually create new experience or new 
possibilities, even if they disclose possibilities that would not have otherwise been 
recognized without their activity.153 They discover new forms of expression that chart the 
order of being. Experience is always already common experience, even if it can be further 
explored by artists. And, according to Scheler, how could it be otherwise? Reproduction of 
ordinary experience would be superfluous, and pure subjective fancy would be “transitory 
and … necessarily a matter of complete indifference to other people.”154 Art, for Scheler, 
only makes sense on the background of a remarkably comprehensive common experience. 
Individuals never differentiate themselves from common experience in this sense, but only 
discover their concrete essences within it.155 
 In this context, it seems that Scheler offers a version of the view that being itself is 
well-ordered. Objective values all fit together seamlessly, and there is no conflict but what 
                                               
151 Ibid, 253 
152 Ibid, 253-254 
153 See Chapter Two on hyperconventional change and disclosure for more of my view here.  
154 Ibid, 253 
155 This thesis must be handled carefully, for it does not deny individuality in a different sense. With his notion 
of the “intimate person” (Scheler, Formalism, 561ff.), for example, Scheler argues that each person, 
enmeshed in (or sculpted from) an objective totality of values, is nonetheless singular. An essence is not 
necessarily universal, when it is concrete. 
214 
  
we introduce through our ignorance or ineptitude. But this is not quite right. In another 
work, for example, Scheler not only acknowledges, but vigorously describes the 
phenomenon of tragedy and finds it to be an essential aspect of existence—objective value-
conflict, independent of our idiosyncratic takes on a situation.156 The argument under 
consideration here succeeds, I submit, only if common experience is accurately described. 
Does his description answer to the phenomena? I do not think it does, particularly when 
one attends more closely to the conflicts, some perhaps tragic, that appear in common 
experience. 
 Scheler’s vision of an “immediate flow of experiences” streaming through a channel 
of “sociologically conditioned patterns” of mental life suggests that common experience 
provides a continuous source of meaning in terms of which a person lives, and from which 
one might never need to distinguish oneself but for the call of an essential personality.157 
But this premise is false. The basic reason is that disorder is embedded in common 
experience itself. I give two examples of this disorder, discord and displacement. 
The basic structure of discord is a tension or incommensurability posed by the 
specific contents constituting common experience—these are tensions built into features of 
the shared values, thoughts, and styles of life presented in shared experience, which only 
present themselves in specific contexts. Discord arises when common experience presents 
an issue or poses a challenge to us and reveals its inability to settle the matter for us. We 
saw a minor example of this in Chapter 3 with coin-calling. But more broadly, the conditions 
for discord may be met contingently in any dimension of experience. Discord forces us to 
                                               
156 Scheler, On the Tragic 
157 Scheler, NS, 246ff. 
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make choices—to prioritize—or generate an alternative to the typical responses available 
to us. In such acts we cease to be a mere embodiment of the contours of common experience 
and instead come to engender a positive contrast with it.  
For adults, discord appears in many practical or moral choices. One may be faced 
with a choice between two academic positions, each presenting a significantly different 
arrangement of values: a high-pressure position in a prestigious department amenable to 
one's career or a teaching position amenable to one's family life. One may have to choose, as 
in Sartre's famous case, between a commitment to a family member (one's mother) or to a 
political cause. Most distressing are the choices that leave one marred, like Sophie’s choice 
between one of her two children in a Nazi prison camp. Discord introduces us to a common 
world we did not make, but which calls on us nonetheless to act.  
Discord appears in life even for young children. It opposes the complete 
“overshadowing” of the mental life of a child in the ethos of a family. For instance, a child 
faces the diffuse influences of her parents: parents may assent to entirely opposed 
activities, have differing temperaments and moods, express themselves in different gestures 
or patterns of language, and embody different styles or attitudes toward life. Much of the 
complex turbulence of a concrete romantic relationship is impressed upon the child, and 
not just the celebrated connections it provides between people. Some of these differences 
can be combined or reconciled, but others are confrontational or contradictory. They 
present alternative ways of being a person. Even life with a single parent can be 
complicated by shifts in mood, temperament, and expectations. Moreover, the child usually 
collects other experiences outside the family, which disrupt regular “family feeling.” It is of 
course possible that a dominant member of a family will override many of the sources of 
216 
  
discord as they arise—an oppressive husband and father may leave little room for 
alternatives. But it is doubtful that such interventions can always succeed. A child, like an 
adult, may also be carried by inertia or indecision past the relevant contextual conditions in 
which a discord arises, and thus may not have to face it at all. But at least sometimes the 
child, like the adult, must act in order to resolve the discord and is therefore forced to 
creatively make choices or create alternatives. Finally, note that discord is not necessarily 
distressing (one may be presented with very different, but equally positive or exhilarating 
values to pursue). Instead, discord refers to the forced moment in one’s experience where 
one must individuate oneself with respect to alternatives presented in common experience.  
Displacement refers to an isolation in common experience in which one must offer 
up a personal act in order to re-engage with one’s world. It is form of detachment forcing 
one to respond to 'gaps' in the structure of common experience—instances when the 
common stream carves out an island, as it were, and no longer carries one along by a 
continuous shared experience. This is not necessarily an intellectual detachment, because 
one’s experience may be principally characterized by impulses or emotions. In 
displacement, one’s impulses are disconnected from a situation such that one must 
articulate or develop them in a new way. 
Displacement, like discord, is often unavoidable. Even in a crowded room, in the 
bustle before a holiday dinner, a child may find herself displaced: the adults move around 
her in indifferent orbits—they are busy, wrapped up in putting the turkey on the table, 
filling glasses, and chattering; the child drifts between the adults, but is not present to 
them. Here the practices informing common experience have suddenly left a gap, a pocket 
into which the child falls with no immediate expectations, no requirements, and no desires 
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but those she can muster on his own. Now she must speak or act in order to fill the practical 
space left to her, to reconnect with her environment. Of course, she cannot produce her 
act ex nihilo, but must draw on available resources. Nonetheless, raising one activity to 
prominence—to go explore outside, to raid the dessert early—forms a new connection of 
one’s own to experience in a way only made possible from the space opened up in 
displacement. In displacement, one's own desires and ideas have a chance to “materialize” 
and move one to action in a new way; the source of one's acts moves from the 
undifferentiated dictation of the common stream to something more immediately one's 
own. Displacement forces this new distinction between being drawn along by practical 
engagements and moving oneself along. This distinction may not be very sharp, and it may 
not last long, but it indicates a starting point for a person attached to specific contents by 
means of creative acts. 
If these patterns accurately describe part of our engagement with common 
experience, then the development of one’s own ideas—one’s sense-making—is often not a 
matter of discovery, but of creation. Discord and displacement describe concrete anomaly 
or even disorder in common experience. In these patterns, the resources provided by 
common experience prove inadequate for containing the life of a person; one must 
contribute something new to it in order to act. As practical, intellectual, and ethical beings, 
we carry with us the skills and values with which we inhabit a shared world, but this shared 
world also inhabits us with its meaning and resistance. We realize disorder in our world 
and respond to it creatively; but then we realize disorder in ourselves. There is slippage 
between the disorder of worlds and ourselves that places us out of common order, with our 
own ideas.  
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Art often expresses this disorder too. For example, Sophocles' Antigone reveals the 
discord between two currents in common experience, brought to relief only in a contingent, 
tragic circumstance. Hopper's “Night Hawks” and Dostoevsky's Notes from 
Underground both seem to showcase possible displacements, where common experience 
fails to secure the ongoing engagement of its members. Artists often bring us into contact, 
not with new orders of being, but with being out of order.  They enable the conditions 
under which we may experience discord and displacement, and thus inspire us to respond 
with our own creative acts.  
Creation poses a special problem for Scheler. Recall that common experience was 
introduced as an element in a solution to the problem of other minds. Common experience 
accounts for our cognition of ideas owned by others and essentially related to them. But for 
Scheler to explain the cognition in others of our own new ideas, he must hold that common 
experience is, in some sense, a repository of all possible (cognizable, shareable) 
experience—that the materials of experience are never created, but only “wrested … from 
the fearful inarticulacy of our inner life.”158 But this is just what Scheler’s conception of the 
link between personhood and our own ideas leaves unclear: how is this idea the one I 
stumble upon and how are specific ideas discovered in my personality? The reason is that 
creativity operates on the senses available in the situation. Thus creation involves some 
continuity with common experience, but is nonetheless irreducible to it. Even if there is a 
more basic personality with which our ideas may be continuous, then, this personality does 
not provide the criterion for one’s own specific ideas—it does not have the “content” to 
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serve in this way. The only essential criterion is that I thought this or I did this in a way 
irreducible to common experience.  
I will not argue further whether or not there is an essential personality, and will 
investigate without this assumption. Even if persons have essences, I do not see that their 
possession guarantees the continuity required to undermine the necessity for creative acts, 
overrides the specificity of anomalous concrete experience, or even undermines the 
possibility or necessity of changing oneself. If one has a basic ordering of values, one might 
still need to be creative. Many of the ideas one claims for oneself are what one comes up 
with, achieves, or creates, rather than what one discovers to be true of oneself. 
4.2.2 Identifying with One’s Creation 
Nonetheless, one may not identify oneself with one’s own creations in any more 
than an expedient or short-lived way. I had this idea, I did this, and I created this may not 
express additional phenomena that indicate a genuine contribution to selfhood, among 
them responsibility for one’s creation, commitment, protection or nurturing of the creation, 
or pride, for example. One may make sense of things in a new way, but need not value or 
embody this sense-making further. In Chapter 2, I developed the concept of internal and 
external goods to argue that only some of our engagement in a world constitutes 
meaningful identity. Now I extend this view with some sharper analytical tools and a richer 
descriptive vocabulary.  
Phenomena like commitment and responsibility tend to accompany an internal 
relation to one’s creations. Internal goods are one specification of an internal relation. By an 
internal relation, I mean a relation that modifies the constitution of one or more of its 
relata. Once established, the existence of the relata entails the existence of the relation. A 
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traditional example of an internal relation is marriage, which bears an internal relation 
between spouses. Meaning-holism in semantic theory provides another example: a term 
acquires its meaning only on the basis of a complex of structural relations to other terms in 
a language which determine the appropriate use of the term. Virtues, too, are properly 
characterized as internally related to selves. Having a virtue is partially constitutive of being 
virtuous. One cannot have a virtue without being (in part) the virtue. And by newly 
achieving or possessing a virtue, one becomes meaningfully different. I define external 
relations negatively: an external relation is a relation in which the constitution of relata are 
not altered by their relation. For example, being to-the-left-of is an external relation. 
External relations are not trivial; it is important to see that externally related entities can 
affect each other, as when one billiard ball strikes another. But in such relations, the mere 
fact of the relation between entities does not affect their identities. So, for example, private 
property ownership may typically be an external relation made possible by a particular 
political and economic arrangement, but it can also be partially constitutive of one's 
identity through an internal relation. One can see this latter point in cases in which the 
identity of a businessperson is internally related to his business. To seize his business 
would be to bring a kind of personal harm to this person. Such examples show that the 
concept of an internal relation can be applied in a rigorous logical sense only with great 
care in characterizing relata. The concept of an internal relation, in this context, captures an 
important, meaningful connection we bear to aspects of ourselves, others, and our world. If 
you burn down my home, I will experience a loss incommensurate with the loss of an 
externally related physical object, though most of what constitutes significance for me will 
of course survive the burning. Alternatively, if, over time, I lose my attachment to my home, 
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this entails either that I have changed or that my home has changed. Internal relations do 
not always survive such changes.  
Creativity, I claim, contributes to selfhood when it enhances or develops internal 
relations. My questions are (1) what accounts for internal relations and (2) how do 
creations support them?   
There are many analytically separable and nuanced concepts of the I, among them 
consciousness, the subject, the ego, the rational agent, the logical pole of experience, the 
essential personality, the self, the embodied self, or the soul, to take a few. By person I mean 
the totality of ways of making sense one has at one’s disposal. Recall that senses put us into 
contact with the world, with its affordances and possibilities. They include both cognitively 
articulated thoughts, but also embodied skills and values.159 The self, by contrast, specifies a 
subset of one’s personhood—an integrated system of senses that mutually support and 
confirm each other. The basic phenomenon of selfhood involves coherence, meaning, and 
facility in one’s world. The distinction between personhood and selfhood entails that one 
may enact a self to varying degrees, because one’s sense-making must itself afford 
integration and one must realize this integration in one’s life. Let’s pursue this further.  
The model of the self I endorse claims that robust selfhood results from the 
coherence of three constitutive factors: values, talents, and self-image.160 Values order the 
objects and activities of one’s experience by their importance. Typically values act 
prereflectively on our experience, conditioning what appears to be worth doing. We can 
also reflect on our values, though doing so is difficult and may lack fidelity to our 
                                               
159 See Chapter Three. 
160 Schroeder (2013). Schroeder’s account draws heavily on the account of freedom offered by Bergmann 
(1991). 
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experience. Talents refer to one’s physical, intellectual, or artistic capabilities, skills, 
knowledge, and sensitivities for actively engaging in one’s world. Self-image refers to one’s 
self-assessment or self-understanding. When each of these factors is aligned and acted 
upon, one is “self-enacted”—living with a robust and fulfilled self. For example, a 
businessperson who values her products, her customers, and her contribution to her 
community; who successfully runs her business; and who conceives of herself as a 
businesswoman will be self-enacted in at least this portion of her life. By contrast, a lawyer 
may value her work and successfully represent her clients, and yet feel that she should have 
pursued some other calling, art or medicine for instance, more fitting to her self-image; a 
parent may value the raising of children, see herself principally as a caregiver, and yet 
constantly find herself unable to inspire and educate her children in the way she would like; 
a painter may see herself as an artist, produce exquisite designs, and yet be unable to 
appreciate the value of her art as anything but transient or superficial additions to culture. 
In each of these cases, one gets the sense that life is not going as well as it could, and that it 
could be otherwise. On this view, being a self is not a given; selfhood is won or lost through 
a process of development and integration. 
I amplify the constitutive factor theory in three ways to serve present purposes. 
First, I emphasize opportunity or an occasion for action as a necessary condition. One does 
not achieve self-enactment in a vacuum, apart from a world that affords one’s sense-making 
and in which one acts.161 Many self-enactments are very refined, situated in the specific 
                                               
161 One might argue that there are extreme cases of self-enactment that depend on no (relevant) conditions of 
the world. I take Viktor Frankl’s account of affirming life in a Nazi prison camp to be a possible 
counterexample (Frankl 1992), or perhaps, in principle, the Stoic sage. If these are indeed plausible 
counterexamples to my claim, then I would need to be more precise: an occasion for action is necessary 
just in case one’s self-enactment refers to conditions of the world, which it normally does.     
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details of a practice. The self-enacted professional athlete may have a difficult time with 
retirement, for example, if his new life affords none of the opportunity for engagement and 
achievement he found in his earlier work. Second, I reiterate that one’s senses of value, skill, 
and knowledge may far exceed what one integrates in self-enactment. We see this extension 
at work, for example, when one can basically understand another’s perspective and values 
without adopting them for oneself—when they are not one’s own. One can recognize the 
importance of specific problems—say, water distribution in underdeveloped countries or 
the need for a unified physical theory—without thereby working on those problems. They 
are not experienced to be one’s own problems to solve. Third, of the three constitutive 
factors, I prioritize the importance of one’s values. We find, for example, that even the inept 
parent or the unfulfilled businessperson can nonetheless affirm their lives, even while they 
lack full engagement. Self-image can change with great rapidity given the right insights, and 
many aspects of talent can typically be changed or achieved, but one commits to one’s 
values much more robustly, even when one falls short of self-enactment.   
The enacted self and its constitutive elements condition the existence of internal 
relations. Self-enactment attaches one to specific elements of one’s world, elements one 
depends on for continued robust selfhood. This is why burning down my home could affect 
me and my possibilities, to the extent that I have invested a life into it. What one “owns” on 
the basis of selfhood extends into the world, into one’s projects, activities, and valued 
objects. Moreover, the constitution of one’s enacted self—one’s integration of values, 
talents, and self-image—expresses its own set of internal relations. On the basis of their 
relation, they bear an enhanced expressive power, so to speak. That is, if one values reason, 
has a talent for reasoning, and sees oneself to be one who reasons, then reason becomes 
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potent in a way it cannot otherwise be—similarly for the constitutive factors of a pro 
basketball player or an artist. Removing a factor leaves each remaining factor truncated. 
From the expressive power of a self-enactment, finally, we typically see the enhanced 
phenomena of ownership—responsibility, commitment, and protection.  
But note that one’s self-enactment need not be created or call for creativity. One may 
be self-enacted in a conventional identity in the “common stream,” where one “owns” ideas, 
not through creation, but by adoption.162 Creativity performs a complex, contingent, but 
important function facilitating changes in oneself and one’s world where self-enactment is 
threatened or calls on one for its achievement.  
In one case, for example, we see Kekule  struggling to make sense of benzene. The 
character of this struggle is more than just intellectual curiosity—he is committed and to 
some extent risks himself on this problem. He masters the relevant concepts and theory, 
invests himself in the project, and, until creating the required synthesis of concepts, is 
uneasy with his theoretical sense-making. As a theoretical achievement, this creation bears 
no stamp of subjective idiosyncrasy—it is not “his” for that reason. Neither is it simply one 
more idea he has had, whether creative or not. This new idea develops out of the complex 
self-enactment he achieves in his work and reinforces it. And this is fortunate, because 
one’s self-enactment may not last long on an insoluble problem, particularly in a world that 
resists one’s values. Most cases of meaningful creativity are of this kind, preserving or 
pursuing self-enactment by creating knowledge, skills, or sensitivities that realize new 
possibilities for oneself and one’s world. Here we typically see inventors, entrepreneurs, 
and scientists. We also see artists seeking to connect experience in new ways. Artists, as 
                                               
162 Or perhaps, as with Scheler, one enacts aspects of an essential personality.  
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mentioned earlier, can present a special case when their work expresses the disorders of 
our world. But like prophets of old, this task of pointing out disorder is their calling, or it is 
as close as they get to it.  
Based on the view I have presented, I can point out a few evaluative complexities. 
First, it is possible to create without responsibility or commitment, to create against one’s 
highest values—the values that figure in self-enactment—and even to undermine one’s 
self-enactment through creativity. One who values reason and who realizes the problem of 
evil can be left adrift; similarly, creative insights do not always wait until one is ready for 
them. Novelists, for example, can be surprised and disgusted by the violence or degradation 
they can make sense of, in part by embodying their characters and in part by creating them. 
It takes an additional commitment to honesty and the writing process to see the project 
through to completion.  
Second, despite evaluative puzzles like resentment and self-deception, I see no 
principled reason to deny self-enactment and creativity to morally dubious or evil people. 
Cons, cheats, and liars can express creativity in their work. Exploitation and torture are arts 
calling for constant creative extension. The leaders of cults or white supremacy groups can 
express a robust integration of directed hate, facility, and self-image. Creativity, in these 
contexts, advances hateful work. Though this work often consists of magisterial acts of 
value-blindness, illogic, and disdain for others, it nonetheless creatively contorts values and 
insecurities toward new possibilities—think of Mein Kampf. Creativity is not fettered by 
positive value, but only the affordances of the objects of experience—which are apparently 
quite extensive.  
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Third, I have been describing what might be called the moral psychology of creators 
without drawing the distinction between creative novelties proper—new ways of making 
sense—and embedded novelties in the world. This conflation is typical, (1) because many 
creative acts occur in a medium, occurrent with their embedding. The writer, for example, 
often creates only as she writes. Often because of the first reason, (2) internal relations 
extend not only to new sense-making, but also to embedded novelties—specific 
expressions of ideas, novels, paintings, theories, and so on. The social value of creativity 
occurs only in these embedded novelties, and we tend to respect (and often legally protect) 
this attachment. Among the many complexities that result from these relations, I emphasize 
the case in which the creator identifies with her creation. I return to Plato’s account of 
writing to describe some of the difficulty:       
At the Egyptian city of Naucratis, there was a famous old god, whose name was Theuth; 
[…] he was the inventor of many arts, such as arithmetic and calculation and geometry 
and astronomy and draughts and dice, but his great discovery was the use of letters. 
Now in those days the god Thamus was the king of the whole country of Egypt […]. To 
[Thamus] came Theuth and showed his inventions, desiring that the other Egyptians 
might be allowed to have the benefit of them; he enumerated them, and Thamus 
enquired about their several uses, and praised some of them and censured others, as he 
approved or disapproved of them. […] But when they came to letters, This, said Theuth, 
will make the Egyptians wiser and give them better memories; it is a specific both for 
the memory and for the wit. Thamus replied: O most ingenious Theuth, the parent or 
inventor of an art is not always the best judge of the utility or inutility of his own 
inventions to the users of them. And in this instance, you who are the father of letters, 
from a paternal love of your own children have been led to attribute to them a quality 
which they cannot have […].163 
 
Theuth here expresses the attachment of an internal relation to his work. We can, I think, 
imagine the pride that comes with presenting one’s own greatest achievement. Of course 
                                               
163 Plato, Phaedrus, 274b ff., Jowett trans. 
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Plato makes the first point about this special attachment. It can obscure one’s evaluation of 
the creation. I do not think one can insist on this point, however, because (1) in many cases 
of creativity an audience does not (or has not yet) grasped what is creative or newly 
valuable about a creation. Or (2) the difference in evaluation may entail a genuine value 
conflict. Nonetheless, the protectiveness one has for one’s creation links it directly to self-
enactment in a way that resists honest criticism. Along with a creator’s pride in a creation, 
we also see the disappointment or resentment that can accompany its censure, or 
dismissal. This is because, where creators identify with their creations, they take the 
attacks on their work to be attacks against themselves.  
 Typically the values in question in creativity are superficial, not because they are 
fake or unimportant, but because they are themselves continuous with deeper shared 
values. Kekule  could rely on the scientific values that informed his work when 
communicating his results to others. In addition to the requirement that a creative novelty 
be understood, Theuth and Thamus could presumably discuss the merit of writing so long 
as they agree on some standards of evaluation and, more generally, they both embody a 
commitment to evaluating its costs and benefits for others. Aside from its constitutive 
value, most creativity adds new instrumental, artistic, or intellectual value that we assess 
more broadly through familiar evaluative standards. The background condition is that the 
creator and his audience shares common purpose or set of values that the creation claims 
to enhance or achieve.    
 There is, however, the possibility of value-creation of a more significant kind. From 
the analyses of personhood and selfhood, we can infer the limitations of evaluation. In an 
individual case, the values integrated in one’s self-enactment provide one’s most 
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meaningful evaluative perspective. This perspective extends, in degrees of understanding, 
to those additional values with which one is familiar, though one may not identify with 
them. But despite this extension and its evaluative possibilities—the shifts and changes 
made possible through new identifications or different priorities—the limit of one’s 
evaluation is necessarily the limit of one’s familiarity in a world. Value-creators work at this 
limit. They offer values, seemingly impossibly, that are discontinuous with antecedent 
values, which make a new claim on us to evaluate differently. Such creation calls for some 
special consideration.  
4.2.3 Value-Creation 
What makes sense of value-creation? To answer this question, I supplement my 
account of creativity with a Nietzschean account of the creator, primarily as it is offered in 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra.164 The picture of a creator I take up from Nietzsche is neither a 
born genius nor the result of an accidental process, but is rather the result of a 
developmental process in which one masters, but cannot reconcile, many of the values 
transmitted in one’s world. The value-creator faces evaluative disorder and responds with 
an alternative. Despite the simple consistency value-creation possesses with the account of 
creativity I have offered throughout this dissertation, there are nonetheless some 
distinctive puzzles. My point of entry for studying the nature of the creator will be 
Nietzsche’s “On the Way of the Creator,” where he discusses the challenges facing the 
development of a creator.  
Many of Nietzsche’s points about value-creation are highly stylized to achieve a 
particular effect on a reader. He offers few (recognizably) concrete examples, because, as I 
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interpret him, he is himself engaged in an effort to create a new value. At least within 
written or literary works, a value-creator usually cannot take typical argumentative 
strategies for granted because the values that coordinate the sense one makes of premises 
are themselves under question. Offering familiar examples of something often just 
reinforces familiar interpretations of those things. There are limits to what examples can 
do. Nonetheless, I will try to offer some examples to orient us to some of the key points 
about value-creation.  
Value-creation in literature typically embeds argumentation within descriptions that 
disclose anomaly within evaluation. I offer utopian novels like Edward Bellamy’s Looking 
Backward or Ernest Callenbach’s Ecotopia, or Daniel Quinn’s fictional dialogue, Ishmael, to 
be examples of this effort. In such works, an author methodically situates arguments, and 
the value-perspectives behind them, within the lives of those who hold those values, in 
order to generate dissonance. The author must produce the conditions for a reader to grasp 
the contingency of specific values—to deny their status as fixed constraints on sense-
making. To do this, for example, Nietzsche and Quinn perform genealogical analyses in an 
effort to undermine orthodox values; Bellamy and Callenbach produce descriptions of lives 
that do not depend on specific values. Or, in the case of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche 
requires a reader to think interpretively in ways that disrupt habitual patterns of thought 
and association, and conjoins habitually disconnected ideas. To put a complex point 
schematically: to realize and communicate their values successfully, value-creators must 
somehow invert what we take for granted in other kinds of creation. In ‘common’ creation, 
one takes values for granted and overcomes problems in our practices; in value-creation, 
one first shows how the practices we take for granted disclose problems with our values. 
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Hence both kinds of creativity depend on some meaningful continuity with the past. Yet 
value-creation attempts something altogether more difficult, because it challenges the 
values that help constitute selfhood and criticizes the life’s work of those most devoted to 
those values. The normal response to this attack is entrenchment, conservation, and 
counterattack—often without understanding.  
Among efforts to create value, Nietzsche’s work is distinctive because he seems to 
advance the value of value-creation as such, in addition to some specific values. I am not 
convinced that Nietzsche entirely succeeds in this goal, but he does offer striking insights 
into the difficulties of value-creation.                       
In “On the Way of the Creator,” Nietzsche’s Zarathustra describes two powerful 
pressures working against the creator: the challenge presented by one’s world through 
social norms and a personal deficiency undermining creative work. What are these 
pressures and how might the creator overcome them? 
The social pressures against creativity function in two ways, as a relation of the 
creator to those around him who challenge or ridicule him and his activity, and as a matter 
of social conscience, in which the ideals and judgments of the masses penetrate the 
creator’s own ideas and motivational sources. The problem is being either against or among 
“the herd.” Nietzsche provides numerous strategies for dealing with the former problem, 
including choosing one’s friends prudently, altering one’s environment, focusing one’s 
efforts on only those who are most open to creative achievement, and neglecting those who 
are beyond help, who can only function as an obstacle to creation. Should each of these fail, 
however, the creator must attempt to separate himself from the many influences of the 
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herd, even if that means accepting, enduring, and even pursuing complete physical solitude 
and isolation. 
This same principle of purging and escape applies to the social conscience as well, 
but now the means of escape is much more difficult to discover. The social conscience can 
go with the creator even into isolation. Thus Nietzsche attempts to show in his general 
ethical project how to overcome the “yolk” of herd conscience in its various guises. This 
project includes intellectual, ethical, and aesthetic critiques; the presentation of new goals, 
ideals, and ethical prerogatives; and a revision of our approaches to culture, art, science, 
and philosophy, of which his focus on creation is a substantive part. Above all, however, the 
essentially problematic element of social conscience is its moralism. Nietzsche argues that, 
by the nature of value-creation alone, any new value will be automatically rendered “evil” 
by society. This is because the moral attitude is self-contained, conservative, and constantly 
defensive; it survives by recognizing and suppressing alternative forms of life and criticisms 
of its tenets. Nietzsche’s strategies suggest the possibility of breaking the grip of social 
conscience through the mastery of a highly critical, “free spirit” perspective. Normally, a 
value functions prereflectively to condition what we find important. When we live in terms 
of a value, we see no distinction between the value and its motivational power. Even when 
we recognize the values that guide us, they normally do not appear as the proper objects of 
assessment. In short, we do not draw a distinction between a value and the value's 
contribution to action. Nietzsche's free spirit discloses this conflation and enables a critical 
assessment of value. The free spirit transforms values from sources of motivation into 
resources, which can then serve in a revaluation of values. 
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However, to free oneself from the grip of social conscience is not yet to become a 
creator. “You call yourself free? Your dominating thought I want to hear, and not that you 
escaped from a yoke.”165 The second pressure—personal resistance—works against the 
creator once he achieves a free spirit. For Zarathustra, freedom from the illicit influence of 
social norms and practices is not enough—freedom must be freedom for something. But in 
discharging the motivational force of values, becoming “free” from the yolk of one's 
received values, we introduce a new problem of motivating further action. This is the 
problem of resistance.  
Resources can be as scarce or plentiful as you like, but creation requires taking up 
these resources in a particular motivated way, a way that imbues them with orders of 
significance in which one sees some resources as more worthy of development and pursuit 
than others. The problem is this: the free spirit has wiped away the motivational elements 
that guide a person. The values figuring among one's resources can no longer guarantee 
motivation to action, because the creator has escaped from them in order to better inspect 
and evaluate them. The creator is free, but free for nothing. Nietzsche writes, 'One day you 
[creator] will no longer see your high, and your low will be all too near; your sublimity itself 
will frighten you like a ghost. One day you will cry: “Everything is false!”'166 Beyond the 
social conscience is the emptiness left once that conscience is purged. “But the worst enemy 
whom you can encounter will always be yourself; you ambush yourself in caves and 
woods.”167 The creator must find a new way of relating to and taking up his resources and 
motivating his activity, one which overcomes two threats: the threat of motivational 
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stagnation (sublimity), with its concomitant developmental stagnation; and the threat of 
self-undermining, self-destructive, or degenerate activity (ambush). Nietzsche sketches an 
answer to this problem:  
     Lonely one, you go the way of the lover: you love yourself and that is why you despise 
as only lovers despise.  
     The lover wants to create because he despises! What does he know of love who did 
not have to despise precisely what he loved! 
     With your love go into your isolation and with your creativity, my brother; and only 
later will justice limp after you. 
     With my tears go into your isolation, my brother. I love him who wants to create over 
and beyond himself and thus perishes.168 
 
Given the emphasis on despising oneself, one possible interpretation is that the void 
opened up by becoming free for creating is itself a motivating force. Here despising 
becomes an act of focusing on the fact of one's emptiness and one's underdeveloped values. 
This has two elements: the concept of a lack and the act of disgust or despising one’s 
condition. One sees the limitations of one’s own resources, including social and cultural 
conditions, and reacts with disgust. One is drawn to fill in this lack by creatively working 
with one's resources in new ways, by experimenting with new configurations of values, by 
acquiring new skills and working with them until something stable and coherent—a new 
creation—ultimately emerges.  
But I find this view problematic. First, an awareness of a lack does not necessarily 
result in the impulse to fill it. By analogy, a lack of knowledge does not call one to pursue it 
unless one first determines the importance of filling the lack: there are many mathematical 
truths one neither knows, nor cares to know. A lack of motivational value could just leave 
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one listless and apathetic. Therefore, something more is needed than the generic sense of a 
pure lack. Second, were one to respond with disgust to a perceived lack, there is nothing to 
constrain this motivation to creative development. A disgust with current cultural 
conditions could push one to despair, apathy, or spontaneous destruction, rather than the 
creation of new value. Disgust is not itself sufficient for creation even when it is available as 
a motivational source. The phenomenon of disgust is much more one of revulsion, 
avoidance, and abandon, than of active engagement, and is suspicious on those grounds as 
motivation for creativity. It is clear that Nietzsche, perhaps rightly, emphasizes disgust with 
many of one’s cultural and social norms, but disgust does not figure necessarily into the 
transformations and development of the creator once these norms are aborted.  
My solution to this problem is more Heideggarian in spirit. In the achievement of a 
free spirit stage of development, one discloses oneself to be a possible value-creator. This is 
a structural feature of transforming “lived” values into resources, that they become 
malleable and changeable. One understands that, whatever the evaluative conditions that 
dominate within familiar practices, they could to some extent be otherwise. There exists 
the possibility of alternative, change, and new difference. This realization of oneself to be a 
possible value-creator is similar to “expecting the unexpected,” in that it does not yet 
possess a specific content. The objects of one’s experience, values, afford modification for 
the free spirit in a way they otherwise do not. Nonetheless, the price paid by the free spirit 
is the greater part of his self-enactment—no values are any longer one’s own. And this is 
the lack experienced by a value-creator, but now not just a lack or a loss, but also an ideal to 
work toward again. Thus the free spirit takes up the possibility of creating new value and 
with it a new self.    
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To understand my claim here, consider why we typically do not understand 
ourselves to be value-creators. First, in Scheler’s common stream, what passes for common 
sense conceals creativity—our lives and practices are typically distributed among and 
shared with others, providing the basis for shared intelligibility. Only one who creates in 
response to the deficiencies of this common world gets an initial sense that creativity is 
possible and may even be necessary. Second, because values take priority in the structure of 
the person, and because they act invisibly on average in coordinating experience, it often 
takes a great deal of experience to become familiar with the meaningful limits of our values 
and the ways they can contingently conflict. Only a complex person is likely to get an initial 
sense of differences among values and their possible deficiencies. Third, both to deal with 
one’s world effectively and to make the deficiencies of values matter, one must typically 
embody them in self-enactment. Otherwise, the conditions are not met for caring about 
achieving an integration of values. Fourth, even when one finds one’s self-enactment 
threatened in an attempt to integrate different value-perspectives, one typically does not 
make the dramatic purging of the free spirit. A different option is to simply make a creative 
choice, reinforcing one value over another without introducing a new alternative value. 
Only becoming a free spirit discloses the possibility of creating an alternative self-
enactment based on a new value.  
One might wonder whether this account of the creator agrees with Nietzsche. My 
account seems to agree with much of Nietzsche’s aspirational conception of the self. With 
some interpretive work, for example, the Three Metamorphoses—the camel, the lion, and 
the child—suggest the steps one must take to disclose oneself to be a value-creator.169 We 
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see Nietzsche’s rejection of common experience in his early admonition: "Be your self! All 
you are now doing, thinking, desiring, is not you yourself."170 However, Nietzsche’s 
emphasis on types in his later work may also indicate a different concern for the kinds of 
cultural contributions that types provide in addition to value creators. And even in 
Zarathustra, Nietzsche seems to suggest that individual value creators may not be the end 
of development.171 Though I have not suggested anything that contradicts these additional 
directions of investigation, I have also not offered an understanding of creativity that 
extends to them. Though it can be difficult to pin down Nietzsche’s official view, we can see 
many of the resources required for understanding the value-creator.  
*** 
 To generalize this account of the value-creator and verify it in concrete cases, I think 
we have to recognize that my interpretation of Nietzsche records (1) an idealized process 
that admits of variation, (2) an emphasis on distinctively moral values, and (3) an account 
of original value, and not just creative value. A more general account of value-creation does 
not need to invoke the concept of evil, except with respect to moral values. The value-
creator often faces the inertia of dogmatism and its reactionary tendencies, even in science, 
art, or industry, where creators may just be called tasteless or stupid, in so many words, to 
dismiss their work. In a different kind of case, the recent advent of alternative forms of 
unregulated currency seems to articulate a value at odds with the traditional form of the 
state. A currency like Bitcoin may not simply be the solution to a problem on typical 
evaluative systems, but rather the condition for the existence of a new way of evaluating 
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what economic exchange should be. It is not for that reason morally evil, even if it is 
considered bad in some ways and wrong in others. The closest many of us come to 
individual value-creation can be seen in two cases. The first involves periods of localized 
value-crisis, relieved by a “rebirth” into a new form of life. Occasionally, no deep knowledge 
of an existing model guides this rebirth. For example, one may begin to question the value 
of marriage without much familiarity with the history of its criticism; one may realize and 
pursue a new value to make sense of intimate relationships—to evaluate them—only to 
later discover a large community devoted to the value one proposes. This is an example of 
creation without origination. Second, the act of following alongside a value-creator itself 
calls for co-creation. So, for example, to follow Quinn’s Ishmael is to trace an intellectual 
development that gradually unhinges a Western value of perpetual progress and 
domination of nature, seeking to supplant this value with something quite different. But an 
engaged reader does not simply read words, but rather traces the arc of meaningful 
development established by the text, often leaping ahead to prefigure key moves, and 
grappling with the deflation of values to which one has long been committed. Reading such 
a book leaves one’s evaluative perspective changed, provided one grasps the meaning of the 
text and there is a coherent meaning to grasp.     
 The key points to take away are these. First, value-creation is possible, and there is 
some sense we can make of it. Second, value-creators often do face extreme adversity, both 
in simply being understood and in being tolerated, let alone embraced. Third, the resistance 
of a world to a new value is also the resistance to a new form of life—a new way of being a 
self. But, fourth, because creativity is constrained by only what existence affords, and not to 
238 
  
some standard of truth or goodness, I again see no strong reason to assume new values are 
necessarily positive contributions.  
4.3 CONCLUSION 
To put the issue starkly: one the one hand, a value-creator often risks everything by 
interacting with an uncompromising, conservative world that denies her way of life. A 
‘common’ creator often creates something with unknown and unpredictable effects, 
whether material or personal. Either creator may well create something of negative value. 
On the other hand, we in the world who do not adopt that value or create new ways of 
evaluating have no better way of assessing creations than through the critical and 
evaluative perspectives we already have. And we have no better way of enriching our lives 
and building a better world when faced with its disorder than by creating anew. This 
situation often represents a stalemate between creators and their world.  
 Within the complexity of a meaningful world, there is no single adequate answer to 
the questions: “how should creators deal with their world” and “how should we deal with 
creators and their creations.” There is no single evaluation of the value of creation, because 
its value depends in each case on what is created. We do have the general credo to 
maximize positive value, but this credo is completely unhelpful when the task is to evaluate 
positive value in untested creation, partially discontinuous with antecedent orders of 
meaning. A world involves ideals and values that figure into one’s creativity; and one can 
create something that extends shared possibilities and values. A personally fulfilling 
creation may fail to be socially new or valuable, or it may be morally condemned. We can 
also see the possibilities of a highly creative person who nonetheless falls short of value-
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creation and a value-creator who nonetheless fails to provide any cultural contribution. The 
former pursues the perfection and full realization of a received value through high 
creativity. Such a person may perform an invaluable service to the value-creator who 
creates a new value without articulating or developing it thoroughly. But this is an 
altogether safer path for a creator, and a path that often maintains a world’s values as they 
are.  
More than anyone else, the value creator experiences the phenomenon of being out 
of order, being apart from the most basic, meaningful possibilities available to others, 
recognizing their deficiencies, and recognizing the necessity of a creative act. But the value 
creator does not impress creations into a world, like seals into wax. The world does not 
extend meaningfully in all directions uniformly, evenly, waiting for one to discover its 
features. It is concrete and specific, yet incomplete. Its strands of meaning protrude in 
disconnected agencies, the riffling hair of Medusa in which we are entangled. The relations 
we form, the bridges we cross, the values we create, depend not on the discovery of 
preexisting possibilities—with the creative act we cross nothing but nothing—but rather 
on the availability of a destination, a place to land on shifting grounds of meaning. The 
being of these relations, we hold only in the selves we enact and our commitment to them. 
Creativity forms the relations a world could not form for itself. But because it could not 
form them, it cannot easily evaluate them. This, I hope, is a first step toward understanding 
the real value of creativity, and an indication of the work to be done.     
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMATION AND REMAINING WORK 
 
 
 I began this dissertation with the view that we do not understand creativity well 
enough to cultivate its value or mitigate its disvalue. I have worked to present an account of 
human creativity that illuminates a single phenomenon at work in many domains. Through 
creative acts one brings new ways of making sense into the world, with its new meaningful 
possibilities. Creativity enacts the becoming of new being. I have argued for this much in 
common for creativity in all domains. From this view, I isolate the three main results. 
 First, creative novelty is discontinuous with antecedent orders that would seek to 
make sense of it. Nonetheless creative novelties must be partially continuous with 
antecedent conditions in order to achieve meaning and value. These two aspects of creative 
novelty provide the basis for my claim that creativity puts one “out of order,” which I hope 
to have demonstrated in multiple contexts. This disorder provides the sense, inextricable 
from creativity, that relates creativity to a prior nothingness. 
 Second, creative novelty is a modification of one’s own sense-making. This result is 
the key to grasping the generality of creativity in multiple domains. Scientific practice and 
everyday problem-solving often require creative work no less than artistic practice.  
 Third, creativity does not imply a positive value. I argued against conceptions that 
either stipulate the positive value of creativity and its results or argue for the intrinsic value 
of new being. As a consequence, the evaluation of creativity stands to be much more 
complex, for both creators and the recipients of their creations, than one might think. 
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 These results fall short of offering specific prescriptions for cultivating creative 
value. But they lay the groundwork for what can only be more specific and exacting work by 
urging the integrity of the phenomenon that features in further investigation. I briefly 
suggest three areas, both to indicate further work to be done and work I do not take myself 
to have adequately addressed. 
Domain and Relation Specific Investigation: Though creativity possesses a 
generality in all domains, a full account of creativity would nonetheless examine the 
varieties of novelty in different domains. I have indicated some distinctions—for example, 
between creativity in artistic, scientific, or entrepreneurial practice—but without any effort 
to exhaust the main points one might make in each domain. Moreover, the relation between 
creativity and such varied phenomena as imagination, dreams, or freedom is left largely 
unexamined here. 
Ethics: The investigation of creativity within philosophical ethics shows a great deal 
of promise for theoretical and practical considerations. For example, an investigation of 
creativity suggests a new way of interpreting existentialist ethical positions and moral 
dilemmas. And creativity shows promise for everyday efforts to form more valuable ethical 
solutions to problems and assist in self-development. The emphasis on practices could be 
extended in an analysis that gives some practices greater priority for assessing creative 
value and enabling creators. Finally, the issue of conflict between value creators and their 
worlds requires further examination.    
Metaphysics: While I have hinted at constraints on a metaphysics of creativity, 
several puzzles still demand fuller philosophical treatment. Put in Whitehead’s terms, for 
example, a metaphysics that includes meaningful creativity must include both the becoming 
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of continuity and the continuity of becoming. A second metaphysical set of questions would 
investigate a more general conception of creativity than we find in the specifically human 
case, if there is one to be had.    
*** 
 These areas of investigation push a philosopher in multiple directions. But the 
importance of creativity in its many manifestations warrants this attention.  
 
 
 
  
243 
  
REFERENCES 
 
 
Bergmann, Frithjof, On Being Free (South Bend: U of Notre Dame Press, 1991) 
 
Bergson, Henri, The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Andison, Mabelle 
(New York: Dover, 2007) 
 
Berliner, Paul, Thinking in Jazz: The Infinite Art of Improvisation (Chicago: U Chicago Press, 
1994) 
 
Boden, Margaret, The Creative Mind: Myths and Mechanisms (New York: Routledge, 2004) 
 
Boden, Margaret. Creativity and unpredictability. Stanford Humanities Review, Volume 4 
Issue 2, July 1995, Pages 123-139 
 
Chabris, Christopher F & Daniel J Simons, “Gorillas in Our Midst: Sustained Inattentional 
Blindness for Dynamic Events,” Perception, 1999, Vol. 28, pg. 1059-1074 
 
Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly, Creativity: Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and Invention 
(New York: HarperCollins, 1996) 
 
D’Agostino, Fred, “Chomsky on Creativity,” Synthese, 58 (1984), 85-117 
 
Dreyfus, Hubert, Fernando Flores, and Charles Spinosa. Disclosing New Worlds: 
Entrepreneurship, Democratic Action, and the Cultivation of Solidarity (Cambridge: MIT, 
1997) 
 
Drucker, Peter F. Innovation and Entrepreneurship (New York: HarperCollins, 1985) 
 
Finke, R., Ward, T. B. & Smith, S. M., Creative Cognition: Theory, Research, and Applications 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992) 
 
Frankl, Viktor, Man’s Search for Meaning, trans. Ilse Lasch (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992) 
 
Freud, Sigmund, “Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming,” in The Freud Reader, ed. Peter Gay 
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1995) 
 
Gendlin, Eugene, Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning (New York: Free Press, 1962) 
244 
  
 
Hausman, Carl R., A Discourse on Novelty and Creation (Albany: SUNY Press, 1984) 
 
Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time (Sein und Zeit), trans. Macquarrie, John (New York: 
HarperCollins, 2008) 
 
Heidegger, Martin, Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Hofstadter, Albert (New York: 
HarperCollins, 2001) 
 
Hermanns, Williams, Einstein and the Poet: In Search of the Cosmic Man (Brookline Village: 
Branden Books, 1983)  
 
Joas, Hans, The Creativity of Action (Chicago: U Chicago Press, 1996) 
 
Johnson, Mark, The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding (Chicago: U 
Chicago Press, 2007) 
 
Kant, Immanuel, Critique of the Power of Judgment (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of 
Immanuel Kant), ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2000)  
 
Kaufman, Scott B and Elliot Samuel Paul, eds., The Philosophy of Creativity (Oxford: Oxford 
UP, forthcoming) 
 
Koestler, Arthur, The Act of Creation (London: Hutchinson, 1964) 
 
Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live by (Chicago: U Chicago Press, 2003) 
 
Lavoie, Don, “The Discovery and Interpretation of Profit Opportunities: Culture and the 
Kirznerian Entrepreneur” in The Culture of Entrepreneurship, ed. Brigitte Berger (San 
Francisco: ICS Press, 1991) 
 
Levinas, Immanuel, Existence and Existents (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2001)  
 
MacIntyre, Alasdaire, After Virtue (South Bend: U of Notre Dame Press, 2007, Third Edition) 
 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (New York: 
Routledge, 2006) 
 
245 
  
Milgram, R. James, “Pattern Recognition Problems in K – 12,” Undated, published online: 
http://math.stanford.edu/~milgram/pattern-problems.pdf 
 
Minsky, Marvin, “Why People Think Computers Can’t,” AI Magazine, vol. 3 no. 4 (Fall 1982) 
 
Mumford, M. D., “Where have we been, where are we going? Taking stock in creativity 
research,” Creativity Research Journal, 2003, 15, 107–120 
 
Nietzsche, Friedrich, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Norman, Judith, ed. Rolf-Peter Horstmann 
and Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002) 
 
Nietzsche, Friedrich, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Diethe, Carol (New York: Cambridge 
UP, 2007) 
 
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, ed. Adrian Del Caro & Robert Pippen, trans. Adrian Del 
Caro (Cambridge : Cambridge, 2006). 
 
Nietzsche, Friedrich, Untimely Meditations, trans. Hollingdale, R.J. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 1997) 
 
Plato, Phaedrus, trans. B. Jowett  
 
Rothenberg, Albert and Carl Hausman, eds., The Creativity Question (Durham: Duke UP, 
1976) 
 
Russell, Bertrand, Our Knowledge of the External World (Chicago: Open Court, 1914) 
 
Scheler, Max, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values (Evanston: Northwestern 
U Press, 1973) 
 
Scheler, Max, Man’s Place in Nature, trans. Hans Meyerhoff (New York: Noonday, 1968) 
 
Scheler, Max, “On the Tragic,” trans. Bernard Stambler, in Tragedy: Vision and Form, ed. R.W. 
Corrigan (New York: HarperCollins, 1980)  
 
Scheler, Max. The Nature of Sympathy. Intro. Graham McAleer. (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 2008).  
 
Schroeder, William, “Constitutive Factor Theory” from Superseding Freedom (Personal 
manuscript; last revision 2013) 
246 
  
 
Schumpeter, Joseph. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: HarperCollins, 2008) 
 
Shane, Scott, A General Theory of Entrepreneurship: The Individual-opportunity Nexus 
(Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2003) 
 
Singer, Irving, Modes of Creativity: Philosophical Perspectives (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010), 
Kindle Edition 
 
Sternberg, Robert, ed., The Nature of Creativity: Contemporary Psychological Perspectives 
(New York: Cambridge UP, 2011) 
 
Weinberg, Robert, Creativity: Genius and Other Myths (New York: W.H. Freeman and 
Company, 1986) 
 
Weston, Anthony, Creative Problem-Solving in Ethics (New York: Oxford UP, 2007) 
 
Whitehead, A.N. Process and Reality (New York: The Free Press, 1978) 
 
Zahavi, Dan, Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
